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In this work, I attempt to contribute to the future of African and intercultural 
philosophy. This is undertaken by a comparative appraisal of the late lamented 
Kenyan philosopher Henry Odera Oruka’s (1944–1995) philosophic sagacity, and 
intercultural philosophy as conceived by Dutch intercultural philosopher Wim van 
Binsbergen. Oruka (1990a) identifies four main trends in contemporary African 
philosophy: ethnophilosophy, professional philosophy, nationalist–ideological 
philosophy, and philosophic sagacity or sage philosophy. He later added hermeneutic 
and artistic/literary trends (Oruka 1991). I review the debate on the existence, nature, 
and identity of African philosophy and posit the relevance of intercultural philosophy 
to contemporary African philosophy. I examine the major issues around 
ethnophilosophy with a reading of Tempels and Kagame and the main criticisms, 
especially those of Oruka, in a bid to posit his rationale for endorsing philosophic 
sagacity. I focus on Oruka’s philosophic sagacity and the methodology used in 
investigating it. I attempt to answer two main questions: what is sage philosophy and 
how does one distinguish it from the other forms of philosophy that are available in 
Africa? African sage philosophy or philosophic sagacity commonly refers to the body 
of thought produced by persons considered wise by their communities. Oruka 
categorizes these wise persons into two groups: folk sages and philosophic sages. Folk 
sages are well versed in the popular wisdom, culture, and beliefs of their people. They 
are essentially conformists with the communal set-up. They are folk sages because 
they do not transcend the celebrated folk wisdom of their people. They remain at the 
first order of sage philosophy: popular wisdom. Philosophic sages are those that seek 
rational foundation and critically evaluate commonly held cultural beliefs. They are 
able to transcend the communal beliefs of their societies by taking a critical and 
rational distance. When interviewed by a professional philosopher, they are able to 
provide balanced answers on various themes, such as the nature of the Supreme 
Being, the nature of death, the nature of time, the concept of the person, the meaning 
of freedom and equality, the nature of education, and so on. This triggers Oruka to 
compare them to Western philosophers in spite of the fact that some of them are 
unable to read or write. He dismisses ethnophilosophy as a collective mode of 
philosophizing and endorses the individual sage as the valid mode of philosophizing. 
This, according to Oruka, is standard African traditional wisdom, which obtains in the 
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African context. I also employ post-modernist (post-structuralist) and other criticisms 
of Oruka’s philosophic sagacity and show how post-modernist ideas (deconstruction 
of single identity, Western hegemony, and bounded culture) are used as a bridge to 
my proposal of intercultural philosophy. I identify globalization as one of the most 
important socio-political and cultural developments in our contemporary world that 
needs philosophical scrutiny. I examine Oruka’s philosophic sagacity and the 
orientations of several African philosophers to see if they can stand the test of time. 
This permits me to invite African/intercultural philosophers to think beyond local to 
global sagacity. I attempt to go beyond their positions by exploding their contentious 
conception of culture and examining whether intercultural communication is possible 
or not. This is achieved through a discussion of intercultural philosophers such as 
Ram Adhar Mall and Wim van Binsbergen. Finally, I identify the main challenges for 
the contemporary African/intercultural philosopher. The challenges are enormous, but 
we need to create an intercultural framework in a bid to go beyond borders. I propose 
an intercultural hermeneutic, one that is couched in counter-hegemonic discourses and 
that will allow us to cross borders, as the globalization process requires us to do. 
 
RESUME 
Ce travail est un essai de contribution à la consolidation de l’avenir de la philosophie 
africaine et interculturelle. Cela se fait par une évaluation comparative de la sagacité 
philosophique de Henry Odera Oruka, philosophe kenyan de regrettée mémoire 
(1945-1995) et la philosophie interculturelle, telle que conçue par le philosophe 
interculturel néerlandais, Wim van Binsbergen. Oruka (1990a) identifie quatre 
principaux courants de la philosophie africaine contemporaine. Ces tendances 
comprennent entre autres, l’ethnophilosophie, la philosophie professionnelle, la 
philosophie nationaliste et idéologique, la sagacité philosophique ou philosophie du 
sage. A celles-ci il, greffe plus tard l’herméneutique et les tendances 
littéraires/artistiques (Oruka 1991). Je fais l’état des lieux des débats sur l'existence, la 
nature et l'essence de la philosophie africaine et je pose le principe de la pertinence de 
la philosophie interculturelle dans le champ de la philosophie africaine 
contemporaine. J’examine les grandes questions autour de l'ethnophilosophie avec 
une lecture de Tempels, de Kagame et des principales exégèses, singulièrement celles 
501712-L-bw-Mosima
xv 
de Oruka, dans le but de justifier la raison d’être de la sagacité philosophique. Je me 
concentre sur la sagacité philosophique de Oruka et la méthodologie utilisée dans 
l'enquête. Je tente de répondre à deux questions essentielles: Qu’est-ce que la 
philosophie du sage et comment peut-on la distinguer des autres formes de 
philosophies qu’on rencontre dans le champ de la pensée africaine ? La philosophie 
du sage africain ou sagacité philosophique désigne communément le corps de pensée 
produite par des personnes considérées comme sage par leurs communautés. Oruka 
catégorise ces sages en deux groupes: les sages folkloriques et des sages 
philosophiques. Les sages folkloriques désignent ceux qui sont en parfaite osmose 
avec la sagesse populaire, la culture et les croyances de leur peuple. Ils sont 
essentiellement conformistes envers la configuration commune. Ce sont des gens 
folkloriquement sages parce qu'ils ne transcendent pas la sagesse populaire magnifiée 
par leur peuple. Ils restent au seuil de la philosophie du sage, qui est la sagesse 
populaire. Les sages philosophiques quant à eux renvoient à ceux qui cherchent le 
fondement logique à toute pensée et passent aux cribles de la raison les croyances 
culturelles communément admises comme axiomes. Ils sont capables de transcender 
les croyances communes de leurs sociétés en prenant une distance critique et 
rationnelle. Lorsqu'ils sont interrogés par un philosophe professionnel, ils sont 
capables de fournir des réponses mesurées sur divers thèmes, tels que la nature de 
l'Être suprême, la nature de la mort, la nature du temps, le concept de personne, le 
sens de la liberté, de l'égalité, la nature de l'éducation, etc. Cela pousse Oruka à les 
comparer aux philosophes occidentaux en dépit du fait que certains d’entre eux soient 
incapables de lire ou d'écrire. Il rejette ethnophilosophie en tant que mode collectif de 
philosopher et approuve le sage individu comme le mode valide de philosopher. Ce 
qui, selon Oruka, est la sagesse traditionnelle africaine standard, obtenue en contexte 
africain. Je convoque aussi des postmodernistes (poststructuralistes) et d'autres 
critiques de la sagacité philosophique d’Oruka pour révéler comment les idées 
postmoderniste (déconstruction de l’identité unique, l’hégémonie occidentale et la 
culture délimitée) servent de ponts d’analyse à la philosophie interculturelle que je 
propose. J’identifie la mondialisation comme l'un des développements sociopolitiques 
et culturels les plus importants dans notre monde contemporain qui a besoin d'un 
examen philosophique minutieux. Je tente de voir si la sagacité philosophique 
d’Oruka et les orientations de plusieurs philosophes africains peuvent résister à 
l'épreuve du temps. Cela me permet d'inviter les philosophes interculturels africains à 
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éviter tout nombrilisme culturel et à envisager par conséquent une sagacité 
philosophique à l’échelle planétaire. Je tente d'aller au-delà de leurs positions par 
l'exploration de leur conception controversée de la culture, et pour voir si la 
communication interculturelle est possible. Cela est rendu possible avec la 
confrontation des philosophes interculturels comme Ram Adhar Mall et Wim van 
Binsbergen. Enfin, j’identifier les principaux défis que doit relever le philosophe 
interculturel / contemporain africain. Ces défis sont titanesques, mais il nous faut 
créer un cadre interculturel afin d'aller au-delà des frontières. Dans cette optique, je 
suggère une herméneutique interculturelle, formulée dans le contre-discours 
hégémonique mais qui nous permet de traverser les frontières comme nous le fait 






INTRODUCTION: AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY 
 
1.1. Introduction 
This dissertation entails a comparative philosophical appraisal of the concept of philosophic 
sagacity, as advanced by the late, and much lamented, Kenyan philosopher Henry Odera 
Oruka (1944–1995). I will attempt to critically evaluate his contributions to the development 
of contemporary African philosophy. This comparative appraisal will be from an intercultural 
philosophical perspective as conceived by the Dutch Africanist1 philosopher and 
anthropologist, Wim van Binsbergen.  
The birth of the mode of discourse known as African philosophy is quite an 
interesting one.2 A version of this species of discourse has its origins in a specific form of 
counter-discourse which Ghanaian philosopher Kwasi Wiredu termed ‘conceptual 
decolonization’ and his fellow countryman Anthony Kwame Appiah refers to as ‘ideological 
decolonization’. Western philosophy is a product of a civilization and a disciplinary quest 
that is almost three thousand years old. African philosophy, on the other hand, has no such 
history, unless the arguments and conclusions of Afrocentrism are accepted in totality. 
                                                 
1 Initially, the term ‘Africanist’ was used primarily to refer to a branch of linguistics. Nowadays, it is used 
internationally to denote the academic study of (Sub-Saharan) Africa in general, as pursued by Africans as well 
as people from other continents. I am using the term here in this disciplinary sense. However, in the recent 
democratic South African context—deservedly dominated by the African National Congress (ANC), which 
brought the country to democratic majority rule—the term often refers specifically to opposition parties with a 
mainly Black constituency and a political agenda centred on the African continent, such as the Pan Africanist 
Congress (PAC). 
2 Osha (2006). In an attempt to trace the 20th-century origins of academic philosophy in Anglophone Africa, 
Barry Hallen (2009), for example, asserts that academic philosophy in Anglophone Africa arose in a 
‘conservative’, yet ‘turbulent’ intellectual climate. It was conservative because philosophical paradigms in the 
English-language academia derived mainly from the analytic tradition, which provided a comparatively more 
narrow conception of philosophy than its European Continental counterparts. It was turbulent because there 
were competing claims about what should constitute the sources of African philosophy as advocated by 
Africanists and African intellectuals from a diverse variety of disciplinary and vocational backgrounds—such as 
social anthropology, missionary and religious scholarship, and academic philosophy (Hallen 2009: 23). 
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Let me elaborate. The claim that examples of philosophical texts existed in Ancient 
Egypt is sometimes identified with the school of thought that has come to be known as 
Afrocentrism.3 For American Africanist philosopher Barry Hallen (2009:8), Afrocentrism 
itself is sometimes unfairly and one-dimensionally typed as an attempt to inflate the 
international importance and influence of Ancient Egyptian culture totally out of proportion 
to the ‘scientific’ evidence for it. But from a historical and cultural point of view, the re-
affirmation of Ancient Egypt as an integral part of the African continent constitutes a 
rejection by African scholars of those who have regarded the Saharan and Nubian deserts as a 
kind of ‘iron curtain’ between the ‘black’ African cultural orientations to their south and the 
‘non-black’ (but somehow also ‘non-white’) peoples to their north. Congolese Egyptologist 
and philosopher Theophile Obenga, for example, contests such an ‘iron curtain’. At worst, 
the qualitatively different characteristics of the civilizations thereafter attributed to these two 
groups are said to have interchanged racism from the modern to the Ancient World. At best, 
they are said to disregard the history of the commercial and cultural exchanges that always 
took place between North, West, East, Central, and South Africa.  
Afrocentrism is probably best known in Western scholarship for its arguments that 
both the form and content of Ancient Greek and subsequently European/Western philosophy 
and science were derived directly from Egyptian civilization. This view urged scholars 
studying Greek and Roman civilization to posit that the character of Greek thought and 
civilization was, fundamentally, different and distinctive from that of their Egyptian 
counterparts. Hence, no such fundamental linkage or crossover can be established. The 
Greeks are allegedly distinguished by their ‘abstract’ and ‘reasoned’ thought, while Egyptian 
thought is characterized as ‘regimented’ and ‘practical’.4 British-born Sinologist and 
                                                 
3 Molefi Kete Asante (1990) coined the term ‘Afrocentrism’ to refer to a cultural ideology and worldview 
dedicated to the history and influence of Black people. Afrocentrism intends to expose the global Eurocentric 
racist attitudes towards African people and their place in global cultural history. For the sake of clarity, it is 
important to distinguish between two essential variants of Afrocentrism: the one that cherishes images of an 
original (or prospective) African home as a source of inspiration and self-esteem; and the other variant, which 
claims that Africa possesses these qualities for the specific reason that all civilization originates in Africa. 
Throughout this work, I personally subscribe to the former variant because it offers a great promise to our quest 
for interculturality. The latter variant, on the other hand, can be contested from historical evidence and 
intercontinental cultural interactions (van Binsbergen (2011a)). For more on the debate on Afrocentrism see, for 
example, Diop (1974); Bernal (1987, 1991, 2006); Asante (1990); Lefkowitz (1996); Lefkowitz & Rogers 
(1996); and van Binsbergen (1997a, 1997b, 1997c, 2003, 2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012b, 2012c). 
4 Lefkowitz (1996); Lefkowitz & Rogers (1996). 
501712-L-bw-Mosima
3 
intellectual historian Martin Bernal (1937–2013), who published Black Athena: The 
Afroasiatic Roots of Classic Civilization, made the demolition of this view his life’s work.5 
He tried to present sufficient empirical evidence to establish the importance of ancient 
intellectual interactions between Greek, Semitic Mediterranean, and African peoples on an 
acceptably scientific basis. Bernal’s main argument is that the roots of Western civilization 
are to be sought not in Ancient Greece but outside Europe, in Ancient Egypt and 
Mesopotamia (and perhaps ultimately in Sub-Saharan Africa). Bernal (1991, 2006) discusses, 
largely based on linguistic arguments, the cultural relations between Ancient Egypt and the 
Aegean region (today, Greece and western Turkey) in the Middle and Late Bronze Age (c. 
2000–1200 BCE). 
Even though the initiator of the Black Athena thesis has come under criticism,6 van 
Binsbergen (2011a, 2011b, 2011c, 2012b), without turning a blind eye to Bernal’s 
shortcomings, largely defends him against implicitly hegemonic criticism, conducting a 
constructive re-assessment of Black Athena. He applies Bernal’s inspiration to the global 
comparative and historical study of selected, relatively minor items of formalized culture 
(mankala board games and geomantic divination), and here he finds confirmation of the 
Bernalian/Afrocentrist schema. In his quest for intercultural counter-hegemony, van 
Binsbergen broadens the scope for intercontinental comparison with ancillary sciences such 
as population genetics, long-range linguistics, archaeology, and comparative mythology. 
Moreover, his intercultural philosophical focus drove him increasingly not so much to 
conceptual theorizing, but to empirical historical exploration in wider and wider stretches of 
space and time.7 This method enables him to empirically underpin the premise of the 
fundamental unity of humankind and to endorse the undeniable empirical reality of massive 
cultural continuities through space and time, on a transcontinental scale, and profoundly 
involving Africa. This leads him to argue:  
 
We cannot treat any proposed South–North cultural influence of sub-Saharan Africa 
upon the Mediterranean (via Ancient Egypt), and thus upon Eurasia at large, as an 
independent and all-explaining factor; instead, the commonalities between Greece and 
Egypt are to be explained, largely, from a common West Asian/Mediterranean source 
                                                 
5 Bernal (1987, 1991, 2006). 
6 The main collection of critical studies of Black Athena is Lefkowitz & Rogers (1996). There is more 
discussion of Bernal’s Black Athena thesis in Chapter 7 of this work. 
7 I will return to van Binsbergen’s approach to intercultural philosophy below. 
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in the Neolithic and Bronze Age, for which ‘Pelasgian’ seems a fitting name […]. 
This also leads to a totally different interpretation of the relation between Egyptian 
Neith and Greek Athena and of the etymology of their names.(van Binsbergen 2011a: 
7) 
 
Nevertheless, given the problematic ruptures and discontinuities between 
contemporary African realities and the undoubtedly impressive cultural and intellectual 
achievements of Ancient Egypt, it is difficult to sustain a continuous relationship between the 
two textual genres. For the sake of the argument in this work, let us begin the quest for the 
origins of African philosophy with its encounter with post-Enlightenment modernity, which 
in the case of Africa and much of the Third World entails the realities and the histories of the 
following events: slavery, apartheid, colonization, decolonization, and the post-colonial 
aftermath which Cameroonian philosopher and political scientist, Achille Mbembe, terms 
‘neo-colony’ (Mbembe 2001). It is in this painful existential matrix that one locates the birth 
of African philosophy in its modern and its contemporary formation.8 
Philosophy in Africa has been, since its very inception more than half a century ago, 
dominated by the discussion of one compound question:  
 
• Is there an African philosophy? 
• And if there is, what is it? (Bodunrin 1981:163). How can we retrieve it? What 
are the conditions of its possibility (Mudimbe 1988: ix)? 
 
The first part of this question has unhesitatingly been answered in the affirmative. 
Some, however, including cosmopolitan African philosophers such as Valentin Yves 
Mudimbe and Kwame Anthony Appiah, are hesitant on this affirmation; and Paulin Jidenu 
Hountondji, a philosopher from the Republic of Benin, opts out by a mere nominal approach, 
asserting that African philosophy is simply global academic philosophy by people who 
happen to be Africans. The late French missionary and philosopher, Henri Maurier, however, 
has this answer: “The answer [to the question as to whether an African philosophy exists] 
must surely be: No! Not yet!”9 
                                                 
8 Osha (2006: 156). 
9 Maurier (1984: 25). 
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Nevertheless, dispute has been primarily over the second part of the question, as the 
various specimens of African philosophy presented do not pass muster (Bodunrin 1981). 
Those who refuse to accept certain specimens as philosophy have also been said to deny an 
affirmative answer to the first part of the question. Nigerian philosopher Godwin Sogolo 
observes that one frequently gets the ‘uncomfortable impression that that question itself is 
what constitutes African philosophy’.10 Now, why should the question, ‘Is there an African 
philosophy?’ be so central? Rather than doing philosophy, these paralysing questions and 
forays into unproductive ontology prevailed in the initial attempts to define the parameters of 
the discipline. Hountondji’s view that ‘philosophy is not a system but a history, essentially an 
open process, a restless, unfinished quest, not closed knowledge’ has not provided 
satisfactory insights into these questions.11American philosopher Jay van Hook doubts aloud 
when he argues that anyone even superficially acquainted with Western philosophy is 
familiar with such designations as ‘British philosophy’ or ‘American philosophy’, or ‘French’ 
or ‘German philosophy’, or, more broadly, with ‘Anglo-American’ and ‘Continental 
philosophy’. These labels do not puzzle anyone. In addition, reference to Asian philosophy 
has become increasingly common in the West. Therefore, what is the problem with ‘African 
philosophy?’ Why is its existence and nature in doubt, and what implications would a 
satisfactory answer have (van Hook 1993:29)? Suppose it should turn out that there is no 
African philosophy or that Africans do not philosophize. Would that make any difference? 
Should every aspect of Western culture have an African counterpart? Nevertheless, such a 
casual dismissal of the problem ignores the important observation made by one of the leading 
Africana philosophers,12 American-born Lucius Outlaw, concerning the high status of 
philosophy in Western culture:  
 
                                                 
10 Sogolo (1990: 41). 
11 Hountondji (1983: 71). 
12 Africana philosophy refers to the works of philosophers of African descent and others whose work deals with 
the subject matter of the African Diaspora. The notion ‘African Diaspora’, modelled after the concept of ‘Jewish 
Diaspora’, was coined in the 1990s and entered common usage in the 2000s. It pertains to the various 
communities all over the world that come from the historic movement of peoples from Africa, primarily to 
Europe, the Americas, and other areas around the globe. Historically, this notion was used to refer to the 
descendants of West and Central Africans who were sold as slaves and taken to Brazil and the United States of 
America, or those who voluntarily migrated to other continents. Prominent Africana philosophers include Lewis 
Gordon, Frantz Fanon, W.E.B. Du Bois, and Robert Bernasconi. 
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Philosophy has been one of the most privileged of disciplines, especially in its self-
appointed role as guardian of the self-image of the brokers of Western history and 
culture. Were this not the case, there would have been no debate about ‘African 
philosophy’. Thus any discussion of African philosophy involves, necessarily, 
confronting this privileged self-image. (Outlaw 1987a: 35) 
 
Appiah supports Outlaw’s observation:  
 
The urge to find something in Africa that ‘lives up to’ the label is, in part, a question 
of wanting to find something that deserves the dignity […]. (Appiah 1992:93) 
 
Van Hook (1993) contends that questions concerning the nature and existence of 
African philosophy are thus perceived as reflecting a Western colonial bias, such that there is 
no such thing as—and there never has been (and some may even insist there cannot be)—an 
African philosophy, because allegedly [I am still rendering this Western colonial bias] 
Africans cannot be considered as rational beings or are simply not as rational as Westerners, 
or they lack the disposition needed to philosophize. It is this perception, no doubt, which lies 
behind Outlaw’s denial that questions about African philosophy’s existence are ‘benign 
queries’ and his accusation that: 
 
They convey the putrid stench of a wretchedness that fertilizes the soil from which 
they grow. (Outlaw 1987b:9) 
 
He points out that any questions about the nature of a specific academic discipline, 
such as African philosophy, are relatively minor compared with the deeper issue: 
 
The deeper issue is one with much higher stakes: it is a struggle over the meaning of 
‘man’ and ‘civilized human’, and all that goes with this in the context of the political 
economy of the capitalized and Europeanized Western world. In light of the European 
incursion into Africa, the emergence of African philosophy poses deconstructive (and 





Even if Outlaw is correct about questions concerning the existence of African 
philosophy, questions concerning the nature of the philosophy need not be viewed as 
excruciatingly bad or unpleasant. For one might argue quite plausibly that questions 
concerning the nature of African philosophy are indicative, at least in part, of a much more 
general concern about the necessary and sufficient conditions for anything to count as 
philosophy. The late Nigerian philosopher Peter Bodunrin observed: 
 
The different positions as to the nature of African philosophy held by various 
contemporary Africans reflect different understandings of the meanings of philosophy 
itself. (Bodunrin 1991:65) 
 
These different understandings, moreover, are by no means unique to Africa, for they are to 
be found in Europe and America as well. As G. Salemohamed, the Mauritian philosopher 
notes: 
 
There is no general agreement within Western philosophy about the criteria applicable 
to philosophy. (Salemohamed 1983:535) 
 
This is evident in the frequent charges and counter-charges that this or that philosopher or 
school of philosophy is ‘not really philosophy’. The issue of philosophy’s identity may be 
more visible in Africa than in the West, however, because dominant and marginal 
philosophical traditions are neither as clear nor as firmly established.13 
In an attempt to answer the questions or demonstrate examples of the existence and 
nature of African philosophy, a deeper analysis reveals that there are generally two distinct 
senses in the usage of the expression ‘African philosophy’. 
 
                                                 
13 An example is the debate about the nature and existence of African philosophy, a debate which was largely 
sustained by the first generation of university-trained African philosophers. The first inspiration to the debate 
was provided by Tempels’ La philosophie bantoue, first published in Dutch (Bantoe-filosofie) in 1945. 
Academic African philosophy in the 1970s and 1980s was dominated by the heated ideological debate between 
defenders and critics of ethnophilosophy. The two main groups were the ‘traditionalists’, with a particularizing 
perspective, and the ‘universalists’ or ‘modernists’, with a universalizing point of view. For more on the history 
of this debate see, for example, Oruka (1975, 1990a); Bodunrin (1981); and Mudimbe (1988). . 
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1.2. The particularizing perspective 
In one sense, African philosophy is explained or defined in opposition to philosophy in other 
continents—and, in particular, to Western or European philosophy. It is presupposed that 
Africans have a unique way of thinking and conceptualizing that makes them radically non-
European. Hence, African philosophy is understood as a corpus of thoughts and beliefs 
produced by this way of thinking. This dimension brands European philosophy as critical and 
rigorous analysis, logical explanation, and synthesis, as opposed to African philosophy, 
which is believed to be innocent of such properties. African philosophy is supposed to be 
based on intuition, related to mysticism and opposed to or beyond rationalism. This is 
essentially the point of view of Lucien Lévy-Brühl (1857–1939), a French 
ethnologist/philosopher of the early 20thcentury. The late philosopher and poet who became 
the first president of an independent Senegal, Léopold Sedar Senghor (1906–2001), shares 
this view when he asserts that European reasoning is analytical by utilization, while Negro-
African reasoning is intuitive by participation. 
What is conceived, from this perspective, as African philosophy is the collection, 
interpretation, and dissemination of African proverbs, folktales, myths, and other traditional 
material of a philosophical tendency. This evokes a culturalist thesis to the effect that any 
philosophy is qualified by the cultural orientation of its propounders. Accordingly, no 
philosophic theme can be handled competently without familiarity with culture, leaving each 
culture with an in-built philosophy (Outlaw 1987b). Thus, one can refer to an African 
philosophy, a Chinese philosophy, an Indian philosophy, and so on. This particularizing 
perspective is what Bodunrin characterizes as the ‘traditionalists’ as opposed to the 
‘modernists’. The view of the traditionalists sketched above differs from the general 
definition of philosophy endorsed by the modernists, as we shall see below. 
 
1.3. The universalizing perspective 
In its general sense, philosophy is viewed, especially in North Atlantic society, as a universal 
discipline whose meaning and content are independent of racial or regional boundaries and 
particular disciplines. Philosophy is regarded as a discipline that in the strict sense employs 
the method of critical, reflective, and logical inquiry. African philosophy, therefore, is not 
expected to be a special case to this meaning of philosophy (Hountondji 1983). This 
universalizing perspective provides the possibility of an intercultural philosophy. 
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The authors of the universalizing tendency deny the idea of an African philosophy 
because most philosophical problems transcend racial and cultural boundaries. African 
philosophy can only be authentic when ideas are appropriated and discussed in the African 
context.14 This is more or less a universalistic/modernist conception of philosophy, as 
opposed to the culturalist/traditionalist view of the particularizing perspective. Hence, 
philosophy is not seen as a monopoly of Europe or any race but as an activity for which every 
race has the potentiality.  
 
Most philosophers in Africa either agree with one of these two conceptions 
summarized above or vacillate between them. Indeed, the literature on the birth and nature of 
African philosophy is vast and quite remarkable.15 For academic research on African 
philosophy today, the deadlock between the so-called ‘traditionalists’ and ‘modernists’ that 
dominated the 1970s and 1980s no longer constitutes such a fundamental obstacle (Kresse 
2007:17). The heated ideological debate between defenders and critics of ethnophilosophy—
the quasi-ethnographic project of presenting collective worldviews of ethnic groups as 
philosophies—has largely subsided and led to a wide variety of projects, among them the 
development of more complex research and discussions. It is now obvious that a diametrical 
opposition between the description of folk wisdom and culturally based worldviews and the 
production of critical and scientifically oriented treatises on modernization is misdirected. 
There are approaches with the character of a ‘third alternative’ (Oruka 1991:43) or ‘third 
ways’ between these two poles which have been developed, promising fresh perspectives for 
research on the documentation and reconstruction of philosophical discourse in Africa. In 
addition, the reconstruction of culturally specific ‘conceptual schemes’ of African 
philosophical traditions has been initiated,16 as well as the contextualized documentation of 
philosophical interviews with individual sages.17 
From the countless differences in the meaning and definition of philosophy, different 
models have been identified and defended and constitute the current scene in contemporary 
African philosophy. 
                                                 
14 Hountondji (1983); Bodunrin (1991); Oruka (1991). 
15 See, for example, Bodunrin (1981); Mudimbe (1988, 1994); Masolo (1994); Hountondji (1996); and Gyekye 
(1997).  
16 Mudimbe (1988); Appiah (1992); Sogolo (1993, 1998); Gyekye (1995).  





1.4. Models of African philosophy 
Oruka (1990a) identifies four trends in current African philosophy. These are 
ethnophilosophy, professional philosophy, nationalist–ideological philosophy, and 
philosophic sagacity. They were presented to the debate on African philosophy in Oruka’s 
Trends in Contemporary African Philosophy.18In the following sections, we will present brief 
summaries of these four main models of African philosophy.  
 
1.5. Ethnophilosophy 
 Among the four trends listed above, ethnophilosophy is perhaps the earliest approach of 
them all (Boele van Hensbroek 1998, 1999). It treats the subject of African philosophy as a 
form of folk wisdom. Thus, beliefs, which are generally known to be characteristic of 
anthropological or religious systems, are depicted as typical examples of African philosophy. 
The earliest known works in this trend include La philosophie Bantou (1945) of the Belgian 
missionary Rev. Fr Placide Tempels (1906–1977), the Rwandan priest Rev. Fr Alexis 
Kagame (1912–1981), who wrote La philosophie Bantou-Rwandaise l’Etre (1956), and the 
Kenyan Rev. Pastor John Mbiti’s African Religions and Philosophy (1970). 
 
1.6. Is Tempels an African philosopher? 
Before we continue discussing the various models in contemporary African 
philosophy, it is necessary to comment on Placide Tempels. Many Africans by birth would be 
horrified to see us list Tempels’ seminal work above as a genuine contribution to African 
                                                 
18 Oruka (1991: 5) later added two other approaches to African philosophy: the hermeneutic, and the artistic or 
literary trends. The hermeneutic trend more specifically accommodates those who choose a linguistic approach. 
Oruka understands the hermeneutic trend as involving ‘the philosophical analysis of concepts in a given African 
language to help clarify meaning and logical implications arising from the use of such concepts’ (ibid. 11). The 
main proponents of this school include the Ghanaian philosophers Kwasi Wiredu (1987) and Kwame Gyekye 
(1995, 1997), and Barry Hallen and his late co-author John Olubi Sodipo (1986), from the United States of 
America and Nigeria, respectively. The artistic or literary trend applies to African intellectual figures in the 
humanities who address themselves to themes basic to Africa’s cultural identity. The main proponents include 
the Ugandan poet and social critic Okot p’Bitek, Kenyan writer and social critic Ngugi wa Thiong’o, and 
Nigerian playwright, poet, and social critic Wole Soyinka. 
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philosophy. Tempels is a non-African by birth, but I have decided to treat him, especially in 
this context, as a great and genuine contributor to African philosophy. This provokes a 
question: can we consider the works of non-Africans by birth as forming part of African 
philosophy? 
Hountondji (1983) makes some interesting claims, advocating the exclusion of the 
works of non-Africans such as Tempels from the list of genuine contributors to the history of 
African philosophy. Hountondji accepts only the geographical and political meanings of the 
term—so that, in his view, African philosophy is a philosophy produced by anybody of 
African descent or nationality. He links philosophy to the geographical origins of the authors 
when he thinks that the texts must be written by Africans (Hountondji 1983:33). He argues: 
 
The Africanness of our philosophy will not necessarily reside in its themes but will 
depend above all on the geographical origin of those who produce it and their 
intellectual coming together. The best European Africanists remain Europeans, even 
(and above all) if they invent a Bantu ‘philosophy’, whereas the African philosophers 
who think in terms of Plato or Marx and confidently take over the theoretical heritage 
of Western philosophy, assimilating and transcending it, are producing authentic 
African work. (Hountondji 1983:53–54) 
 
From the quotation above, Hountondji implies that Tempels is not an African 
philosopher. Hountondji ‘broadens’ the horizons of African philosophical literature when he 
suggests the inclusion of all the research into Western philosophy carried out by Africans: 
 
This broadening of the horizon implies no contradiction: just as the writings of 
Western anthropologists on African societies belong to Western scientific literature, 
so the philosophical writings of Africans on the history of Western thought are an 
integral part of African philosophical literature. So, obviously, African philosophical 
works concerning problems that are not specially related to African experience should 
also be included. In this sense, the articles by the Ghanaian J.E. Wiredu on Kant, on 
material implication and the concept of truth, are an integral part of African 
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philosophy, as are the analyses of the concept of freedom or the notion of freewill by 
the Kenyan Henry Odera or the Nigerian D.E. Idoniboye. (Hountondji1983: 65)19 
 
Why does Hountondji reject the inclusion of Africanist philosophical literature as 
forming part of African philosophy? Would it not be more profitable to ‘fuse horizons’ and, 
in so doing, create a common framework for the hermeneutical practice, as Gadamer (1965) 
would have it? According to Gadamer, our understanding occurs on the basis of our history, 
which in turn has an impact on our consciousness in a given situation or ‘horizon’. 
Nevertheless, understanding is not confined within the horizon of its situation. The horizon of 
understanding is not static but changing and always subject to the effects of history. In an era 
marked by globalization, where mobility and migration are increasingly determining factors, 
traditional specificities of place and belonging have been eroded by virtualization. This 
challenges us to form new contexts of meaning that can foster the integration of the things we 
may consider abnormal. Place and belonging become what we make of them through 
constructs of meaning and through the construction of community. This reminds us of the 
‘placelessly local’ or the ‘locally placeless’, the apt formula (literally utopian in the sense of 
nowhere-ness) that the Indian-German philosopher Ram Adhar Mall(1995) puts at the centre 
of intercultural philosophy. I think Hountondji endorses the Western form of valid academic 
knowledge but does not consider a methodology of constructing valid transcultural 
knowledge. 
Hountondji’s position is understandably the modernist one that conceives geography 
or space as something fixed, immobile, nondialectical—a form of Cartesian cartography of 
spatial science (Foucault 1980: 176). The problem stems from the usage of the adjective 
‘African’ to qualify philosophy. A frequent tendency is to limit the term to the continent that 
has for many centuries been designated by the name ‘Africa’. On this account, ‘African’ is a 
purely geographic expression. Nevertheless, we can also broaden the adjective ‘African’ to 
designate cultural, historical, political, ideological, and social realities.  
Tempels lived and was socially involved in the daily lives of the Baluba. His openness 
and experiences as ‘being-in-the-world’ (Heidegger) enabled him to negotiate a new and 
meaningful identity with that of his Baluba friends. Their mode of existence became his 
                                                 
19 Hountondji thinks we can add Ghanaian philosopher Anton-Wilhelm Amo, who studied and taught in German 
universities such as Halle, Wittenberg, and Jena during the first half of the 18th century, before returning to his 
home country where he died. 
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mode of being (Merleau-Ponty). In addition, the South African freedom fighter Robert 
Sobukwe defines an African as anybody who considers Africa his or her home. Many 
Africanists have agreed that Africa is their home, and I know of many missionaries who 
insisted on being buried on African soil. While thinkers such as Wiredu and Oruka contest 
this obviously narrow definition, the majority of African thinkers do not find it in any way 
aberrant to consider Tempels as the father of contemporary African philosophy. Oruka (1990) 
does not see any reason why the work by an African thinker or in the African intellectual 
context in any branch of philosophy should not be seen as part of African philosophy. 
Oruka’s work Claude Sumner as an African Philosopher aims at defending the view that 
Claude Sumner, a born Canadian, is an African philosopher (Graness &Kresse 1997:265). 
The widespread agreement on the status of Tempels as an African philosopher 
indicates a tacit consensus on this point. A non-African by birth who has lived in Africa and 
developed interests in the daily lives of Africans could produce a philosophical work that 
could be regarded as African. In this connection, Mudimbe and Appiah are African 
philosophers but with cosmopolitan frames of mind. They are citizens of the world, and they 
tend to free themselves from any African ideas or attachments and rather are interested in 
many cultures. For Mudimbe, it is culture rather than birthright that determines the identity of 
an individual’s scholarship. However, such a construction of self through ‘the liberation of 
difference’ (van Binsbergen 2005), is just textual and not of substance. Van Binsbergen 
associates Mudimbe with the metaphor of ‘homelessness’, as Mudimbe does not 
ostentatiously cherish any African roots. This homelessness is not just physical but 
intellectual. Instead, Mudimbe aligns with Appiah, another cosmopolitan African philosopher 
‘who has endeared himself to the North Atlantic audience by rejecting the essentialism of 
Africanness’. Van Binsbergen explains: 
 
Mudimbe does not explicitly, and univocally, choose a constituency in Africa among 
the African masses and their cultural, political and religious expressions; neither does 
he consistently choose a disciplinary constituency in North Atlantic academic life, 
apart from the lack of methodological and theoretical constraint which the literary 
form of the kaleidoscopic, collage-like essay accords him. (ibid.)20 
                                                 
20Van Binsbergen (2005:20).This homelessness is also reflected in Mudimbe’s spiritual life. Over 40 years after 




Mudimbe prefers to analyse other people’s tales, parables, fables, ideas, and 
inventions, but for his personal needs retreats to the bare and windy rocks of agnosticism. His 
Africa is not that of other people; it does not exist as a tangible reality for himself but at best 
constitutes a context for contestation, a laboratory for the politics of the liberation of 
difference. 
Even though Mudimbe and Appiah are Africans, they see the whole idea of having an 
identity as a project. Identity is not fixed but evolutive.21 This explains why, from an 
intercultural philosophical perspective, philosophy in Africa should entail venturing beyond 
one’s own chosen boundaries, regardless of whether such boundaries are defined in a 
geographical, an identitary, a disciplinary, or a logico-conceptual sense. The new home is 
nowhere, the new boundary is situational and constructed, and the new identity is 
performative. 
It would be beneficial for the African philosopher today to go beyond the realm of 
essentialist identity. It is in such a pendulum swing of movement between African 
essentialism and globalizing or universalizing detachment that I place Mudimbe and Appiah. 
Nevertheless, they need to have substantial African rhizomes. Similar problems are not 
absent in other traditions of philosophy. Bartholomew de las Casas enjoys pride of place in 
Latin American philosophy, while European philosophy includes a host of non-Europeans in 
its corpus, including Plotinus (Egyptian/African), Augustine (Tagatse/African), Avicenna 
(Iranian/Persian), and Averroes (Arab). One major reason for the inclusion of these non-
Westerners in the history of Western philosophy is that their philosophic thought is connected 
with, or has had some influence upon, the development of European philosophy. 
Furthermore, Bodunrin (1981) reminds us that some of the most influential figures in 
British philosophy, such as Wittgenstein and Popper, were not even British by birth! 
Similarly, Alfred North Whitehead was born in England, but his later philosophical work 
belongs to the history of American philosophy. In the same vein, the late Malawian 
philosopher, Didier Njirayamanda Kaphagawani (1987) thinks that the works of some non-
African philosophers working in Africa, such as those of Francis Gillies and Gordon 
Hunnings, should also qualify as African professional philosophy. 
                                                                                                                                                        
black, cultivating visits to Catholic monasteries and priests with whom he shared a biography, and even reading 
his breviary for an hour everyday—the trappings of Roman Catholic priesthood without being a member. 
21 Ceton (2005). 
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 The thoughts of the ancient Greeks belong to the history of Western philosophy, but 
the ancient Greeks and ancient Britons were mutually ignorant of each other. Wiredu (1974) 
posits that the intellectual history of humanity is a series of borrowings and adaptations 
among races, nations, tribes, and even smaller sub-groups. Consequently, the work of a 
philosopher is part of a given tradition if it is either produced within the context of that 
tradition or taken up and used in it. The tendency, therefore, to exclude non-Africans by birth 
as genuine contributors while at the same time accepting the North Atlantic academic terms 
of philosophical discourse as givens is quite problematic and unrealistic. 
In contemporary global society, there is a drifting in space, and identity is socially 
constructed. Geography and space are no longer autonomous, predictable, isolated, and fixed 
identities, but rather are defined by the ‘plane of contest’ and interconnectedness. This invites 
us to go beyond the closed, territorial way of existence to an open, global mode of existence. 
Being African has to do with belonging and taking responsibility, which I think Tempels did! 
To make Africa home means to belong to a particular place in Africa and to care about its 
daily problems. The vigorous participation of people like Tempels in the African family 
today should be welcomed rather than tolerated.22 Thus, Hountondji needs to think twice 
about the ‘African by birth’criterion as a condition sine qua non for inclusion in the history of 
African philosophy. We need both the born Africans and the Africans by choice in our move 
towards a new African philosophy. 
 
1.7. Nationalist–ideological philosophy 
Oruka’s second type of philosophy is ‘nationalist–ideological philosophy’. This refers to the 
works of modern African political nationalists such as the former Zambian president Kenneth 
Kaunda, the former Tanzanian president Julius Nyerere (1922–1999), and the former 
Ghanaian president Kwame Nkrumah (1909–1972). It is basically political philosophy and is 
found in manifestos, pamphlets, and discourse related to the anti-colonial struggle for 
liberation. It mostly refers to the political thoughts of post-independence African leaders, but 
it can also refer more generally to radical political thought. These thinkers assume that 
communalism, as the supposed basic tenet of traditional Africa, should form the cardinal 
principle of any sound ideology for modern Africa.  
                                                 
22 In this light, Sanya Osha (2003a, 2005), for example, considers Wim van Binsbergen (since 2002 the editor of 
Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy/Revue Africaine de Philosophie)as an African philosopher.  
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The Nigerian philosopher Sanya Osha (2006) posits that the birth of African 
philosophy was wrought from highly political circumstances which have continued to have 
three profound implications. The first tendency within the discipline had to confront the need 
for liberation and, as such, was based on a discourse that emerged from polemic and overt 
political rhetoric. The second tendency strove for the discursive detachment and theoreticism 
of Western academic philosophy. The third tendency emerged from the sustained critique of 
ethnophilosophy. The Congolese philosopher Ernest Wamba-dia-Wamba says that African 
philosophy should be: 
 
the struggle of the complete liberation of the entire African people […] the struggle to 
destroy every form of exploitation of man by man, of African nations by other nations 
[…]. (Wamba-dia-Wamba 1991:224)  
 
He then goes on to say that an African philosophy department which teaches only Western 
philosophy is ‘principally an oppressive, and thus pro-imperialist, structure’ (ibid. 240). 
 
1.8. Professional philosophy 
The professional philosophy trend is opposed to ethnophilosophy but not to the nationalist–
ideological trend. This is a critical approach used by scholars who have undergone university 
training in philosophy as a discipline and who have published on various themes. Advocates 
of professional philosophy are united in their opposition to ethnophilosophy and in their 
affirmation of the centrality of critical rationality in the activity of philosophy.23 There are 
differences of emphasis among them, however, about the importance of African philosophy’s 
‘relevance’ to independence and development. 
 
1.9. Philosophic sagacity or sage philosophy 
The fourth trend in this list, which is the focus of Oruka’s own distinguished work and this 
dissertation, is ‘philosophic sagacity’ or ‘sage philosophy’. This was introduced to the debate 
on African philosophy during the Dr William Amo Conference in Accra, July 1978. In order 
                                                 




to define philosophic sagacity, it is necessary to explain what sage philosophy is about. 
According to Oruka: 
 
Sage philosophy consists of the expressed thoughts of wise men and women in any 
given community and is a way of thinking and explaining the world that fluctuates 
between popular wisdom (well-known communal maxims, aphorisms and general 
common sense truths) and didactic wisdom (an expounded wisdom and a rational 
thought of some given individuals within a community). While popular wisdom is 
conformist, didactic wisdom is at times critical of the communal set-up and popular 
wisdom. Thoughts can be expressed in writing or as unwritten sayings and arguments 
associated with some individual(s). (Oruka 1991:33-34) 
 
Some of Oruka’s critics have disparagingly called his sage philosophy ‘culture 
philosophy’, suggesting that it cannot be distinguished from ethnophilosophy. Oruka 
makes it clear, however, that his aim is to 
 
[...] invalidate the claim the traditional African peoples were innocent of logical 
and critical thinking’ and thus also the belief that ‘traditional African 
philosophy does not go beyond folk-wisdom and non-critical thought. (Oruka 
1987: 51-52) 
 
Serequeberhan sees sage philosophy as Oruka’s attempt to carve out a middle way 
between ethnophilosophy and professional philosophy, and describes it as the thought of 
indigenous wise men ‘who critically engage the established tradition and culture of their 
respective ethnic groups and/or societies’ (Serequeberhan 1991a:19). These sages, says 
Serequeberhan, occupy a critical space in their culture; they are not merely preservers of 
tradition. 
Practitioners of this fourth trend attempt to extract the philosophical wisdom from 
these sages through dialogue. After conducting interviews with his sages in Kenya, Oruka 
identifies two main categories of sage philosophy (Oruka 1991): 
1) First of all, there is the folk sage, who is well versed in the popular wisdom, 
culture, and beliefs of his people. He is essentially a conformist in relation to the communal 
set-up. He is a folk sage because he does not transcend the celebrated folk wisdom of his 
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people. He remains at the first order of sage philosophy, which is popular wisdom and 
includes all the accepted customary and conventional beliefs and practices of the people. 
2) The philosophic sage individually expresses rational thoughts and moral teachings. 
Such a sage is at times critical of the culture, beliefs, and popular wisdom of his people. He is 
able to reflect on and evaluate what prevails and is commonly accepted in the first order. 
Such a sage is an exponent of second-order philosophy,24 which is didactic wisdom. This 
second-order philosophy is what is referred to as philosophic sagacity. 
Philosophic sagacity is the reflection of a person who is a sage and a thinker. As a 
sage, a person is—as already pointed out—well versed in the wisdoms and traditions of his 
people. As a thinker, he is critical and transcends the communal wisdom. Philosophic 
sagacity, therefore, is the expounded and well-reasoned thought of some individuals in a 
given culture.  
In searching for philosophic sagacity, traditional individual African sages are 
identified and dialogue is carried out with them orally. Traditional Africa here refers to an era 
when the dominance of beliefs and practices in an African setting, as shown by the sages who 
represent a domain or sphere of life, was constituted prior to the penetration by North 
Atlantic and/or global post-17th-century technology, a domain that has managed to more or 
less survive as a relatively autonomous, relatively intact domain of thought and action ever 
since. It is against this background that Oruka postulates the main argument for philosophic 
sagacity. 
Philosophic sagacity maintains that African philosophy in its pure traditional form 
does not begin and end in a folk talk and consensus. It maintains that Africans, even without 
outside influence, are not strangers to logical and dialectical, critical inquiry. Philosophic 
sagacity proceeds on the supposition that the ability to read and write is not a necessary 
condition for philosophical reflection and exposition. Oruka’s project demonstrates that one 
is likely to find indigenous thinkers who are illiterate. They are critical, independent thinkers 
who oversee their thoughts and opinions by the power of reason and innate ingenuity rather 
than by the influence of community wisdom. They are capable of taking a problem or concept 
and offering a more or less rigorous philosophical explanation of it, thereby making clear 
rationally where they accept or reject the communal judgement on the matter. Oruka is so 
thrilled by the idea that he declares: 
 
                                                 
24 This categorization made by Oruka should not be confused with the philosophy journal of that name. 
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Writing is not a great issue. Writing is a good way to store thought and so to store 
philosophy. But writing is not thinking and Philosophy is thinking and one can think 
even if one is incapable or has no facilities for writing. (Oruka 1991:6)25 
 
1.10. Hermeneutical philosophy 
Oruka later acknowledged the emergence of a fifth model of African philosophy, namely 
‘hermeneutical philosophy’. Hermeneutics is a development in European/North Atlantic 
philosophy, seeking to explain the meaning implied in expressions, symbols, texts, and 
human phenomena in general, by vicariously articulating what they mean for the actors who 
originally produced them. Hermeneutic interpretation seeks to probe the ‘silences’, to 
uncover a deeper meaning, perhaps masked and hidden, but waiting to be discovered. The 
hermeneutic tradition could be traced with the German religious philosopher Schleiermacher 
(c. 1800).26 These philosophers prefer to concentrate explicitly upon the distinctive ‘ideas’, 
worldviews, or priorities that are characteristic of particular historical periods and contexts. In 
the African context, a starting point for most hermeneutical philosophers in and of Africa is 
the general conviction that European imperialism and colonialism violently and profoundly 
disrupted Africa’s social, cultural, and political continuity and integrity. One benefit of a 
hermeneutic approach, as a standard intercultural approach, is that it would render 
interculturality more meaningful. In contemporary times, there is a mix between the 
                                                 
25 I think writing is a very important issue and Oruka cannot afford to ignore it. Why are African sage 
philosophers different from, say, the Pre-Socratics, Descartes, Kant, or Hountondji? The reason is that the 
former were not embedded in a world of text production and textual accumulation. The Pre-Socratic Greek 
philosophers, for example, largely operated in an early-literate environment and largely taught orally—though 
some left texts (e.g. Parmenides), and many of their sayings have been recorded in later traditions (collected by 
Plato and Aristotle and brought together, especially in modern times, by the German classical scholar Hermann 
Diels (1848–1922) in The Fragments of the Presocratics). Since the mid-20th century, there has been a 
widespread and profound debate on how literacy and text do violence to the world and to human beings, and 
how they totally transform the experience of reality. Advocates of literacy, such as Jack Goody, Walter Ong, 
and Eric Havelock, stress the impact that the shift from orality to literacy has had on culture and education. 
Writing brought about the major transformation of the ancient Near East: the state, organized religion, and 
proto-science. Oruka seems to have ignored these debates, which were already being staged extensively when he 
wrote in the 1980s–1990s. Even among African philosophers, Oruka’s stance on this issue has been contested 
by Bodunrin, Hountondji, and Keita. We will return to this in Chapter 5. 
26 Some major figures in Western (notably Continental European) philosophy linked to or identified with this 
tradition include Heidegger, Gadamer, Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Sartre, Merleau-Ponty, and Ricoeur. 
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indigenous African and the rest of the world. However, this meeting is characterized by North 
Atlantic hegemony. The hermeneutic approach to African philosophy could help us single out 
what aspects or elements of the mixture are to be valued and re-affirmed as a sound basis for 
a progressive African social, political, and cultural heritage.27 Okonda Okolo observes: 
 
The interest in hermeneutics arises out of the reality of […] a generalized identity 
crisis due to the presence of a culture—a foreign and dominating tradition—and the 
necessity for a self-affirmation in the construction of an authentic culture and 
tradition. (Okolo 1991:201)  
 
Serequeberhan observes:  
 
It is no accident that the discussion of African philosophy is taking place in the 
context of the increasing contemporary importance of hermeneutics, deconstruction, 
and […] context-oriented modes of doing philosophy in the discipline at large. 
(Serequeberhan 1991a:14)  
 
This type is evident in Outlaw’s call for African philosophers to deconstruct the colonial 
heritage by ‘de-colonizing the mind’ and to reconstruct a shattered indigenous African 
heritage (Outlaw1987b: 11). It is apparent at any rate that the hermeneutical and 
deconstructive trends in African philosophy draw heavily upon similar trends in Western 
philosophy.  
Deconstruction is a post-modern method of analysis, derived principally from the 
works of French philosophers such as Jacques Derrida, Michel Foucault, and Jean-Francois 
Lyotard. Its goal is to undo all constructions and assumptions in a bid to reveal the arbitrary 
and internal presuppositions of the text. Deconstruction employs a text’s own stratagems 
against it, producing a force of dislocation that spreads itself throughout the entire system, 
fissuring it in every direction and thoroughly delimiting it. Deconstruction attempts to undo, 
reverse, displace, and resituate the hierarchies involved in polar opposites such as 
object/subject, right/wrong, good/bad, pragmatic/principled. As a method of post-modernist 
                                                 
27 For more African advocates of a hermeneutical approach in African philosophy, we may cite Nigerian 




epistemology, deconstruction is avowedly, intentionally, and intensely subjectivist and anti-
objectivist. It hesitates to dismiss any perspective as entirely without interest. It precludes 
universal knowledge or global theory because it is itself an anti-theoretical enterprise. In this 
light, interpretation is intertextual rather than causal, with much suspicion of reason and 
rationality. 
 
1.11. Other approaches in contemporary African philosophy 
Mudimbe speaks of three main approaches in current African philosophical practice. First is 
the critique of ethnophilosophy, a critique which draws upon the Western philosophical 
tradition’s view of appropriate philosophical practice. The second is the ‘foundational’ 
approach, which questions the epistemological foundations of the human and social sciences. 
The third approach includes philological studies, critical anthropology, and hermeneutics. 
The Ghanaian philosopher Kwame Gyekye distinguishes between traditional and modern 
African philosophy, while other African philosophers such as Sodipo and the Congolese 
philosopher Tshiamalenga simply distinguish between professional and traditional African 
philosophy. 
If one examines the discussion surrounding the various types or models of African 
philosophy mentioned so far, one recurring issue that emerges is whether philosophy is to be 
construed primarily as ‘professional philosophy’, and thus ultimately along the lines of the 
institution of Western philosophy during the last millennium, or to be construed contextually 
as some form of culture philosophy. In addition to those who think of philosophy 
contextually, there are some whose effort is directed towards making explicit the worldviews 
of traditional cultures, while others are more concerned that philosophy be relevant to issues 
of independence, modernization, and development (Nkrumah 1970). Perhaps a better way of 
stating the problem is in these two pertinent questions: 
 
1) Is philosophy the product of a universal human reason or is every philosophy 
primarily an expression of the culture which produces it? 
2) Could the meeting of African philosophy and the other philosophical traditions all 
over the globe not produce novel and promising directions for philosophy as a whole? 
 
The heart of the matter is that, for a long time, African philosophy, as displayed by 
academic African/Africanist philosophers, was largely dependent on the so-called 
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mainstream Western philosophical establishment. Their use of categories and conceptual 
systems in a non-Western context like Africa still depended on Western epistemological 
orders, with indifference towards indigenous African philosophy. Mudimbe claims that even 
those that professed to be ‘Afrocentric’ in their representations, consciously or unconsciously 
still referred to the same Western epistemological orders. Such descriptions are as much 
products of Western cultural priorities and prejudices as anything African. The 
power/knowledge system (Foucault) of colonialism propagandized Western civilization, 
philosophy included, as the cultural paradigm. Africa was constructed as the ‘Other’, and 
most things African were viewed as negations of that paradigm (Mudimbe 1988). 
Even though Oruka, in his sage philosophy project, implicitly intends to counter the 
Eurocentric bias against traditional African thought, he does not explicitly interrogate 
Western images of Africa nor challenge their hegemony. His modernist position in the project 
is a propagation, however indirect, of Western hegemony in African studies/philosophy.28 
Oruka’s philosophical position and aesthetic style is rooted in the modernist Enlightenment 
and its belief in reason, and in the idea that man can decisively shape the world, that history is 
progress, that logical, rational thought can penetrate all mystery, and that there are no murky 
depths of existence that cannot thus be illuminated. Some modernist scholars are looking for 
absolute knowledge in science. They believe that science is objective, universal, and rational. 
Early Enlightenment ideals involved rational enquiry as the guiding principle for all 
knowledge, and the belief that only progress in intellectual method could bring about a world 
of order, security, and social understanding. Scholars associated with this tradition include 
the philosophers Kant and Voltaire. The flipside to this position is that, in believing that their 
values should be universally applied, Enlightenment thinkers tended to see Europe as the 
most enlightened and civilized part of the world. Hegel, for example, thought it was morally 
permissible to colonize non-Western peoples.  
Oruka’s tendentious dependence on the Western epistemological order is defensible 
from the modernist position described above. However, the modernist position in itself is in 
serious doubt from the post-modern standpoint and from existential critiques. Post-
modernism has developed since the 1950s and embraces the relativism of a sophist like 
Protagoras and even Aristotle. For the post-modernist, knowledge claims are not absolute or 
universal, but they exist in relation to specific discourses. The French post-modern 
                                                 




philosopher Jean- Francois Lyotard (1924–1998) argues that knowledge can be legitimated 
only by reference to the scientific language-game in which it is made.29 For Derrida (1976), 
there is no such thing as a truth in itself, as truth is plural. The post-modern position rejects 
modern theory and recognizes a situation where a multitude of theories exists and none is 
superior to any other. Post-modernists reject modernism’s ‘grand’ narrative, meta (master) 
narratives à la Lyotard, and narratives that claim to be scientific, objective, and universal, 
that serve to legitimate modernity and assume justice, truth, theory, hegemony. In addition, 
existentialist critiques of modernism agree with Western Marxists that Enlightenment 
heritage is totalitarian and dominating. The German philosophers Horkheimer and Adorno 
remind us of the dangers contained in a Faustian celebration of science without humanity or 
morality (Horkheimer &Adorno 2002). In common with German philosophers Friedrich 
Nietzsche (1844–1900) and Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), post-modernists share scepticism 
about the possibility of truth, reason, and moral universals, a conviction that terms like ‘good’ 
and ‘bad’ are inappropriate and an insistence that subjective and conflicting interpretations 
are the closest humans can come to ‘understanding’.30 While aware of the hegemonic 
tendencies in the use of science, American philosopher Sandra Harding has no option but to 
admit that all of science is a mere myth, an ethnoscience, but that some of its methods do 
warrant science’s pretence to objectivity, rationality, and validity (Harding 1994,1997). 
However, could this imply that African worldviews and African ways of thinking 
cannot be carefully thought out and made explicit within what we could term the framework 
of their own rationality? (Mudimbe 1988). Mudimbe’s question aims at exposing and, if 
possible, avoiding some silent dependence on a Western episteme. He proposes knowledge 
from: 
 
                                                 
29 Lyotard explicitly draws inspiration from Wittgenstein’s language-game in elaborating his own idea of 
‘Grand’ narrative in his book The Postmodern Condition. According to Austrian-born British philosopher 
Ludwig Wittgenstein (1889–1951), language-game refers to the context in which an utterance is made, which 
determines the purposes served by the utterance and therefore its meaning. Wittgenstein thought that 
philosophical problems are due to ignoring the ‘game’ in which certain ideas are used. He conceives of a 
plurality of language-games and tries to show the different activities language users engage in. Lyotard applies 
this notion mainly in his analyses of power, authority, and legitimation. 




[...] a wider authority: intellectuals’ discourses as a critical library and, if I could, the 
experience of rejected forms of wisdom which are not part of the structures of 
political power and scientific knowledge. (Mudimbe1988: x-xi)  
 
Modern science ought to consider itself as a knowledge system among other 
knowledge systems, which each contain their respective criteria of truth and claims of 
validity. I submit that in contemporary times, characterized by globalization, a more 
satisfactory way to deal with African philosophy is the method that has been developed in 
intercultural philosophical studies. This will provide us with insights and information about 
traditions of knowledge and intellectual practice elsewhere in the world, in social contexts 
very different from our own. This will involve taking African and other globally available 
knowledge traditions seriously in a bid to flavour and augment each knowledge tradition.  
 
1.12. Intercultural philosophy 
This is the point where I wish to introduce a particularly inspiring and courageous approach 
to many of the problems discussed above—an approach that in many ways I consider a way 
out of the dilemmas and aporias otherwise insurmountable. This is the approach of the Dutch 
philosopher, anthropologist, and protohistorian Wim van Binsbergen, who, after a splendid 
career in the social sciences with professorships in major European and African centres of 
learning, in 1998 acceded to the chair of Foundations of Intercultural Philosophy at the 
Erasmus University Rotterdam. Wim van Binsbergen’s conception of intercultural 
philosophy comes from his explorations as an anthropologist and oral historian. It operates at 
the borderline between anthropology and philosophy, even though occasionally it spills over 
into belles lettres, ancient history, and comparative cultural and religious studies. The 
modernist philosopher may raise eyebrows at such an eclectic approach, as one deviating 
from the conventions of the discipline. The post-modernists, on the contrary, question any 
possibility of rigid disciplinary boundaries between the natural sciences, humanities, social 
sciences, art and literature, culture and life, fiction and theory, image and reality in nearly 
every field of human endeavour. They consider conventional tight definitions and 
categorizations of academic disciplines in the university context to be simply remnants of 
modernity. Michel Foucault (1926–1984) is an example of the cross-disciplinary character of 
post-modernism. He was at once a philosopher, historian, social theorist, and political 
scientist. Jacques Derrida (1930–2004) was a philosopher, art critic, and architectural 
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consultant. Senghor was a philosopher, poet, and statesman. Mudimbe, sometime professor of 
anthropology, language(s), and literature at Duke and Stanford Universities, would justifiably 
protest at being typed simply as a ‘philosopher’. This is because he also approaches 
philosophy as a historian of ideas and literature and therefore writes about it from outside its 
confines more than he does from within (Hallen 2009:61). 
Intercultural philosophy investigates as its central theme interculturality.31 It is that 
branch of philosophy that was explicitly established in order to address the globalization of 
difference. This explains the theory of interculturality: using philosophy to critique 
anthropology and anthropology to critique philosophy. Intercultural philosophy seeks to 
develop a discourse that will allow for a discussion of all philosophical problems from an 
intercultural perspective. It does this by a theoretical reflection on concepts like culture, 
cultural diversity, cultural relativism, multiculturality, power, hermeneutics, and dialogue. 
Intercultural philosophy, with the use of such concepts, critically explores the conditions 
under which we can talk of interculturality. It seeks to prevent any philosophical position 
from assuming an absolute position. The central idea that runs across the views of authors 
like Kimmerle, Mall, Lohmar, and Wimmer, as far as intercultural philosophy is concerned, 
is that there are many philosophical traditions of significance in all regions of the world, 
rather than just a few or one. They posit that the meeting of different cultural orientations and 
philosophical tendencies calls for an intensive and qualified discourse on the part of all 
concerned. 
Hence, in its general sense, such ‘intercultural philosophy’ as conceived by Mall, of 
an earlier vintage than van Binsbergen, explores the circumstances under which an 
interchange between distinct ‘cultures’ can take place, notably to give and receive in different 
situations and aspects, such as knowledge production of one culture about another, tolerance 
or intolerance, and conflict or co-operation in the economic, social, and political domain.32 
Mall’s approach is similar to a comparative-approach philosophy (which is tantamount to 
studying the similarities and differences between different ‘cultures’), and this could foster 
relativism in philosophy. In this case, there would be no mutual exchange and enrichment, as 
this approach could not really help the self-understanding and practice of philosophy itself. 
Intercultural philosophy is not specifically devoted to the comparison of the world’s major 
                                                 
31 See, for example, Mall & Lohmar (1993); Mall (1995); Kimmerle & Wimmer (1997); van Binsbergen (2003). 
I have benefitted from discussions and translations of the works of Kimmerle and Mall from van Binsbergen 
(1999, 2003). 
32 See Mall (1995), Chapter 1; Mall (1993). 
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philosophical traditions (African, Chinese, Indian, European, Jewish, and Islamic). Instead, it 
envisages an abstract and formal, rather than substantive, investigation for interculturality. 
Doing intercultural philosophy would entail putting into contrast, rather than merely 
comparing, different philosophical traditions. The Chinese intercultural philosopher Vincent 
Shen (2010) understands ‘contrast’ as the rhythmic interplay between difference and 
complementarity, discontinuity and continuity, which pave the way for real mutual 
enrichment between the different traditions of philosophy. 
We must admit that the term intercultural philosophy existed before van Binsbergen 
succeeded to the German intercultural philosopher Heinz Kimmerle’s chair of that 
designation; however, van Binsbergen re-defined the concept. In his attempt to re-define 
intercultural philosophy in a more specific form, van Binsbergen does not endorse mere 
philosophical pluralism. He goes further and investigates, specifically, how the philosophical 
traditions relate with one another, how it is possible (or impossible) for them to create valid 
knowledge about one another and about the life-worlds that each of these philosophical 
traditions builds for their adherents. He argues: 
 
In a more specific form [...], we would conceive of intercultural philosophy as the 
search for a philosophical intermediate position where specialist philosophical 
thought seeks to escape from its presumed determination by any specific distinct 
‘culture’. […] we render explicit the traditions of thought peculiar to a number of 
cultures, and we subsequently explore the possibilities of cross-fertilization between 
these traditions of thought.(van Binsbergen 2003:468-469) 
 
In summary, we need to distance ourselves from the comparative- philosophy 
approach to interculturality because such an approach would retain the concept of culture as 
holistic and bounded. This would mean that many distinct ‘cultures’ exist side by side. 
Wholeness and boundedness would assume an existential cultural identity that is claimed to 
be the opposite of performativity. Yet, the concept of culture is performative. Performativity 
implies that culture is not fixed but flexible and based on changing experiences or contextual 
considerations. This can be explained in the sense that human beings in their daily lives have 
several overlapping ‘cultural orientations’, which co-exist and from which they learn daily, 
and not just one ‘culture’ that combines claims of totality, integration, and boundedness. The 
erroneous notion that ‘culture’ is bounded and holistic implicitly produces the illusion of 
fixed unchanging truths and intolerance to diversity.  
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 The difference between intercultural philosophy and comparative philosophy, as 
defined by van Binsbergen, is somehow limited or narrow. I think van Binsbergen could have 
defined this difference more broadly. He defines intercultural philosophy primarily as 
philosophizing about the possibilities and limitations of interculturality. This position leaves 
undefined the geographical, cultural, class, and historical locus in which to conduct such 
philosophizing. Van Binsbergen’s locus is that of a renegade post-North Atlantic 
ethnographer turned Nkoya prince and sangoma33in Zambia, thus creating a locus that did not 
exist before. His position is essentially different from his Rotterdam predecessor, Heinz 
Kimmerle, who does not think of the possibility of thinking through a culture outside a 
specific cultural embedding or dream of cultural interstices, where the ‘in-between’ may 
situate itself. Moreover, van Binsbergen’s approach is also different from the nostalgic 
essentializing position evinced by the South African philosopher Mogobe Ramose and his 
Nigerian colleague, Tunde Bewaji, in their conception of an ubuntu philosophy.34 These two 
examples could have helped van Binsbergen define his conception of intercultural philosophy 
much more broadly. 
Intercultural philosophy attempts answers to questions such as the following: 
 
• What is culture? Is it possible to speak of a plurality of cultures? 
• How can we think diversity and unity at the global scale? 
• How is such thinking to be informed by a re-thought concept of culture, one that is 
capable of dealing with both diversity and unity at the global scale? 
• How can we conceive the situation and the process of interculturality? 
• Is it possible to produce valid knowledge across cultural boundaries? 
• How may we approach the apparently irrational beliefs of those not sharing our own 
cultural orientation? 
• How can we overcome the obvious difference, inequalities and historical grievances 
between continents, nations, etc? 
                                                 
33Sangoma is a term for a diviner-priest in the tradition of the Nguni-speaking peoples (Zulu, Xhosa, Ndebele, 
and Swazi) of southern Africa. Characteristically, they are specialists in the dynamics of collective healing at the 
level of the kin group and local community in southernAfrica. Van Binsbergen became a sangoma during his 
religious anthropological fieldwork. He argues that sangomahood is a source of valid knowledge and is 
translatable to a global format. For more on sangomahood, see van Binsbergen (2003, 2007). 
34 We will come back to ubuntu philosophy in Chapters 2 and 7. For more on ubuntu, see Samkange & 




1.13. Research questions and hypotheses 
Against the background of the various models of African philosophy posited above, this work 
attempts to provide answers to the following questions:  
 
1) How can we renew the dynamics in African philosophy, whose stagnation has been 
caused by a sterile debate on ethnophilosophy?  
2) What is the best approach for contemporary African philosophy to take in a context 
marked by the high degree of global interconnectedness and interactions today? 
3) Is there only one philosophical orientation, or are there many to jointly help shape the 
future of the discipline? 
 
These questions lead on to two ideas that will guide us through much of the argument 
of this thesis. First; there is the idea that Oruka’s philosophic sagacity is an innovation in 
African philosophy. He brings out a system of knowledge outside the North Atlantic one, 
thereby trying to take away the claim that North Atlantic science is the only valid system of 
knowledge. 
Second, we need to go beyond Oruka’s conception of philosophic sagacity in our 
search for a valid and reliable form of an African philosophy in contemporary times. Such a 
conception of philosophic sagacity is one which can influence and be influenced by other 
philosophical traditions all over the world. Van Binsbergen (2003) substantiates this claim 
with a critical evaluation of sangomahood as a form of indigenous African wisdom that can 
better fit the present globalized, intercultural world. This explains our inclusion of an 
intercultural philosophy which—or so we hope—is not only theoretically and conceptually 
sophisticated, but also empirically accountable35 and politically responsible. Intercultural 
philosophy enables us to go beyond the particularism of the ethnophilosophers and the 
universalism of the professional philosophers. It also alerts us on, and helps us deconstruct 
the hegemonic imposition of the North Atlantic model. 
 
                                                 
35 As an attempt to develop an intersubjective language to formulate an ontology of the present, philosophy is 




Our methodology throughout this thesis will be a comparative analysis of the writings of 
Oruka and intercultural philosophers such as Wim van Binsbergen, against the background of 
a more general assessment of the state-of-the-art in African philosophy. In the process, we 
will make explicit, and critically examine, the concepts and theories these authors deploy as 
central elements in their philosophies. We will seek to purify these concepts and theories 
from whatever one-sidedness or other shortcomings they may have in these authors’ own 
works and selectively forge them into some tools towards a new orientation in contemporary 
African philosophy.  
 
1.15. Relevance of the general debates on philosophic sagacity 
In this section, I present some of the views of scholars on Oruka’s conception of philosophic 
sagacity and the main points they raise. As a trend in African philosophy, literature on 
philosophic sagacity is as bountiful as the perspectives and interpretations of it are varied. 
Bodunrin (1981) maintains, as do Hountondji (1983) and the Sierra Leonean philosopher 
Lansana Keita (1985), that philosophy cannot develop fully unless it ‘writes its memoir’ or 
‘keeps a diary’. These three African philosophers are of the opinion that writing creates an 
epistemological base for philosophy, and so the oral interviews Oruka carries out with sages 
cannot be endorsed as serious academic philosophy. Bodunrin goes further, to suggest that 
philosophic sagacity is similar to French anthropologist Marcel Griaule’s Ogotemmêli, who 
‘displays a great philosophic sagacity in his exposition of the secret doctrines of his group’, 
and to the approach carried out by Barry Hallen and J.O. Sodipo among the Yoruba in 
Nigeria. 
Didier Kaphagawani (1987) judges that philosophic sagacity is a second-order 
philosophy to ethnophilosophy and, hence, could not exist without the latter. He speaks of a 
probable (though only apparent) ‘misconception’ by Oruka in annotating four trends in 
African philosophy as types, and he later endorses this ‘misconception’ as valid, as they turn 
out to be bi-valent: they represent types of African philosophy, on the one hand, and methods 
of philosophizing in Africa, on the other (Kaphawani 1987). However, Oruka clarifies that 
philosophic sagacity is rather a second order to culture philosophy. Sages reflect upon 
culture, not as it is summarized in consensus form and analysed by professional philosophers, 
theologians, or missionaries (as in ethnophilosophy), but based on their personal experiences 
in the community. 
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For Lucius Outlaw (1987b), philosophic sagacity invalidates the pernicious myth that 
African peoples are of a decidedly primitive mentality and permits the recognition of the 
existence of philosophy in traditional Africa. His stance forcefully argues that the debates on 
African philosophy serve as a timely deconstructive critique of philosophy, marking the death 
of an ageing and decadent mode of thinking in Western intellectual circles. It is in this regard 
that German philosopher Christian Neugebauer (1987) highlights the historical background to 
the myth of primitive mentality in Western intellectual circles. He asserts that philosophic 
sagacity is out to criticize and refute European racism, notably that of Hegel and Kant and of 
their vast and decisive inheritance, which is constitutive of much of modern philosophy. 
The Nigerian philosopher and former student of Oruka, Anthony Oseghare (1985), 
appraises Oruka’s philosophic sagacity as a new orientation in African philosophy and so 
exhorts African philosophers to devote more time to it. Nevertheless, Oseghare is incorrect to 
claim that before Sage Philosophy: Indigenous Thinkers and Modern Debate on African 
Philosophy (1991) and the project of sage philosophy, African philosophy suffered from 
sterility. Perhaps in certain philosophical circles African philosophy was lacking vitality, but 
it was certainly not sterile. 
Oseghare also makes a distinction between sagacity and knowledge, in a bid to clarify 
and enhance Oruka’s project on who a real sage is. He maintains that both are involved in the 
acquiring and using of skills, but they are distinct: sagacity includes practical wisdom, which 
is acquired through experience, and has a wider significance than knowledge. Sagacity could 
also be wisdom which is limited to common sense and wisdom that goes beyond common 
sense. 
The German philosopher Gerd-Rüdiger Hoffmann (1984), writing from the standpoint 
of a limited orthodox Marxism, claims that sage philosophy is a bourgeois reflection which 
tends to isolate philosophy from ideology. To him, philosophy and ideology are identical, and 
there can be no philosophy in society without classes. Hence, to the extent that sage 
philosophy is a philosophy rooted in classless peasant African society, it cannot be 
philosophy but is some form of peasant storytelling. He admits that ancient Greece had a 
philosophy, but then, he writes, ancient Greece was already a class society (Oruka 1991:7-
8).36 
                                                 
36 Cited in Oruka (1991: 7-8). Hoffmann’s claim needs some modification. We cannot speak of a classless 
society where we have peasants. Moreover, there has been a long debate on the class nature of African society, 
before and after the imposition of colonialism.  
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The Kenyan philosopher Frederick Ochieng’-Odhiambo (2002a) traces the 
development of Oruka’s thoughts in African philosophy from the early 1970s to the 1990s, a 
period spanning slightly more than 20 years. Oruka’s views on African philosophy in general 
and philosophic sagacity in particular are demarcated into three stages: pre-1978, 1978–1984, 
and 1984–1995.37 The struggle against ethnophilosophy and a search for the best possible 
definition of African philosophy is what punctuates and characterizes the pre-1978 period. 
During this period, Oruka is very uncompromising and antagonistic towards 
ethnophilosophy. He attempts to dislodge ethnophilosophy from African philosophy because 
it does not constitute philosophy in any proper sense of the term. The second period is the era 
of philosophic sagacity. It also marks the beginning of a compromise and accommodative 
stance towards ethnophilosophy in explaining and defining African philosophy. The third 
stage (post-1984 period) is the sage philosophy era. This period, according to Ochieng’-
Odhiambo, witnesses a continued and increased compromising spirit to the extent that the 
distinction between ethnophilosophy and sage philosophy becomes quite blurred.  
However, American philosopher Gail Presbey (2007) does not agree that Oruka had a 
compromising spirit or ended up embracing ethnophilosophy as Ochieng’-Odhiambo asserts. 
Sage philosophy, Presbey maintains, is distinct from ethnophilosophy and remains a unique 
approach within African philosophy. The main differences stem from the fact that Oruka’s 
sages are critical, reflective, rigorous, and dialectical. She also asserts the importance of 
naming the individual thinkers who share their personal thoughts.38 In her opinion, one needs 
both the individual sages and critical evaluation to constitute a sage philosophy project. She 
also does not see why Oruka does not include the folk sages in his project. This is because, 
according to Presbey, the folk sages show more philosophical talent than his description 
would lead us to believe. She also asserts that Oruka’s project was not an extraverted 
discourse (meaning it was not built up essentially for a European public)39 but one that had a 
focus on practical matters. She presents a list of ways Oruka’s sage philosophy project helped 
several practical matters in his own local community and country at large. 
Ochieng’-Odhiambo (2007) traces and articulates the various stages of philosophic 
sagacity as an approach to African philosophy in academic discourses. He also argues that 
                                                 
37 Presbey (2007) prefers to call Ochieng’-Odhiambo’s distinctions the early, middle, and later Oruka, similar to 
the way people refer to the early or later Heidegger or Wittgenstein to help scholars know the context of one’s 
remarks. 
38 See also Ochieng’-Odhiambo (2002a) for this distinction. 
39 This is one of the criticisms of ethnophilosophy (Hountondji 1996: 45).  
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even though it is strongly attached to traditional Africa, it could still be relevant to modern 
African nation-states. Finally, he tries to figure out the distinction between philosophic 
sagacity and sage philosophy. He contends that too often some individuals, at times 
mistakenly, used the two terms interchangeably. For Ochieng’-Odhiambo, Oruka did not use 
‘sage philosophy’ and ‘philosophic sagacity’ interchangeably even though some scholars 
have persisted in that erroneous assumption. Oruka, he asserts, made a distinction between 
two categories of sage philosophy: folk or popular sagacity, and philosophic sagacity. While 
the folk or popular sagacity articulates the well-known communal maxims, aphorisms, and 
general common-sense truths, philosophic sagacity expresses the thoughts of wise men and 
women that transcend popular wisdom and attain a philosophic capacity (Oruka 1991:33-34). 
Hence, while we can consider all examples of philosophic sagacity as forming part of sage 
philosophy, not every illustration of sage philosophy constitutes philosophic sagacity. This 
explains why in Oruka’s conception of philosophic sagacity, the folk sagacity dimension of 
sage philosophy is relegated to the background—since it would be a fall-back to 
ethnophilosophy, which Orukawanted to avoid at all costs. 
Presbey (1997) looks at the various problems that could arise in the implementation of 
Oruka’s sage philosophy project. She highlights some criticisms of the project and presents 
some examples of the relevance of Oruka’s work. Presbey (1999) explores the role of 
Oruka’s sage philosophy within African philosophy and philosophy in general. She raises the 
larger issue of the relationship of wisdom and philosophy as the heart of the sage philosophy 
project. She interviews some individual sages in Kenya and attempts an analysis of what they 
said. In her interviews, the sages reveal that their lives were devoted to the betterment of their 
communities and their service was to various individuals in that community. Two main 
aspects arise from this theme, that of individuals living a selfless life for the good of others in 
the community, and living a life where strong negative emotions are controlled (ibid.95). 
Presbey recommends that the many wise sages to be found in Africa merit further study by 
philosophers and others. 
Tunde Bewaji (1994) in his review of Sage Philosophy posits the entire project as a 
refreshingly challenging and effective polemic against opponents of philosophic sagacity, 
against the doctrine of philosophical non-reflectivity of the traditional African mind, and 
against the idea of pre-logicality or irrationality of traditional African peoples. 
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The overview of the opinions above shows that Oruka’s philosophic sagacity has a 
place in the modern debate on African philosophy.40 The modernist context from which 
Oruka produces sagacity is relevant to the future of the philosophical enterprise in Africa. 
Nevertheless, where I tend to disagree with these opinions is that they focus on fundamental 
differences between the North Atlantic and Africa, the regions which are the context of this 
work. African philosophy, as most of the views above imply, can only be discussed in 
reference to the North Atlantic paradigm. We need to go beyond that. We need to overcome 
both centrist universalism and separatist particularism. Both of the extremes are 
interculturally untenable. Oruka elaborates on African wisdom, but he gives us the 
impression that this wisdom is limited to Africans in their particular context. Intercultural 
philosophy allows us to go beyond that context, and I posit that African wisdom can be 
interculturally relevant and have practical implications. 
The hegemonic context in which philosophic sagacity is produced is hardly discussed, 
and nor is the high degree of global interactions that characterize our contemporary world. 
Furthermore, the impression inherent in the opinions is that Africa can receive only and not 
return, with the usual evident signs of Western difference and superiority. This explains why 
only Western paradigms are used to perpetrate its hegemony. A counter-hegemonic approach 
would be interculturally rewarding. 
In this project, I attempt to go beyond Western constructs with their hegemonic 
universalist approach; but I do not reside in the ethnocentric trap, and rather look beyond in a 
bid to foster intercultural dialogue. The ethnocentric trap focuses on an essentialist, unified 
identity, giving the impression that the self forms a unity onto itself. It interprets identity as 
an internal, tradition-laden entity that ought to be protected from influences coming from 
                                                 
40Sagacious Reasoning: Henry Odera Oruka in Memoriam (1997)is a book edited by Anke Graness and Kai 
Kresse. This book is a collection of essays by Oruka written between 1972 and 1995 and essays on him by a 
mixed group of scholars united in their interest in African philosophy and their knowledge of Oruka and his 
works. The book is dedicated to Oruka. The ‘Prologue’ is written by Kai Kresse and an ‘Epilogue’ by Anke 
Graness. Other contributions are Kwasi Wiredu’s ‘Remembering H. Odera Oruka’; Sophie Bosede Olowule’s 
‘Oruka’s Mission in African Philosophy’; Muyiwa Falaiye’s ‘Popular Wisdom vs. Didactic Wisdom: Some 
Comments on Oruka’s Philosophic Sagacity’; Frederick Ochieng’-Odhiambo’s ‘Philosophic Sagacity 
Revisited’; Dikirr Patrick Maison’s ‘Sagacity in the Maasai Concept of Death and Immortality’; Oriare 
Nyarwath’s ‘Sagacity and Freedom’; Gail Presbey’s ‘Is Elijah Masinde a Sage? The Dispute between H. Odera 
Oruka and Chaungo Barasa’; Ulrich Lolke’s ‘Parental Care as a Principle of Development’; and Dismas 




outside. Ethnocentrism is a pitfall we have to liberate ourselves from because it encourages 
immutability, whereas one can acquire many more identities in life. Ethnocentrism limits 
identity to some unchanging object to be handed down from one generation to the next. This 
is dangerous because it generates only more ethnical, social, and political problems than it 
pretends to solve. 
Intercultural philosophy enables us to acknowledge difference but does not allow us 
to entrench ourselves in that difference. Humanity surely has a viable survival strategy in 
intercultural dialogue with those from other cultural orientations. At the epistemological 
level, there is a need for the contemporary African philosopher to engage in intercultural 
complementarity and critical collaboration with other philosophical traditions all over the 
globe. This would foster the construction of African knowledge and lead to insights in 
African matters of vital importance today. It would necessitate a re-thinking in our search for 
the expressions and representations of traditional wisdom in Africa and beyond. In this 
process, a newer vision of African sagacity would emerge, beyond Oruka’s, enabling us to 
explore the possibilities and strategies of intercultural epistemology. 
 
1.16. Outline of the dissertation and overview of chapters 
My tentative answers to the questions are provided in the following seven chapters of this 
thesis, each of which deals with a different but related aspect of philosophic sagacity and 
intercultural philosophy. The presentation that follows provides an overview of each chapter 
and indicates how each chapter fits into the overall plan of this work. 
The debate on the existence, nature, and identity of African philosophy has been 
presented in this Chapter 1, Introduction: African philosophy. This chapter focuses on the 
debate about African philosophy among African and Africanist academic philosophers that 
was sparked off in the 1960s and 1970s and continues to the present. This debate led to the 
development of two antagonistic camps: the universalists or modernists, and the particularists 
or traditionalists. The chapter also discusses the various models or trends in African 
philosophy as conceived by African philosophers such as Oruka and Mudimbe. This 
discussion goes beyond the debate on African philosophy and postulates the relevance of 
intercultural philosophy to contemporary African philosophy. 
Ethnophilosophy constitutes Chapter 2 of this work. It provides a review of the debate 
to date on ethnophilosophy from the time the Belgian Franciscan missionary Placide Frans 
Tempels initiated the ethnophilosophical tendency in philosophico-anthropological studies in 
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Africa with the publication of his axial work Bantoe-filosofie /La philosophie bantoue in 
1945. A selection from the main texts of Tempels and the Rwandan Roman Catholic priest 
Alexis Kagame is presented so that we can highlight their main arguments and impact on 
contemporary African philosophy.  
From ethnophilosophy to philosophic sagacity is the title of Chapter 3. This chapter 
shows ethnophilosophy as the pivot of contemporary African philosophy. The purpose of 
Chapters 2 and 3 is to place ethnophilosophy centre stage in the main articulations that follow 
on the debate on the nature of African philosophy. However, we also examine the main 
criticisms against ethnophilosophy, especially those of Oruka, in a bid to validate Oruka’s 
rationale for endorsing philosophic sagacity.  
Sage philosophy: Basic questions and methodology constitutes Chapter 4. This 
chapter has a particular focus on Oruka’s sage philosophy and the methodology used in 
investigating it. I attempt to answer two central questions: what is sage philosophy, and how 
does one distinguish it from the other forms of philosophy that are available in Africa? A 
brief picture is presented on the continued relevance of wisdom in various traditions. Then 
there are sketches of, and comments on, the interviews Oruka had with some Kenyan sages. 
This chapter also provides a historical basis and presents the merits of philosophic sagacity 
within contemporary African philosophy. The purpose of this chapter is to attempt to provide 
the rationale for the treatment of philosophic sagacity as a fully-fledged trend in the 
development of African philosophy. 
Re-thinking Henry Odera Oruka’s philosophic sagacity in African philosophy is 
Chapter 5. This chapter brings out the main objections that have been levied against Oruka’s 
sage philosophy project. These objections range from Oruka’s own criticisms of the project to 
methodological and definitional problems. This chapter also uses a different philosophical 
method and aesthetic style (post-modernism) to go beyond the modernist stance inherent in 
Oruka’s approach. I also submit that a responsible post-modernism might be very useful for 
African/intercultural philosophy in our global context. 
Chapter 6 is entitled Philosophic sagacity in African philosophy: Propagating the 
West? This chapter shows that philosophic sagacity is a subtle propagation of Western 
hegemony. Oruka does not critically revise the North Atlantic paradigm in his 
implementation of philosophic sagacity; hence, the Western power/knowledge system has 
had far-reaching implications for the constitution of knowledge about African realities. 
Colonialism is presented as a hegemonic project aimed at organizing and transforming non-
Europeans areas into fundamentally European constructs. I will then proceed to show how 
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anthropology was used, as a science, to foster the mercantilist ideology of colonialists and 
influence Eurocentric prejudices about so-called ‘primitive’ peoples. I also examine van 
Binsbergen’s experiences and criticisms of anthropology, especially Africanist anthropology. 
This discipline is contested for its claims for the production of valid intercultural knowledge. 
The chapter ends by highlighting van Binsbergen’s migration from cultural anthropology to 
intercultural philosophy.  
Towards a philosophy of globalization is the title of Chapter 7. In this chapter, I 
identify globalization as the one of the most important socio-political and cultural 
developments in our contemporary world that needs philosophical scrutiny. I try to see if 
Oruka’s philosophic sagacity and the orientations of several African philosophers can stand 
the test of time. This permits me to invite African/intercultural philosophers to think beyond 
local to global sagacity. I attempt to go beyond their positions by exploding their contentious 
conception of culture and to see if intercultural communication is possible. This is undertaken 
with a discussion of intercultural philosophers such as Ram Adhar Mall and Wim van 
Binsbergen. 
Chapter 8 is The African/intercultural philosopher today: Challenges and 
perspectives. In this concluding chapter, I identify the main challenges for the contemporary 
African/intercultural philosopher. The challenges are enormous but we need to create an 
intercultural framework in a bid to go beyond borders. I propose an intercultural hermeneutic, 
couched in counter-hegemonic discourses, a hermeneutic that allows us to cross borders in 







This chapter seeks to present a review of the debate on ethnophilosophy from the time the 
Belgian Franciscan missionary Placide Frans Tempels initiated the ethnophilosophical 
tendency in philosophico-anthropological studies in Africa with the publication of his axial 
work, Bantoe-filosofie (La philosophie bantoue) in 1945, and the impact ethnophilosophy has 
had and continues to have on present-day African philosophy. Even though we have had a 
brief presentation of this topic in Chapter 1, I still think it necessary to throw more light on 
the historical background and context of its emergence in a bid to see the problematic it 
raises. This explains my treatment of the African debate on ethnophilosophy in African 
philosophy in Chapters 2 and 3 of this work. 
It is widely acknowledged that current discussions about African philosophy are in 
some way a reaction to Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy.41 Even though Hountondji and the late 
Cameroonian philosopher Towa re-defined the term ethnophilosophy in their own way, they 
did not initially coin the term as it is usually assumed. They rather made their reputation as 
philosophers for their relentless critiques of ethnophilosophy. Hountondji, for example, is 
given credit for this term because of his use of the term in his famous article The Myth of 
Spontaneous Philosophy (1974) to refer to works that describe collective African worldviews 
as philosophy. It is interesting to note that former Ghanaian president and philosopher 
Kwame Nkrumah had registered for a PhD dissertation at the University of Pennsylvania, 
United States of America, in 1943 and had proposed to work on what he termed 
‘ethnophilosophy’.42 
Hountondji and Towa used the term ethnophilosophy to refer to a cream of thinkers 
inspired by Tempels. Towa constructed the term ethnophilosophy to classify a group of 
works which mistakenly, according to him, attribute achievements of philosophy to 
‘traditional’ Africa. This consists in identifying the philosophy of any society with its 
                                                 
41 For more on the debate on ethnophilosophy see, for example, Towa (1971b); Hountondji (1983); Neugebauer 
(1987, 1990); Bewaji (1991); Wamba-dia-Wamba (1991); Masolo (1994); Osha (2011). 
42 Osha (2003b: 5-14). 
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worldview—in the case of Africa, the system of values which can be derived from myths, 
rites, proverbs, customs, and African culture at large. According to this conception, 
philosophy is implicit in every traditional society. This can be studied through the cultural 
elements and the implicit thoughts to be exposed as a collective philosophy. 
Towa explains that ethnophilosophy, as an approach, is neither purely philosophical 
nor ethnological, but ethnophilosophical. The Cameroonian philosopher Fabien Eboussi-
Boulaga describes ethnophilosophy as a philosophic work that is close to ethnography. He 
likens it to an ‘exhumed philosophy’, a ‘tribal philosophy’, and an ‘ethnic philosophy’.43 
Bodunrin also discards ethnophilosophy. He judges that ethnophilosophical works are 
‘philosophically unsatisfactory’ (Bodunrin 1981:173), not because the materials on which 
they are based are philosophically underserving; rather, it is because ethnophilosophers ‘do 
not attempt to give a philosophical justification of the belief system or issues that arise in it’. 
They are simply ‘dogmatic in the veneration of the culture’ (ibid.172).  
Hountondji describes ethnophilosophy as an ethnological work with philosophical 
pretensions.44Among his many definitions of ethnophilosophy, Hountondji writes that it is 
 
[…] the extension into the field of thought in general of the inventory of the corpus of 
so-called ‘primitive’ knowledges, [an inventory] that had been undertaken at that time 
for plants and animals by two pilot-disciplines: ethno botany and ethno zoology.45 
 
Even if this is how Hountondji and Towa constructed the term ethnophilosophy, it is 
not how the term is commonly understood by the large number of sociologists, philosophers, 
and anthropologists that, almost 70 years after Tempels, still take him seriously.46 The term is 
seen in analogy to ethnohistory, ethnoscience, ethnobotany, and so on. These three terms are 
an anthropological coinage from between the 1950s and the 1970s.  
Neugebauer (1990) identifies two central points that may clarify the context of the 
discussion on ethnophilosophy: The first point relates to the racialist and paternalistic 
ideology of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism. The second point, according to 
Neugebauer, indicates the necessity to be always explicit about one’s own concept of 
                                                 
43 Eboussi-Boulaga (1977: 29-31). 
44 Hountondji (1983: 34). 
45 Hountondji (2002: 208). 
46 For more on this large following see, for example, Kagame (1956); Jahn (1961); Griaule (1965); Griaule & 
Dieterlen (1965); Mbiti (1970); van Binsbergen (1981, 2003); Hebga (1982); and Neugebauer (1990).  
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philosophy. Nevertheless, the academic philosophical discourse is not the only discourse in a 
society. It is possible, in the African context, to clearly perceive a discourse of non-academic 
philosophers, or a scholastic–religious discourse, or a discourse of sages and elders (ibid. 46-
47). This suggests a need to study alternative discourses, with a refocusing on those 
discourses that have been taken for granted and those that have been suppressed. 
 
2.2. Pike’s codification in the study of culture 
Members of a society always have more or less coherent ideas as to what the principles are 
on which that society is built and what makes it tick. However, these so-called participants 
are not professional sociologists, anthropologists, historians, or political economists. Much of 
the internal workings of society depend on forms of submission and exploitation which the 
members can hardly afford to realize consciously and which are covered under thick layers of 
symbolism and ideology. Sheer exploitation of one class by another may present itself to the 
participants as laudable service to the gods, the ancestors, the king, the aristocracy, elders, 
men, etc. So, by and large, the way participants view and categorize their society goes some 
way towards understanding that society, but never all the way. The classification which a 
scientific observer applies to a society must take into account the participants’ own 
classifications, but observers also need to go beyond such local classifications, leading to 
analytical perspectives that the participants themselves would never contemplate, 
perspectives that would often even be unthinkable in the terms of their own society and 
culture. 
In order to deal with these types of problems, American linguistic anthropologist 
Kenneth Pike (1912–2000) coined the terms emic and etic, which to him are not so much two 
modes of approaching and analysing a society but, in a narrower sense, two ways to render 
the classification system of a different culture: emic, in which the analyst seeks to understand 
and render the indigenous classification system; and etic, in which external analytical 
categories are imposed regardless of the people’s own classification.47 The paired concepts of 
emic and etic have been used to differentiate between the awareness by members of a cultural 
orientation on how the culture is internally structured, on the one hand, and a structuring that 
is analytically imposed from the outside, on the other. In other words, the concept emic 
signifies a method of analysis of a cultural orientation as produced by members of that 
                                                 
47 See Pike’s Language in Relation to a Unified Theory of the Structure of Human Behavior (1954/1967). 
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cultural orientation. This model explains the ideology or behaviour of members of that 
cultural bearing. The concept etic signifies a method of analysis produced by a researcher or 
an outsider or an observer towards a local production of cultural elements. The etic model 
attempts to be universal, while the emic is considered to be culture-specific. 
Pike’s terminology is borrowed from a linguistic method of analysis of cultural 
orientations in anthropology. In linguistics, one can describe speech sounds from two 
interrelated angles: that of phonetics (hence etic), and that of phonology, whose basic unit of 
study is the phoneme (adjective, phonemic; hence emic).The phonetic perspective provides a 
purely external description, informed by the anatomical and physical parameters of which 
speech sounds consist. The phonemic frame of reference, on the other hand, points to the 
smallest unit of speech sound that can be adequately perceived by those who are able to use 
the given language, relying on the distinguishing parts of the speech sound. 
Pike’s classification came from the new orientation of the classic anthropology that 
had arisen in the 1930s with such proponents as Malinowski, Evans-Pritchard, Leiris, Fortes, 
and Griaule. Before this new orientation, the etic approach was the dominant mode in 
anthropology.48 However, with the coming of prolonged, in-depth fieldwork and therefore of 
an emic approach, the empirical horizon of individual studies had to become narrower. Emic 
analysis necessitated that the researcher learned a new language and stayed on the spot for 
years, within a narrow space and time. In this sense we can talk of an ethnoscience. 
Ethnoscience is an emic presentation of the indigenous knowledge of a different culture, 
where diminished mental powers, for example, may be caused by witchcraft, demons, 
breaking of taboos, ancestors, etc. Yet the same culture also knows about bone setting, 
obstetrics, and so on in ways that would also be considered valid from a Western or 
cosmopolitan scientific point of view. We may also cite ethnobotany, which is likely to 
classify plants according to local cosmologies and beliefs, and not according to the 
universalizing, analytical, scientific classification system initiated by the Swedish botanist, 
physician, and zoologist Linnaeus. In the same way, ethnophilosophy must be understood as 
an attempt to render in discursive, cosmopolitan academic text, the indigenous philosophizing 
of a particular culture—in this case an African culture. It is not a form of ethnology but 
simply an application in the philosophical perspective of emic anthropology. Such rendering 
is devoid of the universalist and cosmopolitan viewpoint in both form and meaning. This 
                                                 
48 We may cite theories concerning the fixed and universal phases of aesthetic development, such as 
evolutionism, diffusionism, and materialism. 
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probably explains why in the field of African philosophy, ethnophilosophy (in the hands of 
Towa, Hountondji, etc.) came to be a pejorative term for the kind of rendering of African 
traditional thought (as was the case with Tempels, Kagame, etc.) that is no longer being done. 
But why not? Did we not throw away the child with the bath water?  
One of the persistent questions in African philosophical debates is this: what is the 
nature and possibility of an African philosophy? Can we retrieve it? We shall see how 
Tempels and Kagame have attempted to answer this question. I will proceed in the next 
section to show that there is still much authentic African thought in Tempels and Kagame. 
Their methods may be flawed, and therefore the format of what they present is disputable; 
Tempels, for instance, used the Scholastic format.49 However, every format change from oral 
to text is inherently problematic, and the same format change is always involved whenever 
we do cultural description. 
 
2.3. Placide Frans Tempels 
Tempels is credited with being the first to argue that Africans have a philosophy. Even 
though he was neither an African by birth nor a professional philosopher, he had a huge 
influence on African philosophy with the publication of his book Bantu Philosophy. It is 
widely acknowledged that current discussions about African philosophy are in some way a 
reaction to Tempels’ book, originally published in Dutch as Bantoe-filosophie in 1945.50 
Tempels is both hero and villain in the story of African philosophy. Perhaps both terms are 
too strong, yet Tempels is credited with being the first to argue that Africans have a 
philosophy. In the words of Eritrean philosopher Tsenay Serequeberhan: 
 
 Tempels was forced to admit—against the grain of the then established 
‘knowledge’—that the Bantu/African is not a mere beast devoid of consciousness, but 
a human being whose conscious awareness of existence is grounded on certain 
foundational notions. (Serequeberhan 1991a:11) 
 
                                                 
49 The Scholastic format pertains to the theological and philosophical method of learning in medieval European 
schools, which emphasized deductive logic and the authority of key figures such as Plato, Aristotle, Augustine, 
and Aquinas. 
50 The first French version, entitled La Philosophie bantoue, was published in 1945, and the first English 
translation, by Rev. Colin King, was published in 1959.  
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Serequeberhan’s comment is deliberately negative and interculturally misleading. 
Tempels wrote his book not because he was ‘forced’ as Serequeberhan opines, but because he 
had lived with the Baluba. Throughout his encounters with the Baluba, he was convinced of 
and open to Africa’s capability to build a philosophical life-world. That did not force him to 
admit but rather forced him to proclaim the fact, in the face of widespread racialist 
assumptions to the contrary at his time. In addition, the numerous criticisms levied against 
Tempels in major debates in African philosophical circles by professional philosophers 
require some comment here. Tempels was neither a professional philosopher nor an 
ethnologist or anthropologist. He was clearly only an amateur philosopher who had 
undergone two years of training in philosophy in the seminary while preparing for the Roman 
Catholic priesthood. That was his only claim to scholarship and academic knowledge. 
 Mudimbe, a leading African philosopher and linguist, notes that Tempels’ book ‘cast 
doubts on the greatness of the colonial venture’ and provoked the anger of those who 
‘considered the right to colonize as a natural right’ (Mudimbe 1988:137). In addition, 
Hountondji observes that Tempels was a voice for humanitarianism and social justice within 
the framework of colonialism.  
However, Tempels is also a villain of the story. For while he acknowledged that the 
Bantu-speaking had a philosophy, he maintained that they were for the most part unconscious 
of that philosophy: 
 
We do not claim that Bantus are capable of presenting us with a philosophical treatise 
complete with an adequate vocabulary. It is our own intellectual training that enables 
us to effect its systematic development. It is up to us to provide them with an accurate 
account of their conception of entities, in such a way that they will recognize 
themselves in our words and will agree. (Tempels 1959:24) 
 
Furthermore, as Mudimbe argues, Tempels did not totally reject the ideology of 
colonialism, but rather: 
 
[…] proposes more efficient means to his avowed goal, the task of civilising and 
evangelising Bantu peoples. (Mudimbe 1988:137-138) 
 
Moreover, as Hountondji remarked, while crediting the Bantu with a philosophy 
Tempels’ own philosophical credentials were minimal and he used the word ‘philosophy’ 
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loosely to mean little more than a coherent, rich, and complex way of thinking.51Finally, 
Mudimbe argues that even though we have gone beyond the far-reaching and drastic change 
initiated by Tempels, we still find traces of Tempels in African philosophy. The most 
stimulating debates or orientations in the field of African philosophy still delineate 
themselves, directly or indirectly, with respect to Tempels (ibid.).52 The Cameroonian 
philosopher Pierre Meinrad Hebga (1928–2008) corroborates this view when he challenges 
those scholars who oppose Tempels and underrate the work of his supporters (by referring to 
this work debasingly as ‘ethnophilosophy’) as just being unappreciative of someone who 
made it possible for them to philosophize (Hebga 1982). 
Before we delve into Tempels’ conception of a Bantu philosophy, it is necessary to 
take a look at the intellectual climate and the impact this climate had at the time. The 20th 
century was dominated by a number of highly significant geopolitical processes: colonialism 
and decolonization; the Cold War and its subsequent culmination in the supposed global 
hegemony of the United States of America; greatly intensified intercontinental migration 
(especially from Africa), and the concomitant rise of multiculturalism especially in Western 
Europe; a new and decisive phase of globalization supported by new technologies of 
information and communication; and the emergence of fundamentalisms and terrorisms on a 
hitherto unprecedented, global scale. Under the influence of these geopolitical processes, a 
dominant discourse of difference emerged. There was a remarkable difference claimed to 
exist between Western and ‘primitive’ philosophies. This difference belongs to an intellectual 
edifice as expressed by Lucien Lévy-Brühl. Racialism emerged in the 18th century as the 
dominant expression of European expansion and the transcontinental domination which the 
racialism justified. Colonial rule after the Berlin Congress was saturated with racialism. 
Lévy-Brühl, an armchair anthropologist (rather than a philosopher), merely gave a systematic 
expression to what was commonly thought all around him by intellectuals from Europe and 
the United States of America. He posits that there is a radical difference between the West 
                                                 
51 In this work, the term ‘Bantu’ is used as a linguistic category/macrofamily (a division of Niger–Congo or 
Benue) and hence as an admissible and established scientific term. This is opposed to ‘Bantu’ as an ethnic 
category in the southern African racialist political system. The early African philosophers took over the ethnic 
Bantu category, although Tempels and especially Kagame, the linguist, may have actually meant ‘Bantu-
speaking’. Because of the unsavoury political antecedents of the term, in southern African scholarly literature 
the term ‘Bantu’ is no longer used and is replaced by the uncontentious, conspicuously linguistic ‘Bantu-
speaking’. 
52 See for example, Towa (1971b); Oruka (1975); Bodunrin (1981); and Hountondji (1983).  
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and ‘primitive’ peoples. The West, for example, is characterized by a history of intellectual 
and spiritual reasoning, whereas the life, Weltanschauung, and thinking of the ‘primitives’ 
were viewed as inferior or having nothing in common with the West.53 
From Lévy-Brühl’s assertion, we can deduce a theory of two types of mentality: the 
Western participates in rational, logical thought and inquires into causal determinations and 
relations; ‘primitives’ are pre-logical and strictly depend upon the law of mystical 
participation.54 This binary opposition model conceived by Lévy-Brühl ushered in 
contributions dealing with ‘primitive philosophies’. This does not necessarily mean that all 
those who were then studying ‘primitive’ organizations tried to defend Lévy-Brühl’s thesis of 
a fundamental difference in reason between the ‘primitive’ and the ‘civilized’. Instead, all of 
them, even those like Delafosse, who commented upon African structures and peoples with a 
vivid Einfühlung (sympathy), tried to pinpoint the divergence between Europe and the Black 
continent and to describe this difference in a bid to possibly bring out points of convergence 
in human cultures. By 1965, English anthropologist Sir E.E. Evans-Pritchard (1902–1973), 
who propagated Lévy-Brühl in the 1930s and translated or prefaced some of his works in 
English, could state: 
 
[...] there is no reputable anthropologist who today accepts this theory of the two 
distinct types of mentality. (Evans-Pritchard 1980: 88)55 
 
In The Invention of Africa (1988) and The Idea of Africa (1994), Mudimbe maps out 
the historical course of the apprehension and description of the ‘Other’ in Western thought 
from pre-colonial times and the consolidation of the African image in the power/knowledge 
system (Foucault) of colonialism and during the post-colonial period. The divisions between 
savage versus civilized, pre-logical versus logical, perceptual versus conceptual, oral versus 
                                                 
53 See Mudimbe (1988: 135-136) and also Evans-Pritchard (1980: 80). 
54 In an attempt to make a difference between the ‘Western’ mind and the ‘primitive’ or ‘native’ mind,Lévy-
Brühl argues that the primitive mind is unable to address contradictions, unlike the Western mind that uses logic 
and speculation. Consequently, the native mind does not distinguish the supernatural world from reality but 
rather uses ‘mystical participation’ to manipulate the world. This means that the native mind engages in larger 
spiritual realities, beyond normal human understanding or experience. In this way, human beings in primitive 
cultures cannot be separated from their collective representations (group rituals, religions, myths, and customs), 
which are transmitted from one generation to another.  
55 For more criticisms of anthropology, see van Hensbroek (2003).  
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written, and religious versus scientific all indicate a division of reason between the so-called 
closed (African) and open (Western) societies. These dichotomies illustrate Eurocentric 
prejudices in Western thought about so-called primitive peoples and endorse the political 
project behind the constructions of cultural paradigms of the ‘Other’.  
Meanwhile, philosophy developed, in the course of the 20th century, a sophisticated 
philosophy of difference, primarily associated with Jacques Derrida. By contrast to its 
structuralist predecessors—especially Lévi-Strauss, who stressed (fundamental) difference as 
a primal strategy of human thought—these post-structuralists have explored the very rich and 
revealing implications of the idea inherent in Hegelian and Marxian dialectics that any 
presence carries within itself the implications of its own absence. Any difference has the 
implications of a non-difference, which is a state of being identical. In this philosophical 
tradition, the human condition is understood to be self-evidently and automatically beyond 
fundamental difference, unless the one-sidedness of political strategy and performative self-
presentation tempt one to violence against reality, including a fellow humanity, and to insist 
on a difference that is not really there. 
The dynamics of socially asserted identity (e.g. in the ethnic, political, and religious 
field) are claimed to thrive on the interplay between the (occasional, situational) invention of 
difference and the (occasional, situational) admission of such invention. From an intercultural 
philosophical perspective, the point is not to deny the existence and the socially constitutive 
nature of difference but to critique the tendency to claim fundamental difference, and to 
overcome the stalemate stagnation of social, political, and intellectual engagement that this 
tendency entails. This requires that we de-essentialize our own science in an attempt to go 
beyond fundamental difference and find a common ground.56 
Tempels was caught at the crossroads of several currents, namely, the evolutionary 
assumption of the late 19th century, Lévy-Brühl’s theses on pre-logism, the European self-
declared mission to civilize Africans through colonization, and Christian evangelization 
(Mudimbe 1988:136). Tempels came to Africa for religious motives, and he identified with 
the Bantu in a bid to bring them along the road to civilization, knowledge, and true religion. 
Even though he came to preach a foreign worldview, he ended up learning, respecting, and 
codifying the indigenous worldview. We can therefore perceive of Bantu Philosophy as a 
personal testimony to a new discovery that made a great impact in the life of Tempels. He 
admits: 
                                                 




I must say that my goal, in this study of the Bantu was to feel myself ‘Bantu’ at least 
once. I wanted to think, feel, live like him, have a Bantu soul. All that with the 
intention of adapting […]. There was doubtless in my attitude something more, or 
something else, than the simple scientific interest of an anthropologist who asks 
questions without the object of his science, the living man in front of him, necessarily 
being the objective of his investigations. My attitude perhaps included an element of 
sympathy towards this living individual and evoked in him a reaction of confidence 
towards me. (Tempels 1962:37) 
 
From this quotation, we notice that Tempels distances himself from the dominant 
anthropological model at the time. Anthropology, as a discipline, originated in the age of 
European expansion in order to entrench colonial rule and foster European prejudices about 
so-called primitive peoples.57 Tempels went against the grain and adopted a radically 
different attitude from the ethnocentric emphasis of the classical anthropology of his time; his 
attitude was one of sympathy with real encounters, visibly absent in anthropology. As an etic 
outsider trying to bring out the emic philosophy of the Bantu-speaking, he remained open to 
them. His encounter with the Baluba was independent of the assumptions and presuppositions 
of what he had learned. He lived among the Baluba in a non-impositional way, in a bid to 
catch a glimpse of their life as it showed itself. This encounter also transformed his own life 
radically. He involved himself in what Husserl calls ‘phenomenological reduction’: 
examining the meaning produced by pure impersonal consciousness and describing the 
human ‘life-world’ in terms of those essences found within conscious experience. 
There were immediate reactions to Tempels’ book. French philosopher Gaston 
Bachelard greeted Tempels’ book as a treasure. Senegalese intellectual Alioune Diop pledged 
his faith on it and wrote an introduction to the French version in which he described Bantu 
Philosophy as the most influential work he had ever read. Nevertheless, the book met with 
stiff resistance from the Roman Catholic hierarchy.58 This, however, did not dissuade 
                                                 
57 For more on anthropology see, for example, Mudimbe (1988); van Hensbroek (2003); and Chapter 7. 
58 For example, Bishop Jean-Felix de Hemptinne tried to control the circulation of Bantu Philosophy and 
persuade Rome to condemn the book as heretical. He even insisted that Tempels be expelled from the country. 
All these attempts, however, failed and his critique has no relevance for the contemporary discussion. The 
African debate, with further critiques of Tempels, is discussed in the next chapter. 
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Tempels from proposing his work, and particularly his ontology, as a good way white men 
could use to encounter Africans and understand them.  
We have seen above the intellectual climate and the impact it had at the time Tempels 
wrote his seminal work Bantu Philosophy. How, then, does Tempels conceive of a Bantu 
philosophy? How does he make explicit Bantu traditional systems of thought within the 
framework of their rationality? In the next section, I put forth the main points in Tempels’ 
conception of Bantu philosophy. 
 
2.4. Tempels’ vision of a Bantu philosophy 
Mudimbe (1988:138-139) summarizes Tempels’ conception of a Bantu philosophy in five 
propositions:59 
 
1) Since Bantu are human beings, they have organized systems of principles and references 
(Mudimbe 1988:138).These systems constitute a philosophy even if Bantu are ‘not capable of 
formulating a philosophical treatise, complete with an adequate vocabulary’ (Tempels 
1959:36). Thus, it is the function of outsiders, like Tempels himself, to formulate for the 
Bantu what their philosophy is. In other words, this philosophy is an implicit one, and it is 
Tempels who can make it explicit by interpreting Bantu answers to his questions, thereby 
unveiling its organized and systematic character of beliefs and customs. Even though 
Tempels introduces a particular mode of representing and endorsing the existence of a Bantu 
philosophy, I find his position here extremely condescending. Besides, this raises two 
pertinent questions: why should the Baluba be incapable of expressing their thought in 
discursive, coherent, explicit terms? Why should it require outsiders, such as Tempels, to do 
that for them? Let me explain. The Baluba cannot do so because so far they have not been 
exposed to examples of such systematic exposition of thought. Even Tempels knows only one 
such example: the Scholastic, Thomist philosophy he learned in his training for the 
priesthood. Hence, his rendering of Baluba thought has a Thomist format. Kagame, as we 
shall see later in this chapter, also adds to this format the modern philosophical format 
because he had been reading Western philosophy. In my mind, it is only the established 
textual examples, the recognition of such discursive rendering as a genre, which constitutes 
the difference between Tempels and his Baluba interlocutors. There is no inherent 
                                                 
59 For more inspiring summaries see, for example, Eboussi-Boulaga (1968) and Tshiamalenga (1981). 
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incapability here, just as there is no inherent incapability on Tempels’ side. In fact, Tempels 
is clearly only an amateur philosopher, forced by circumstances to write the philosophy of his 
Baluba friends in order to bring his ulterior civilizing motives closer to realization. 
 
2) This philosophy is ontology.60 In the history of Western philosophy, starting from the Pre-
Socratic philosophers, the nature of reality has been described in terms of a static conception of 
being, by the use of set phrases such as ‘the reality that is’, ‘anything that exists’, or ‘what is’. 
This may be largely so in Western philosophy, but it is not universally so. Tempels does not 
accept this static conception of being and he attributes to the Bantu a dynamic conception of 
being, an ontology in which being is conceived as ‘vital force’. The universe can be described 
as an interrelation of forces within the whole of existence. Heraclitus, for example, explained 
change and movement as the essential feature of reality. To this we may add the conception of 
ontology in the works of Heidegger and the French philosopher Jean Paul Sartre (1905–1980) 
in the 20th century. Heidegger, for the grounding of his ontology, likes to go back to 
Parmenides, a Pre-Socratic philosopher of being, more even than to Plato. For Heidegger, 
being is continuously manifesting itself in concrete manifestations in the world. It is the 
meaning that reigns in everything that is. Our being-in-the-world is the basic state of human 
existence. It is our human existence that reveals itself, and it is quite a different conception of 
‘human being’ from the one we find in traditional philosophy. For Sartre, existence precedes 
essence. We cannot explain human nature in the same way as we can describe a manufactured 
article. There is no such thing as a common human nature that is common to all humans, no 
such thing as a specific essence. Rocks and dogs are different from human beings. Rocks and 
dogs, Sartre would say, have only what he calls ‘being-in-itself’ (être-en-soi), or mere 
existence. But a human being, according to Sartre, not only exists, that is, has being-in-itself, 
but also has ‘being-for-itself’ (être-pour-soi)—which means that a human being, unlike an 
inanimate object or tree, is a conscious subject that creates its own future. It is with such an 
approach that Tempels attempts to underpin the African theory of being (ontology), the vital 
force, which is inherently dynamic. Here is what he says about the vitality of being and how 
being relates to its force as opposed to the Western notion of being: 
 
                                                 
60 Ontology is the branch of philosophy that concerns itself with the question of being, the ultimate reality or 
existence. A systematic account of existence is the major preoccupation of philosophers such as Heidegger, 
Merleau-Ponty, Deleuze, Levinas, and Foucault. 
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We can conceive the transcendental notion of ‘being’ by separating it from its 
attribute, ‘force’, but the Bantu cannot. ‘Force’ in his thought is a necessary element 
in ‘being’, and the concept ‘force’ is inseparable from the definition of ‘being’. There 
is no idea among Bantu of ‘being’ divorced from the idea of ‘force’. (Tempels 1959: 
50-51) 
 
3) The main idea in Bantu ontology is a concept of force rather than essence, as compared 
with Western ontology. Bantu ontology in its specificity implies that being, as understood in 
the Western tradition, signifies force in Bantu tradition, and therefore one can state that being 
is force (being = force). 
Here is Tempels: 
 
Bantu speak, act, live as if, for them, beings were forces. Force is not for them an 
adventitious, accidental reality, force is even more than a necessary attribute of 
beings: Force is the nature of being, force is being, being is force. (Tempels 1959: 51) 
 
The origin, the subsistence or annihilation of beings or of forces, is expressly and 
exclusively attributed to God. The term to ‘create’ in its proper connotation of ‘to 
evoke from not being’ is found in its full signification in Bantu terminology (Kupanga 
in Kiluba). (ibid. 57) 
 
All force can be strengthened or enfeebled. That is to say, all being can become 
stronger or weaker. (ibid. 55) 
 
 It is this ontology that explains Bantu consciousness and action. It is found in their 
social institutions, in the moral and religious lives of the people. The interrelationship of 
forces is seen in a hierarchy of beings running down from God (the origin of the vital force), 
through man (including the dead ancestors and the living community of humans), to the 
animal and inanimate world. The dynamic relationship of the vital force in every being can be 
permanently sustained, decreased, or simply brought to an end. The force grows or 
diminishes during passage from one stage to another. With these interactions of forces, 
beings are neither tied to themselves nor are they passive, but they are involved in what 
Tempels describes as a ‘principle of activity’ (ibid. 51); and this ‘dynamic dialectic of 
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energy’ (Mudimbe 1988:139) forms the basis of what Tempels depicts as the ‘general laws of 
vital causality’ (1959: 67–68), that is to say: 
 
(a)Man (living or deceased) can directly reinforce or diminish the being of another 
man; 
(b)The vital human force can directly influence inferior force-beings (animal, 
vegetable, or mineral) in their being; 
(c)A rational being (spirit, manes, or the living) can act indirectly upon another 
rational being by communicating his vital force to an inferior force (animal, vegetable, 
or mineral) through the intermediacy of which it influences the rational being. (ibid. 
67-68) 
 
4) Bantu notion of being can be construed and rendered with clarity through the conceptual 
frame of Western philosophy. By this, Tempels implies that the Bantu have an implicit, 
unconscious philosophy that needs a superior Western terminology for it to be uncovered. It 
would be instructive to note that Tempels is not only advocating for a Bantu mode of thought. 
He is also attempting to reconcile both Europe and Africa at the level of spirituality and, 
subsequently, of mind. He argues:  
 
It is our job to proceed to such systematic development. It is we who will be able to 
tell them in precise terms, what their inmost concept of being is. (ibid. 36)  
 
5) Bantu ontology could well be a possible basis for and reference point to the ontologies of 
all ‘primitive peoples’ or non-Western societies in general. In fact, we notice that through the 
whole of Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy, he employs the words ‘Africans’, ‘Bantu’, ‘primitives’, 
‘natives’, and ‘savages’ interchangeably. By this he probably wants to indicate that even 
though he is introducing to us the ‘philosophy’ of his Baluba friends (a small community in 
the Belgian Congo, today known as the Democratic Republic of Congo), his conclusions 
could well be a possible basis for and reference point to the ontologies of all ‘primitive 
peoples’ or non-Western societies in general. This position refutes the theories of Lévy-Brühl 
and ethnocentrism inherent in classical anthropology. The point conveyed here by Tempels is 
that indigenous systems of knowledge, outside the North Atlantic one, especially among so-




 Many colonials who are living in contact with Africans have assured me that I have 
set out nothing new, but merely set out systematically what they had grasped vaguely 
from their practical knowledge of Africans. (1959: 37)  
 
We have seen the five main propositions in the philosophy of Tempels. It is important 
to note the ideological relevance of his work. Tempels adds to the European discourse on the 
non-Western world, and in this case upon Africa, and he also conceives it as part of his 
‘mission to civilize’. Yet, in this attempt, he implicitly argues for the recognition of an 
African philosophy. Thus, in spite of the book’s extremely condescending tone, Tempels 
makes a significant break from classical anthropology. Moreover, at the level of academic 
African philosophy, the book served as a basis and reference point for all future attempts at 
formulating and constructing an indigenous African philosophical system. This ignited the 
debate about philosophy in Africa among academic African philosophers who reproached the 
work of Tempels. We shall examine these critiques in Chapter 3. 
But far from these critiques, a better way to read Tempels’ book would be to 
understand the context in which he wrote it and how his encounter with the Bantu shaped his 
own life. While Tempels was attempting to ‘civilize’, he found his moment of truth in an 
encounter with people he came to teach. He thus became their student and he tried to 
understand their version of the truth. During this encounter he came to know many things 
about the Bantu, which radically called into question his own convictions as the civilizer. He 
explored these conscious experiences without making any metaphysical assumptions. This 
intercultural encounter had a profound transformational effect in the life of Tempels. 
Tempels’ active participation in the symbols and rituals of those he was supposed to teach led 
him to understand and interiorize their indigenous beliefs better, rather than just limiting 
himself with prejudices. He knew where he was coming from but found ways of negotiating 
his own identity with the Bantu and making meaning out of the tension of the various 
contradictions in his own life.  
In the first proposition of Tempels’ philosophy sketched above, he claims that 
Africans are incapable of articulating the way they perceive and understand the world. This 
opinion stems from the derogatory, Eurocentric conception that Africans live in a world that 
is essentially symbolized and ritualized in character. This implies that indigenous African 
peoples predominantly articulate their beliefs and values through rites, rituals, and 
masquerades, rather than using discursive verbal statements such as proverbs and myths. I 
think such an argument calls for the intercultural fieldworker, who is professionally trained, 
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to be active in trying to decode (interpolate the meanings of) such behaviour (symbolic and 
ritual), proverbs, and myths. Moreover, the tendency to limit the verbal articulateness of 
Africa peoples has been strongly challenged.61 In the next two sections, we will see some 
attempts to decode symbolism, ritual, myths, and proverbs in a comprehensive and discursive 
manner. This is seen in the works of Marcel Griaule and Alexis Kagame. 
 
2.5. Griaule’s Ogotemmêli 
Marcel Griaule (1898–1956), the French anthropologist known for his studies of the Dogon 
of West Africa, suggests a certain affinity between so-called Bantu ontology, as pioneered in 
Father Tempels’ amateur ethnography, and the worldview of the Dogon in present-day Mali. 
In the preface to Conversations with Ogotemmêli, he shows this relationship: 
 
Ten years ago [G. Dieterlen’s Les Ames des Dogon (1941), S. de Ganay’s Les Devises 
(1941) and my own Les Masques (1938)] had already drawn attention to new facts 
concerning the ‘vital force’. […] They have shown the primary importance of the 
notion of the person and his relations with society, with the universe, and with the 
divine. Thus Dogon ontology has opened new vistas for ethnologists. […] More 
recently […] Rev. Fr. Tempels presented an analysis of conceptions of this kind, and 
raised the question of whether “Bantu thought should not be regarded as a system of 
philosophy”. (Griaule 1965: 1- 2) 
 
In his study, Griaule relied on one informant, Ogotemmêli of Lower Ogol, a hunter 
who became blind by accident and who, in Griaule’s words, was ‘endowed with exceptional 
intelligence and wisdom’. In 33 days Ogotemmêli was able to introduce Griaule to the 
popular wisdom traditions and beliefs of the Dogon. Oruka, however, thinks Ogotemmêli is a 
folk sage, as opposed to the philosophic sage, in his categorization of sagacity.62 Griaule’s 
essay is organized around the informant’s interwoven monologues.63 These monologues, 
which are divided into two parts, range from the subject of the creation of the world to the 
                                                 
61 Some examples include the works of Griaule, Gyekye, Kagame, and Wiredu. 
62 We will repeatedly return to this categorization in Chapters 3, 4, and 5. 
63 There is an update on Dogon studies at the end of this section. For more critical literature around Griaule and 
Ogotemmêli see, for example, Ogono d’Arou (1956); Sarevskaja (1963); Goody (1967); Lettens (1971); 
Clifford (1983); and van Beek (1991). 
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origin of social organizations. The first part is based on a mythical decoding of the universe 
in its being, and the second focuses on interpreting the various symbols that underlie Dogon 
history, culture, and society. According to Griaule, the second part describes: 
 
[...] a world system, the knowledge of which will revolutionize all accepted ideas 
about the mentality of Africans and of primitive peoples in general. (Griaule 1965: 2) 
 
Nevertheless, many anthropologists, especially on Dogon studies, have not endorsed 
Griaule’s proposition for two main reasons: 
First, they doubted the authenticity of the conversations Griaule held with 
Ogotemmêli. This is because the Dogon, as primitives who live in a world that is symbolic 
and ritualized in character, were considered to be unable to have conceived of and articulated 
such a complex structuring of knowledge. In addition, Ogotemmêli, without any formal 
training in the conventional Western sense (indeed, he had undergone no modern education 
and spoke no Western language), was able to articulate this in so compelling a manner that it 
went against the grain of previous studies in and of African thought. Ogotemmêli’s mystical 
display of intuitive intellectualism puzzled the anthropological establishment. In fact, the 
dominant view was that the Dogon, like all primitives, lacked skills in decoding intellectually 
abstract symbols. Nevertheless, I think this is not a valid argument. This is because it merely 
underrates the extent to which literate specialist esoteric knowledge, like that of Islamic 
scholars, had entered the world of the Dogon and had been digested there. The Senegalese 
philosopher Souleymane Bachir Diagne (2004), for example, has written an intriguing 
exploratory account of the influence and effects of these philosophical texts, originally from 
Greece and then passed to the Islamic world. He asserts that these texts were introduced into 
the African context more than one thousand years ago. 
Second, Griaule’s book claims to be a simple report of Ogotemmêli’s teaching. These 
recitations of a simple guardian of ancestral tradition, in which Ogotemmêli intelligently and 
methodically interprets much of Dogon myths, symbols, and rituals, have been doubted. 
Moreover, Griaule’s book has also been criticized for not obeying the basic principles of 
social anthropology. How did he dialogue with Ogotemmêli in just 33 days? The standard 
anthropological procedure would entail long-term participant observation and linguistic 
competence in a bid to undertake key informant interviewing.  
 Finally, I think it is necessary to provide some updates on Dogon studies, especially 
on Griaule’s Conversations with Ogotemmêli. At present, the consensus is that Conversations 
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with Ogotemmêli can no longer be seen as a rendition of either Dogon folk philosophy or that 
of an individual sage, atypical as he might be. The reasons are twofold. First, the Dutch 
anthropologist Walter van Beek (1991) contends that the creation myth does not resonate at 
all with anything discoverable in Dogon society. This implies that the myth might be either a 
personal creation by Ogotemmêli, or a construct in which Griaule was important. The first 
option is unlikely, for various reasons, one of them being that a new set of myths later 
emerged which completely contradicted the first one.64 The second reason follows from Anne 
Doquet’s focus in her thesis Les masques dogon: ethnologie savant et ethnologie autochtone 
(Karthala 1999) on the manner in which Griaule produced his book. Using Griaule’s own 
field notes, which have been published on microfiche, Doquet shows how the information 
that Griaule got from Ogotemmêli was fragmentary and contradictory, and how it was 
worked and re-worked thoroughly by Griaule himself into a coherent and appealing tale. 
Griaule is very much present in the myth himself, not just in the eliciting answers but also in 
filling in gaps, muting contradictions, and constructing the whole edifice of the myth. Doquet 
thus corroborates, and the same holds a fortiori for Renard Pale, van Beek’s conclusion that 
Conversations with Ogotemmêli is not a ‘document dogon’ but a ‘document humain’. Their 
findings have been sustained by a line of new researchers, such as Eric Jolly, Jules Holder, 
Polly Richards, Barbara Demott, and Jacky Bouju, and buttressed by Dogon social scientists 
such as Isaie Dougnon and Sidiki Tinta. Their findings indicate that these ‘conversations’ 
were, in fact, fabrications by members of a Griaule research team in search of international 
fame and fortune (Hallen 2009:24-25). I think van Beek deserves credit for clearly and 
emphatically debunking Griaule. Nevertheless, his debunking of Griaule on details does not 
really diminish the overall stature of Ogotemmêli as a Dogon sage in terms of Oruka’s 
definition or my conception of sagacity. I will come back to this point in Chapter 5.  
Griaule’s work greatly contributed to indicating the importance of myth in an African 
setting, and the relation of myth to primitive philosophies. In spite of the great promise 
Griaule and his followers attach to myths, however, Oruka attempts to dislodge myths from 
the ranks of African philosophy, especially in his conception of philosophic sagacity. For 
him, the works of Tempels and his followers do not contain philosophy but rather 
mythologies. Myths, according to Oruka, are removed from philosophical thought and 
scientific inquiry. He uses a provocative and ironic title, Mythologies as African Philosophy, 
to warn that: 
                                                 




African mythologies should not be substituted for African philosophy. Mythologies 
thrive well where the past is placed above everything, above the present and above the 
future. One gives mythology a wonderfully high place when one calls it ‘philosophy’, 
and then it can be a great obstacle to progress and development. (Oruka: 1997:34) 
 
Here, I think Oruka exhibits a specific conception of myth and mythology. From a 
modernist standpoint, Oruka sets aside myth, religious sentiment, and mystical experience 
(Oruka 1990:1ff) and values the present over the past (Oruka 1997:34). Myths tend to be 
pejoratively thought of as collective representations that are made up of untruths or stories of 
the past. The French anthropologist Lévi-Strauss (1908–2009) argues that there is not just one 
definition or approach to myth. According to Lévi-Strauss’ influential approach to myth, 
myths are in the first place rational structures of superimposed binary oppositions, guides for 
thought, but not for the heart, which is absent in Lévi-Strauss’ theories. Myths can take 
paradoxical forms and even irrational contradictory versions and may not necessarily express 
a given rationality, a fact of which the members of a community might be absolutely 
unaware. 
Furthermore, van Binsbergen’s research on comparative mythology (2003, 2008, 
2009, 2012b), building especially on Witzel (2001, 2012), traces the global history of 
mythology, which may span as much as 200,000 years. In an attempt to show cultural unity 
as the original condition of humanity, he cites mythology as an aspect of African traditional 
wisdom. Myths articulate the wisdom traditions of a people, and they help to portray and 
underpin the people’s conception of the world and man. Myths also provide causal 
explanations for specific natural phenomena, human institutions, and even names. In this 
way, they provide models to be emulated and even act as sources of inspiration in real life. 
Hence, Oruka needs to broaden his conception of myths, as collective representations that are 
based on events or experiences. 
 
2.6 Alexis Kagame and the ethnophilosophical school 
Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy provoked a distant intellectual reaction from the Rwandan priest, 
Alexis Kagame. Kagame unreservedly wanted to check the validity of Tempels’ theory 
(Kagame 1956: 8) and to correct its generalizations and inherent intellectual shortcomings. 
Unlike Tempels, Kagame was a professional philosopher, a knowledgeable historian, 
501712-L-bw-Mosima
56 
anthropologist, linguist, and theologian. In 1955, Kagame was awarded his doctorate in 
philosophy from the Gregorian University in Rome. Two of his books made a profound 
impact in the field of African philosophy. His first treatise, La Philosophie Bantu- Rwandaise 
de l’être, deals with the Banya-Rwanda, a community well-defined by its history, language, 
and culture. The second work, La Philosophie Bantu comparée, expands this research to the 
whole of the Bantu area. According to Kagame, Tempels should be praised for using the 
philosophical method, the Scholastic, Thomist method he learned in his training for the 
priesthood. Yet, Bantu Philosophy shows that Tempels was not a sophisticated, state-of-the-
art scholar. The first reason Kagame gives is that Tempels did not pay attention to Bantu 
languages, which he claims could help express the worldview of Africans. Second, Tempels’ 
synthesis, which is based strictly on his experience within the Baluba-Shaba community, does 
not offer a thorough understanding of Bantu cultures (Kagame 1971:592). It is important to 
point out that thousands of kilometres separate Rwanda from the Baluba in the Democratic 
Republic of Congo. Kagame reconstructs a philosophical system through linguistic analyses 
of Bantu language.65 This approach is not just part of his academic training; he was also 
following the global intellectual trend (language-based structuralism) as initiated by Swiss 
linguist Ferdinand de Saussure. Kagame attempts to demonstrate that Bantu languages reveal 
a complex ontology that is uniquely African. This point comes close to the Whorf-Sapir 
thesis (first half of the 20thcentury) on the near-total determination of the human life-world by 
the specific categories inherent in the specific language spoken. Kagame also subscribes to 
the analytical approach to philosophy. I will briefly present these global intellectual trends 
below. 
 
2.7. Structuralism and language 
Structuralism is a methodology that seeks to find the underlying rules and conventions 
governing large social systems such as language or cultural mythology. The Swiss linguist 
Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913) was bothered by standard 19th century linguistic theories 
                                                 
65 Bantu languages are a subgroup of a larger group, Benue-Congo, which also comprises the Bantoid non-
Bantu languages (Nigeria, Cameroon) and grassfields Bantu (Cameroon and particularly Nigeria). Languages of 
the Bantu family are spoken in Cameroon, Central African Republic, Kenya, and Uganda, and completely or 
predominantly in Gabon, Equatorial Guinea, Congo, Cabinda, Democratic Republic of Congo, Angola, Rwanda, 
Burundi, Tanzania, Comores, Zambia, Malawi, Mozambique, Swaziland, Lesotho, Botswana, Zimbabwe, South 
Africa, and Namibia. 
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that presumed to find some commonality between foreign languages. He emphasized the 
study of the language system itself (langue, which is an idealized abstraction of language), 
rather than particular speech (parole, which is language used in daily life). De Saussure 
argued for a distinction between langue and parole. He was concerned with the ‘deep 
structures’ of language common to all speakers. He saw linguistics as the study of signs, 
which he defined as a combination of the signifier (the physical thing that signifies) and the 
signified (that which is signified). Hence, for de Saussure, language is made of signs, and the 
sign is made up of the signifier and the signified. The signifier is the sound pattern; the 
signified is the concept that comes to mind upon hearing it. De Saussure claimed that these 
are both psychological processes. He believed that recognizing a sign is more complex than 
connecting a name with a thing. It was French anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss who 
adapted and applied de Saussure’s methods to his ethnographic research. Lévi-Strauss sought 
to discover the underlying structures of thought in the myths of non-industrial societies and 
human communities generally. He noted that cultures are seen as systems of signs, the 
meaning of which could be found in the particular relationships of signs in the system itself. 
This implies that the meaning of a thing or an individual person is defined by its surrounding 
cultural structures. It also implies that the system has a coherent structure, which according to 
Lévi-Strauss is reflected in paired opposites. 
 
2.8. Analytical philosophy 
For Kagame, to speak of a Bantu philosophy, two conditions for its possibility ought to be 
taken into consideration: first, studying the consistency in Bantu languages; and second, 
using a philosophical method from Western philosophy in order to analyse it (Kagame 1971: 
591). This method is the analytical approach to philosophy. During a large part of the 20th 
century, the dominant philosophical movement in the English-speaking world was known as 
analytical philosophy. Analytical philosophy is grounded on the thesis that philosophical 
questions are primarily questions of language, with special focus on clarifying notions 
through an analysis of language. The main tasks of the philosopher, therefore, become 
clarification (‘analysis’ in the narrowest sense) of the meanings of the words/language with 
which our beliefs are expressed and justified—in the sense of identifying and assessing the 
arguments and evidence with which those beliefs are justified. Such rigorous linguistic 
analyses could prevent the abuse of language. This is the task analytical philosophers such as 
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Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, and Alfred North Whitehead prescribe to the 
philosopher. 
African philosophers such as Kagame and Wiredu take this challenge seriously and 
apply it in their study of African philosophy. We may also add the Ordinary Language 
Analysis adapted by Hallen and Sodipo in their study of the language of the Yoruba of south-
western Nigeria. It may be instructive to note that Kagame, for instance, uses language more 
as a naïve linguistic scholar, rather than as analytical philosophers such as Russell, 
Whitehead, or Wittgenstein, and based on Scholasticism and thus Aristotle. Wiredu (1972c) 
invites us to take a thorough philosophical look at the different kinds of beliefs Africans do 
actually have as well as the languages with which they are expressed. In Wiredu’s opinion, 
philosophy can be intercultural if it can be translated to meet with the shared foundational 
semantic and logical canons between the different natural languages (Wiredu 1998:148). This 
gives the possibility for an intercultural dialogue in philosophy and enhances the intercultural 
character of philosophy. He goes further to explore the philosophy inherent in the language 
and culture of his native Akan language (Wiredu 1980; 1996). Wiredu argues that the 
different ‘cultures’ necessarily have a universal component that accounts for the 
communication between them. Without such a component there would be no communication.  
What, therefore, is Kagame’s method? Kagame prescribes a systematic analysis and 
interpretation of a specific language in a bid to get to philosophical elements which can then 
be compared with other languages in the Bantu area. Here is Kagame’s description: 
 
[My method is to] look for the elements of a Bantu philosophy first within a specific 
language; to affirm nothing that is not based in an indisputable cultural proof, 
transcribed in the original language itself and translated literally into the language 
accessible to the foreign reader. Once in possession of these basic elements, to 
undertake the study on the scale of the Bantu area, to verify how each zone agrees 
with or differs with the results initially determined. (Kagame 1971:592) 
 
Kagame’s approach could be upheld as a preliminary step towards philosophizing. He 
worked on the premise that Aristotle’s ontology was a consequence of Greek grammar. He 
then tried to bring to light what he believed to be the ontology underlying the different Bantu 
languages. Through language, we can find this collective, deep, implicit philosophy. This 
silent philosophy can be described when we apply the major Scholastic grids to the language. 
They are formal logic, ontology, theodicy, cosmology, and ethics. 
501712-L-bw-Mosima
59 
Kagame aligns the four Bantu ontological categories with Aristotle’s (Table 2.1): 
 






1.Muntu: Being with intelligence 
2.Kintu: Being without intelligence, or thing 
1. Substance 1. οὐσία 
3.Hantu: Expresses the time and place 
(presents variants such as Pa- in the eastern 
Bantu languages, Va-in the west, and Go-+ 







4. Kuntu: Indicates modality and thus 
centralizes all the notions related to 
modifications of the being in itself or vis-à-
vis other beings. Hence, Kuntu corresponds 










6. πρός τι 
7. ποιεῖν 
8. πάσχειν 
9. κεῖσθαι  
10. ἔχειν 
 
For the sake of comparison, I have added the Aristotelian categories in Greek, which 
do not appear in Kagame’s text. From the table, one notices that the first two Bantu 
categories split the Aristotelian concept of substance. Man and things are not of the same 
category but constitute two radically different divisions. Man is the order which conceives the 
way in which things are thinkable. This is because man is endowed with intelligence. The 
things that are thinkable are non-man, Kintu, beings without intelligence. Humans are also 
thinkable but they are not usually conceived of as things, even though slaves could be. This 
category of thinkable things includes minerals, vegetables, and animals. Bantu ontology is 
clearly seen through the interrelationship between these four categories, which all come from 
the same root, ntu, and which refer to being or essence and also the idea of force. Kagame 
asserts that the Bantu equivalent of to be is strictly and only a copula. It links the subject class 
with the predicate and determines the quality of the proposition. By enunciating muntu, kintu 
(the essence of something) is signified and the notion of existence is not necessarily present 




2.9. Kagame and the challenges of interculturality 
In this section, I intend to go beyond the shortcomings inherent in Kagame’s project in a bid 
to provide a viable direction to African philosophical discourse. In the context of 
globalization, we notice that values and other cultural contents flow just as people and 
commodities do, and many boundaries are dissolving. I think Kagame’s conception of 
African philosophy needs a re-thinking. Can an African, in the current globalizing context, 
construct his being based on language? Can we structure African historical wisdom on purely 
linguistic lines? Are meanings within language or cultural systems stable enough to provide a 
definitive interpretation of texts or rituals arising from those systems? 
As we saw above, Kagame is not just a linguistic amateur but a priest trying to detect 
African difference (à la Mudimbe) by claiming identity with Aristotle and Saint Thomas 
Aquinas. However, in the mind of Derrida (1976), such linguistic models are untenable.66 
Derrida argues that most of the structuralist methodology fits within the ‘science of signs’ or 
semiotics. This science is not possible because we cannot have such stable meanings, and no 
definitive meaning of a text can ever be established. The very notion of a ‘definitive 
meaning’ implies certain unproven (and unprovable) assumptions about texts and language. 
Derrida’s deconstructive method is to lay bare these assumptions about language, to 
‘question’ the text about possible multiple meanings, and in so doing to show what he calls 
‘the free play of signifiers’. By this, Derrida implies that the writer of the word ‘privileges’ 
the word for a moment. This ‘privileging’ becomes the medium for the play of the signifier—
difference—rather than any background of a fixed linguistic system, which according to 
Derrida does not exist. This reminds us of the Heraclitan tradition that ‘you cannot step into 
the same river twice’. For Heraclitus, everything is subject to becoming or change. In the 
context of Derrida’s critique, it would mean ‘you cannot step into the same language twice’. 
From Derrida’s perspective, meaning is a process that is always relational and 
fluctuating. It is always inside a context and not outside. Given that meaning can occur only 
as experience, our experiences are constantly overriding (‘overwriting’) the lexical 
definitions of words, effacing those definitions, which in turn are constantly changing. A 
printed dictionary, for example, gives the false impression that language has stable meanings, 
                                                 




whereas those meanings are always ‘at play’ and in a flux. The use of a word not only goes 
beyond the dictionary definitions but also ‘effaces’ those forces at work(thing-in-itself)that 
act just beyond the horizon of consciousness(Derrida 1976). Hence, from the perspective of 
deconstruction, contrary to what Kagame posits, there are no extra-linguistic connections 
available to anchor meanings within language. 
Kagame’s use of language and his claim to final interpretation, in Derrida’s view, is 
hegemonic and borders on the ridiculous. It gives us the erroneous impression that 
Kinyarwanda culture is fixed, unique, and self-evident. Derrida tries to break down the binary 
system that privileges terms which are implicit in assumptions embedded within language 
systems. He suggests that in the use of language, the first term in a group of two is given 
pride of place. In distinctions like male/female, white/black, mind/body, master/slave, 
sign/signified, the first term is always privileged. In the view of Derrida, this is not correct 
because the first term has meaning only in relation to, and only because of, the second term. 
A master can be a master only if there are slaves. The existence of the master is dependent on 
the existence of the slave. This suggests that existence is depicted as the dynamic interactivity 
of its manifestations. In other words, one cannot perceive of a master unless one thinks of 
him in terms of his determining relationship with a slave. That is to say, the existence of a 
master is intelligible only by affirming the existence of a slave. This also suggests that our 
use of language should not be closed systems of absolutely certain, transcendental concepts. 
It suggests that meaning is relational and always fluctuating. This implies that we do not need 
to focus on binary opposites or establish axiological hierarchies, but can think them together 
or approach them in a creative, re-configuring manner. Given the interactions evident in the 
world today, language ought to be open-minded, changeable, and incomplete, and not consist 
of radically opposed entities or be couched in such fixed categories as Kagame wants us to 
see. 
Moreover, language as a means of conceiving being is highly problematic, given 
migrations and intercultural encounters in our contemporary world. This is because there are 
many languages, and people may be able to change languages and speak in several different 
ones. This implies that language is not innate or ontological; rather, it is acquired. We do not 
have a fixed way of conceiving the world. The use of fixed and stable categories gives the 
mistaken impression that identity is stable. Sartre argues that existence comes before essence. 
I exist before I define my identity, and no specific essence defines what it is to be human. 
Even the use of a word at one moment implies at least a slightly different background context 
than the use of the same word at another moment. This brings a difference in meaning, and 
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what this difference is can never be pinned down because even to ask a question about a 
change in meaning is to change a meaning. This, according to Heidegger (1996), is an 
inauthentic mode of communicating. Foucault (1966) too argues that language is a truth unto 
itself, speaking nothing other than its own meaning. Nothing truly meaningful is ever said or 
allowed to be said. Authentic existence is not in language but in caring for the beings in the 
world, given that we are essentially temporal beings. 
Kagame’s study of thought and language ought to take into consideration thinking in 
terms of rhizomes rather than trees. French philosophers Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) and 
Felix Guattari (1930–1992) think that if philosophers approach things as rhizomes, they will 
come up with a very different picture of how things really are. Rhizomes are plants that tend 
to grow horizontally rather than vertically. Rather than sending their roots deep into the 
ground, and rather than being clearly unified and distinct entities, rhizomes spread out, 
growing up and all over things that are in their way, getting tangled up with other rhizomes. 
This implies multiplicity in language, unlike the tree-approach to language, which sees reality 
as one, discrete entity. Approaching language in terms of rhizomes would also lead us to 
consider not just language itself but also other things such as voice and the body, which are 
intertwined with our use of language. 
Furthermore, when Kagame breaks down Kinyarwanda into categories (nouns, verbs, 
adjectives), it may not correctly reflect the way we speak. We rarely speak clearly, as we 
stutter, mumble and leave some sentences incomplete. A rhizomatic approach to language, in 
the mind of Deleuze and Guattari, makes us see language as just one among many languages. 
Deleuze and Guattari recommend against limiting things to one tree and to discrete entities, 
and against considering them in abstraction from their relations with other things. We should 
work from interactions that form a multiplicity.  
Kagame’s approach is quite similar to what southern African intellectuals have done 
with ubuntu/hunhu philosophy.67 They see ubuntu as a key concept to evoke unadulterated 
                                                 
67 See, for example, Ramose (1999). The word ubuntu is used here in the morphological, linguistic sense. It is 
derived from coupling the prefix (ubu-, which in the Nguni languages of southern Africa gives rise to abstract 
words and concepts) to the general root (-ntu, which stands for ‘human’). Hence, in general terms, ubuntu 
simply means ‘being human, humanity, the act of being human’. In the Nkoya language of central Zambia, for 
example, the following forms appear: shintu (‘human’), muntu (‘a human’), bantu (‘humans, people’), wuntu, 
(‘human-ness, the quality of being human’). Among the Bakweri of the southwest region of Cameroon, there is 
also a similarity. Moto means a ‘human, a person’, and wato is plural, meaning ‘humans, persons’. For more 
critical discussion of ubuntu, see Chapter 7. 
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forms of African social life before the European conquest. The worldview (in other words, 
the values, beliefs, and images) of pre-colonial southern Africa is claimed to survive today, in 
remote villages and intimate kin relationships, and constitute an inspiring blueprint for the 
future of social, economic, and political life. As a form of African philosophy, ubuntu brings 
out African potentials such as music and dance, orality and orature, kingship, healing rituals, 
and other cultural achievements from which the rest of humanity could benefit (Ramose 
1999). The concept of ubuntu is not very different from an ideology of blackness such as 
négritude, which is a reaction of black agency to various forms of structural and epochal 
oppression. Zambian humanism and ujamaa do not explicitly essentialize Africans as black 
but as constituting a particular, benevolent, reciprocity-based village society that can also 
inspire in modern times.  
Nevertheless, the use of language to describe the worldview as ‘the southern African 
indigenous philosophy of ubuntu’, in the view of van Binsbergen (2001a,2003) is an etic 
imposition of an alien North Atlantic globalized analytical model, which produces just a 
spurious illusion of local knowledge. Mudimbe (1998) thinks of ubuntu as the liberation of 
difference from the hegemony of white expatriate clergy. He coined the term rétrodiction 
(‘speaking backwards’), to describe African clerical intellectuals like Kagame and Mveng 
who engage in revisiting and romanticizing the past. He maintains that they reconstructed a 
pre-colonial, pre-Christian, African village-based life-world, in which they themselves no 
longer lived or believed, and which was yet dear to them as a source of pride and inspiration. 
In Mudimbe’s case, rétrodiction, as a search for African historical religion and African self-
affirmation, no longer has much room for African historical religion but largely remains at 
home in the North Atlantic region. 
 
2.10. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to present a review of the debate on ethnophilosophy by exploring 
the main aspects of the work of Tempels and Kagame. They wanted to show that the 
indigenous African has a philosophy. Tempels lived with the Baluba for years like an 
ethnographer and wanted to present the realities of his experiences. He attributed to the Bantu 
an ontology that he conceived as the ‘vital force’. This ontology has its own internal 
coherence and permeates the life of every Bantu-speaker. The universe has its own 
interrelation of forces within the realm of existence, which contrasts with that of the 
European. Kagame tries to argue for an indigenous Bantu philosophy by using language. The 
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linguistic analyses of Kagame present a major challenge for intercultural philosophy. 
Language is not a content or product of thought, but at best a prerequisite and carrier of 
thought. Moreover, we cannot totally rely upon the conception of a unique Bantu philosophy. 
That notwithstanding, these authors’ thoughts have opened up further avenues in the field of 
research in African philosophy. The wider implications of ethnophilosophy will be the focus 










This chapter focuses on the implications of ethnophilosophy in relation to the main 
articulations of African philosophy today. I posit that the major aspects of African philosophy 
today revolve around Tempels, in the sense that his work provided a conceptual framework 
and reference for all future attempts to formulate the constitutive elements of a distinctive 
African mode of thought. His efforts to construct an original African philosophical system, as 
we can now see, have led to a plurality of trends.68 The views of some scholars on the 
limitations of ethnophilosophy will be discussed, with special emphasis on Oruka’s 
criticisms. It is important to see how various criticisms of ethnophilosophy gave rise to 
Oruka’s conception of philosophic sagacity. I laid emphasis on ethnophilosophy in Chapters 
1 and 2 because it dominated African philosophy throughout the late 1960s through to the 
1970s. This was when African philosophy was attempting to ground itself in mainstream 
academic philosophy. Prior to and during this period, discussions regarding what African 
philosophy was were dominated by the views of the ethnophilosophers and their critics.69 
Hence, there is the need to provide a picture of the intellectual climate in a bid to show how 
philosophic sagacity and intercultural philosophy form part of a chain of intellectual events in 
African philosophy. 
 
                                                 
68 Neugebauer (1990) lists six main currents: 1. The Christian–linguistic approach; 2. The collective 
hermeneutical approach and the classical African socialism; 3. The individual-hermeneutical approach; 4. The 
phenomenological approach; 5. The linguistic approach; and 6. The apologetic approach. Mudimbe (1988) 
identifies three trends: 1. The philosophical critique of ethnophilosophy; 2. The foundational trend; and 3. 
Philological studies, critical anthropology, and hermeneutics. For more on the trends, see Maurier (1976); 
Tshiamalenga (1981); and Oruka (1990a). 
69 See, for example, Griaule (1949[1965]); Kagame (1956); Tempels (1959); Senghor (1964); Crahay (1965); 
Horton (1967); Mbiti (1970); and Towa (1971b). 
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3.2. Main criticisms of ethnophilosophy 
In this section, I focus on the main criticisms of Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy.70 
Barry Hallen (2006), from an analytical stance, describes the highly problematic nature of 
ethnophilosophy in African philosophy when he states that: 
 
Ethnophilosophy is a four-lettered word, an intellectual invective. I do not know of 
anyone in African philosophy today who voluntarily identifies themselves as an 
ethnophilosopher. It is a category invoked by a critic when he wants to express 
disapproval of the work of someone in African philosophy. (Hallen 2006: 138) 
 
John Mbiti asserts that Tempels’ contribution is more visible in terms of sympathy and a 
radical change of attitude than perhaps in the actual content of his book. Mbiti also expresses 
doubts about the dynamic conception of Bantu ontology (Mbiti1971: 132). Okot p’Bitek, 
from a Nilotic-speaking and so non-Bantu-speaking background in Uganda, attacks Tempels’ 
methodology as having been erected through intuition and not by methods of direct 
observation and comparative analyses of data. This possibly accounts for why Tempels 
attempts to prescribe a common Bantu ontology:71 
 
Tempels invites us to accept this thought-system, not only as Bantu, but as African. 
Can serious […] scholars concerned with a correct appraisal and analysis of African 
beliefs and philosophy afford this kind of generalization? (Okot p’Bitek 1973: 59) 
 
 
However, I think that Okot p’Bitek misconstrues Tempels’ position. Tempels wrote 
only of the Baluba. Therefore, he did not intend the generalizations imputed to him. Bantu 
Philosophy does not pretend to speak for all Bantu-speaking groups, but for the Baluba as a 
Bantu-speaking group. Bantu is a very large language group in the first place, extending from 
Cameroon to the Cape; hence it does not have a single cultural orientation. Yet, even though 
it does not have a common cultural orientation, the speaking of an underlying common proto-
language (Bantu) could possibly imply the adherence to a common worldview. It could also 
suggest at least a converging substrate cosmology and culture in notions of sorcery, authority, 
                                                 
70 For more criticisms of ethnophilosophy, see Mudimbe (1988) and Neugebauer (1990). 
71 See also Tshiamalenga (1981: 179). 
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the family, kinship, time and space, God, and so on. Tempels took the Baluba as a specimen, 
but he was very aware of differences between languages and between cultural groups in 
Africa, given the investment missionaries had to make in every new African language they 
encountered. Moreover, as we earlier mentioned, Tempels was neither an ethnologist nor an 
anthropologist, nor even a professional philosopher. 
Tshiamalenga Ntumba, the philosopher from former Zaire (today the Democratic 
Republic of Congo), levels three specific criticisms at Tempels. First, one cannot claim that 
because the Baluba perceive the world as expressions of the reality of force that force is 
being. Second, one cannot constitute an ontology on the basis of external signs. Moreover, it 
does not make sense when Tempels identifies the Bantu notion of force with the Western 
notion of being. Third, linking force and being is imitation since it is unthinkable without the 
Western conceptual tools Tempels used. Hence, Tshiamalenga contends that Tempels 
constructed his own individual philosophy but did not reconstruct Bantu philosophy 
(Tshiamalenga 1981: 179).72 
The Belgian philosopher Franz Crahay provided the first philosophical critique proper 
of Tempels. Using a metaphor from aeronautic vocabulary, conceptual taking-off (décollage 
conceptuel), he asserts that Tempels and his disciples have not made a distinction between a 
‘vision of the world’, and philosophy proper. At best, what Tempels and his disciples have 
provided can be regarded as a meta-theory on the Bantu worldview (Crahay 1965:64-65). 
Crahay judges that Tempels’ use of philosophical terminology is vague on specific notions 
such as metaphysics, ontology, and psychology (ibid. 63). He sees an additional weakness in 
the title of Tempels’ book (Bantu Philosophy) as confusing intellectually the vulgar meaning 
of philosophy as lived (vécu) with its strict, reflective (réflexif) meaning. Crahay conceives of 
philosophy as an explicit, analytical discourse, radically critical and autocritical, and 
systematic (ibid.). He thinks philosophy as intellectual practice has to be different from 
uncritical descriptions of the worldviews, traditions, wisdom, and languages of a people. He 
outlines the methodological confusion in ethnophilosophy in the following way: 
 
Let us speak frankly: If we do not want to compromise the very project of philosophy 
in Africa, confusing the technical use of this term with its vulgar use, and reduce 
philosophy to a simple vision of the world, we must say that until the present there 
has not been a Bantu philosophy. What exists surely is a cohesive and original view of 
                                                 
72 Towa (1971b) and Hountondji (1996) develop a similar argument. 
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the world particular to Bantus, a kernel of wisdom. Given an ensemble of favorable 
circumstances, it could have brought about earlier a real philosophy. (ibid. 68) 
 
Crahay, who made the importation into Africa of professional Western philosophy his 
livelihood, could only have presented things that way. Now we are half a century later and 
such an idealized understanding of philosophy needs a re-thinking. There is room for 
interculturality wherein philosophy does not preclude human realities and encounters. If we 
take Crahay seriously, it means we would reduce philosophy to just analysis and not life 
issues. This probably explains his ‘conceptual taking-off’.73 This would be absurd because 
we would reject its history and the traditions from which it generated. 
The Cameroonian philosopher Eboussi-Boulaga argues that Tempels’ hypothesis in 
Bantu ontology is not only ambiguous but, in the end, downgrades the muntu to the 
uncivilized, with no moral qualities and completely governed by an order of forces (Eboussi-
Boulaga 1968: 19-20). Eboussi-Boulaga also presents the socio-historical contradictions of 
Tempels’ treatise when he likens the socio-economic hierarchy in the colonial context to the 
ontological hierarchy of the forces (ibid. 24-25). 
Marcien Towa, in two complementary booklets,74 in a general evaluation of the works 
of some ethnophilosophers such as Tempels and Kagame, links the critique of 
ethnophilosophy to négritude’s political ambivalence. Négritude as an expression of 
ethnophilosophy produces an illusory consciousness in one’s cultural identity, which is 
conceived to be different from others and is an extension of the ideology of neo-colonialism 
(Towa 1971b: 24-25).75 He also flaws ethnophilosophy on methodological and technical 
                                                 
73 Crahay’s possibility of a conceptual taking-off (décollage conceptuel) provoked much debate in African 
philosophical circles. Hountondji (1983: 192), for example, does not think Crahay’s metaphor makes sense as a 
condition of possibility for the existence of an African philosophy. He considers that the ‘take-off’ has already 
taken place in African philosophy. Given that all people think conceptually in all civilizations, such a ‘take-off’ 
is always accomplished even when human actors incorporate mythological sequences into their discourse. In 
this light, one could compare Parmenides’ discourse to those of Confucius, Plato, Hegel, Nietzsche, Kagame, 
etc. 
74 Towa (1971a, 1971b). 
75 Négritude is a literary, ideological movement developed by Francophone Black intellectuals, writers, and 
politicians in France in the 1930s. This group included the future Senegalese president Leopold Sedar Senghor, 
the Martinican poet Aimé Césaire, and the Guianian Léon Damas. This group taught that solidarity in a common 
Black identity was an efficient tool against French colonial racism. They believed that the shared Black heritage 
of members of the African Diaspora would help in fighting against French political and intellectual hegemony 
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grounds. He brings forth two controversies in ethnophilosophy’s démarche: first, its attempt 
to think that philosophy is culturally relative; second, confusing ethnology with philosophy. 
As such, Towa beckons us to consider ethnophilosophy as an ideology whose methodology 
betrays both philosophy and anthropology. He also argues that African philosophy has its 
sources in the past, in what its proponents claim to be an ‘authentic’ African past: 
 
What ethnophilosophy praises in the past is not necessarily given by the analysis of 
the past. Retrojection is the method by which ethnophilosophy alters and disfigures 
traditional reality by secretly introducing at the descriptive onset present-day values 
and ideas which can be considered completely alien to Africa, rediscovering them in a 
militant profession of faith, ‘authenticated in terms of their so-called Africanity’. 
(ibid. 32) 
 
Towa’s critique of ethnophilosophy is quite similar to the critique made by critics 
such as Boele van Hensbroek and van Binsbergen of African renaissance and ubuntu. They 
think ubuntu does not describe an emic-authentic, pre-colonial traditional African culture. 
Rather, ubuntu philosophy is a remote etic recreation by scholars who interpret and analyse 
aspects of village life in many contexts and then present it as the ‘philosophy’ of the 
contemporary southern African culture. We earlier saw Mudimbe criticizing African clerical 
intellectuals by using rétrodiction, a term similar to Towa’s rétrojection. 
 Furthermore, Towa argues that most of the works of ethnophilosophers coincide with 
theology. He cites the cases of Roman Catholic priests such as Tempels, Kagame, and 
Mulago, and Protestant pastors such as John Mbiti and Jean Bahoken.76 For him, their 
positions as priests and pastors push their preoccupations in the direction of theology and not 
philosophy as such. With such theological absorption, the concept of philosophy is broadened 
to co-exist with culture. When philosophy is so broadened to co-exist with culture, it can lead 
to the disappearance of philosophy. In this way, Christian dogma is inserted into African 
tradition so that it loses its foreign cast in the face of any nationalist who wants to be proud of 
his cultural identity (Towa 1981:342).  
                                                                                                                                                        
and domination. They formed a realistic literary style and formulated their Marxist ideas as part of this 
movement. 
76 Hountondji (1983: 58-59) also makes the same observation and develops a similar argument. 
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Towa’s critique captures the reality of the Africanization or adaptation of European 
Christianity.77 Nevertheless, his judgement does not take into consideration the underlying 
transformation of that religion within African soil. Mudimbe’s Tales of Faith: Religion as 
Political Performance in Central Africa discusses clerical intellectualism as an 
‘incomprehensible miracle’ for the liberation of African difference.78 Mudimbe, unlike Towa, 
extensively shows that the link between philosophy and theology is not merely a 
disadvantage. In the same vein, van Binsbergen (2005a) points to Roman Catholicism as one 
of the unexpected pillars of African philosophy. Secondly, to claim that philosophy cannot 
co-exist with culture is to create an inherent opposition between the two. Implicitly, Towa is 
taking Western ‘culture’ as standard and universal, but this is inherently incorrect and 
hegemonic. It is not by accident that two of the most prominent texts in the recent history of 
African philosophy have as titles Philosophy and an African Culture (Wiredu 1980) and In 
My Father’s House: Africa in the Philosophy of Culture (Appiah 1992). In our study, we do 
not propose one ‘culture’ over the other but explore the possibilities of cross-fertilization 
between the various cultural orientations and traditions of thought. 
Hountondji’s philosophical critiques of ethnophilosophy have made the debate an 
international one.79 He reveals that Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy was meant for a foreign 
audience in a bid to satisfy ideological aspirations. The methodology of Tempels and his 
disciples is flawed because they tend to portray African beliefs as things of the past that do 
not change, that are somehow eternal. Moreover, African traditional systems of thought do 
not leave room for argumentation or innovation in the quest for the truth. Hence, it becomes 
unacceptable to interpret a static body of oral literature or traditions and label it ‘philosophy’.  
Hountondji also contends that ethnophilosophy presents itself as that of peoples rather 
than individuals. Ethnophilosophy speaks only of Bantu philosophy, Dogon philosophy, 
Bakweri philosophy; as such, its scope is collective, tribal, and of the worldview variety: 
 
Indeed, Bantu Philosophy did open the floodgates to a deluge of essays which aimed 
to reconstruct a particular Weltanschauung, a specific world-view commonly 
attributed to all Africans, abstracted from history and change and, moreover, 
philosophical, through an interpretation of the customs and traditions, proverbs and 
                                                 
77 See also Mudimbe (1988: 152). 
78 See also van Binsbergen (2005) for an extensive critique of this argument. 
79 Most of Hountondji’s criticisms of ethnophilosophy have been collected into his book Sur la philosophie 
africaine(1977), and its English version, African Philosophy: Myth and Reality (1983). 
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institutions—in short, various data—concerning the cultural life of African peoples. 
(Hountondji 1983: 34) 
 
Hountondji’s attempt at the refutation of Tempels and his disciples is untenable. This 
is because he is obsessed with classical individual-centred rationality. He does not take into 
account the ways in which social institutions and social processes structure and restrain 
individual consciousness, impose and warp judgement, contaminate it with collective 
representations. Hountondji’s view of the individual and peoples is monolithic in that it is full 
of much consistent rationality in the individual. The notion of African peoples living in 
communities today is full of complexities. Hence, Hountondji needs a re-thinking here. 
 Hountondji, like Towa, also questions the oral sources of ethnophilosophy. Since 
these oral sources are not philosophical in the technical sense of the word, it becomes evident 
that a scholar like Tempels or Kagame interprets or analyses them to give them a philosophic 
status. For Hountondji, this is an ideological myth because it has to account for an imaginary 
unanimity, to interpret a text that nowhere exists and has to be constantly reinvented. This 
explains why he thinks ‘Bantu philosophy’ is not the philosophy of the Bantu but that of 
Tempels, and the ‘Bantu-Rwandais philosophy’ is not that of the Rwandais but that of 
Kagame. Both Tempels and Kagame, Hountondji asserts, simply make use of African 
traditions and oral literature and project onto them their own philosophical beliefs (ibid.62).80 
I will respond to the criticisms of Hountondji later. 
Christian Neugebauer identifies some glaring contradictions at the theoretical-
methodological level. Tempels posits that the uncivilized African, the ‘pagan’, does not 
change. 
 
Why does not the African change? How is it that the pagan, the uncivilised is stable? 
Because the pagan founds his life upon the traditional groundwork of his theodicy and 
ontology […]. (Tempels 1959:26) 
 
                                                 
80 Hountondji’s criticisms of ethnophilosophy prompted lively debates throughout Africa on the definition of 
African philosophy. Oruka (1990, 1991), contrary to Hountondji, sets out to prove that in traditional Africa there 
have been individuals, non-literate sages, who are rational, critical, and reflective. Hallen and Sodipo also 
identify traditional healers ormasters of medicine as sages among the Yoruba of south-western Nigeria. For 
more on this debate see, for example, Oruka (1972) and Hallen & Sodipo (1986). 
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It follows from Tempels’ view that the ‘pagan’ holds a static ontology, which 
guarantees him a metaphysical sheet-anchor independent of any given social conditions. 
Conversely, the alleged Bantu ontology determines the social conditions, which are 
dependent on the former. Yet, regarding an ontology as static (this being inferred from the 
fact that the ontology in question is the foundation of the pagan’s static ‘form of life’)81 is 
irreconcilable with holding that the very same ontology is dynamic, as does Tempels when he 
states: 
 
We hold a static conception of ‘being’, they are dynamic. (Tempels 1959:51) 
 
Secondly, Neugebauer sees another contradiction in the way Tempels compares the 
Bantu-speaker and the European notion of being. Tempels’ view that Bantu philosophy 
implies a dynamic view of being is, unlike so-called ‘European philosophy’, expressed in the 
statement: ‘Force is being, being is force’. It remains all the same if Tempels is postulating 
that the ‘European’ notion of being is, at least, equivalent to the ‘Bantu’ one. This is because 
he says: ‘the notion of force takes for them the place of the notion of being in our philosophy’ 
(ibid.52). 
The argument above urges Neugebauer to question the impossibility of explaining 
how a per definitionem stable notion of being can be equivalent to a dynamic one. Moreover, 
the phrase ‘force is being, being is force’ can be reduced by itself to the plain tautology 
‘being is being, being is being’. This is because, as Tempels earlier explained, the notion of 
‘force’ serves the same function and occupies the same position within Bantu philosophy as 
the notion of ‘being’ within so-called European philosophy. Finally, one may ask how 
Tempels managed to attain the epistemological miracle of recognizing any dynamic quality 
of being at all, given that the totality of the conception of being within ‘European 
philosophy’, to which Tempels belongs, is static.82 Furthermore, one can cast doubt on 
                                                 
81 The concept ‘form of life’ is borrowed from Ludwig Wittgenstein’s Philosophical Investigations. This 
concept is used to connote the linguistic, historical, sociological, and behavioural determinants which make up 
the situation or environment in which a given language has meaning. 
82 Neugebauer may see this as an ‘epistemological miracle’, but I think it is not quite so. Tempels identified 
himself with the Bantu; and in this encounter, he spotted this dynamic, alternative logic. He had ‘real’ 
experiences with the Bantu and had a personal belief in their reality and effect. I think Tempels did not project 
himself or transfer his experiences from the hegemonic North. He did not identify himself with the Bantu-
speakers as a mere survival strategy. He identified himself with and was taught by them. This intercultural 
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whether Tempels had a firm grasp or by any means a comprehensive knowledge of the 
history of European philosophy. This is because Cicero, the Roman scholar, had already 
stated the dictum: ‘force = being’, such that the announcement of the uniqueness of a Bantu 
philosophy should not be considered as correct. 
The ideological critique of Tempels’ work stems from its implied racialist and 
paternalistic ideology of colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism—which merely 
follows the common spirit of North Atlantic society at the time. Aimé Césaire, for example, 
denounced the neo-colonial character of Tempels’ work. He likens it to creating a diversion, a 
way of diverting attention ‘from the fundamental political problems of the Bantu peoples by 
fixing it on the level of fantasy’, remote from the corrosive effects of colonialism 
(Hountondji 1983:37). Césaire’s work is historically and empirically based on the worldview 
of the Baluba, a people with whom he lived between 1933 and 1940. These people, like those 
in other African countries, had suffered untold but well-known pains under colonial rule.83 
The views advanced by Neugebauer and Césaire are pertinent, but they do not see the 
inner struggle Tempels goes through. Tempels finds himself in the struggle to be allowed to 
approach the Baluba culture, with a total commitment, on the conditions proper to that 
culture, regardless of the preconceived, externally imposed images and stipulations of his 
own society of origin (Belgium), its academic culture, the world of the missions and the 
church. It is in this struggle between the various commitments unified inside Tempels, and 
his notion of the vital force, that I find so interesting in Tempels. 
 
3.3. Oruka’s criticisms of ethnophilosophy 
In this section, I will discuss the main criticisms Oruka levels against ethnophilosophy. I will 
also re-assess the views of the American philosopher Gail Presbey, who engaged in sage 
philosophy research with Oruka and has published extensively on his project.84 
 I have decided to treat Oruka’s critique of ethnophilosophy separately because it will 
give us a clearer picture of his rationale for endorsing philosophic sagacity in contemporary 
                                                                                                                                                        
encounter greatly transformed Tempels and perhaps explains the ‘epistemological miracle’. He benefitted from 
his Baluba friends because he opened himself to their perceptions, values, and beliefs. 
83 Nzongola Ntalaja (1987: 113-14), for example, recalls the atrocities committed by Belgian paternalism in 
collaboration with the so-called ‘traditional rulers’ in the former Belgian Congo (today’s Democratic Republic 
of Congo). 
84 See Presbey (1996, 1997, 1999, 2002, 2007). 
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African philosophy. It is interesting to note that even though Oruka, like other professional 
philosophers, insists on the universalizing perspective in philosophy, he argues that there is 
and must be a difference between African and Western philosophy. He argues, contrary to 
Hountondji, that indigenous illiterate Africans can also be called philosophers like Plato, 
Descartes, or Sartre. 
According to Oruka, ethnophilosophy is more mythology and ethnology than 
philosophy proper (Oruka 1972, 1975). In his ironic title, Mythologies as African Philosophy 
(1972), Oruka posits that mythologies should not be regarded as part of philosophy. He also 
draws a distinction between debased and exact usage of the term philosophy:  
 
When one uses philosophy in the debased form one might (rightly) substitute 
mythology for philosophy. (Oruka1997:28) 
 
This is what Tempels and his disciples did, according to Oruka, when they used 
philosophy in the debased form. Consequently, their works do not contain philosophy but 
mythologies. He refers to Tempels’ notion of vital force as a ‘mythical and ugly phrase’ (ibid. 
30). For Oruka, ethnophilosophy confused African mythologies with African philosophy, 
thereby portraying what African philosophy should not be. He laments that these 
mythological, ethnological, and religious writings ‘have so far been causing us trouble’ in 
identifying African philosophy. This is what he proposes to ethnophilosophers: 
 
Although those writings may have played a role in initiating authentic philosophical 
works in Africa, the most they can now be offered is ‘thanks’; but it would be too 
much to offer them the philosophically serious title of ‘African philosophy’. (Oruka 
1975:53) 
 
Oruka’s conception of myths is superficial, as opposed to our presentation in Chapter 
one. Is Oruka referring to the myths of stupid savages, as propounded by racialist North 
Atlantic scholars, or to African myths as imperfectly studied yet essential underpinnings of 
African life? If properly approached, the insight myths give is profound, not superficial, and 
is a royal road to transcultural understanding. 
According to Oruka, ethnophilosophy cannot even be regarded as a meta-theory of a 
worldview, because it is thwarted by the emic–etic problem (Oruka 1991:24-25). He uses 
Ludwig Wittgenstein’s view of religious belief and Willard van Oman Quine’s 
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‘indeterminacy thesis of radical translation’ as possible supporters of the ethnophilosophical 
thesis. In his Philosophical Investigations, Wittgenstein argues that the non-believer cannot 
understand the believer. The believer has a completely different ‘form of life’ from that of the 
non-believer,85 and the believer and non-believer participate in different forms of life that 
have no essential relationship to one another. Each language-game is logically distinct from 
another.86 The language of faith or commitment of the believer is inexpressible and 
unintelligible in that of the non-believer. This is because each of them plays a different 
language-game. 
Oruka’s use of Wittgenstein is interesting and impressive, but Wittgenstein’s basic 
fallacy is that he considers religion as an act of faith, a commitment to a truth claim, in the 
first place. Secondly, experience with African religion also shows his claim to be wrong. 
Religion is not just limited to knowing doctrinal elements; religion also helps in social 
identification with co-religionists, implying that it takes social and political dimensions. At 
the existential level, African religion, for example, is not just limited to faith but extends to 
therapeutic benefits and sociability in the community which this form of religion generates 
(van Binsbergen 1981). It is not totally true that the non- believer cannot understand the 
believer. As with the case of all transboundary/intercultural understanding, the non-believer 
may in some ways understand the believer, while in other ways such understanding is 
impossible for him/her. 
Wittgenstein’s analogy between the believer and the non-believer can be extended to 
the relation between an insider in traditional African philosophy and the outsider who 
analyses or describes this philosophy in the language of Western thought. From this point of 
view, Oruka asserts that the two (i.e. insider/outsider) cannot meaningfully express their 
thoughts to each other. It would be absurd to find that one can be an expert in the thought of 
the other (Oruka 1991:25). Oruka’s use of this argument is in need of some modification, 
because it is an exaggeration. There is no absolute difference in thought between the insider 
and the outsider. The insistence on such difference would deny the possibilities of any valid 
transcultural representation of knowledge.  
 American philosopher W.V.O. Quine (1908–2000) has a similar view to that of 
Wittgenstein in one of his most famous books, Word and Object. Quine’s thesis is that there 
                                                 
85 See Ludwig Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, Oxford: Basil Blackwell & Mott (1968, sec. 23, p. 
11). 
86Ibid. sec. 7, p. 5. 
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are no culturally universal meanings or propositions. This suggests that the ontological–
epistemological status of meanings cannot be explored or analysed outside of the context in 
which human beings speak or act. Consequently, behaviour is the determinant of meaning 
within a language. It is therefore not possible to unequivocally translate and compare 
theoretical concepts between radically different languages. 
Nevertheless, inasmuch as the Wittgenstein–Quine distinction supports the tenets of 
ethnophilosophy, ethnophilosophers are denied their own thesis. Oruka asserts: 
 
For if their thesis is correct, then the authors are not themselves capable of 
understanding, let alone rationalizing the nature of African philosophy. And this is 
because, so far, all of them (whether Europeans or Africans) have championed what 
they term ‘African philosophy’ by terminologies given in Western scholarship. None, 
so far, has given out what is to be treated as the language of African philosophy. Their 
very concept, ‘vital force,’ is, if they are to be consistent, ‘a Western notion’: it is a 
concept by postulation, not intuition. (Oruka 1991:24-25) 
 
Oruka’s assertion gives the impression that Quine’s thesis is about impossibility. It is 
not. It is rather about indeterminacy—in other words, about the same distortion of 
representation. A distorted picture of a person may still be recognized as representing that 
person. In addition, it cannot be the person because it is merely a representation. Furthermore, 
what Quine and Wittgenstein postulate has nothing to do with the contents of African 
philosophy, but with the possibility of its valid rendering in discursive academic French or 
English prose. It is not totally impossible to get intercultural knowledge. Even though that 
possibility is limited, it is there. If, then, it turns out that African philosophy has a logic 
similar to or identical with Western logic, that is a further step, to be determined by ordinary 
methods of hermeneutics. However, it is far from impossible that we will find, as Wiredu 
(1990, 1996) and Hallen and Sodipo (1986) claim, that African and Western logic are one or 




3.4. Presbey’s attempt at greater precision 
Oruka contends that philosophic sagacity is a philosophy in traditional Africa that is different 
from ethnophilosophy, in spite of the latter being a major trend in African philosophy.87 
Presbey adds some pertinent precision as far as these distinctions are concerned. First, the 
sages are critical, reflective, rigorous, and dialectical. Critical evaluation in Oruka’s sage 
philosophy has two roles. In the first instance, sages themselves engage in critical evaluation 
of their thoughts; and in the second, the professional philosopher engaged in the project may 
comment on what the sages say, during or after the interview (Presbey 2002, 2007). By 
critical evaluation, the sages indulge in what she terms ‘progressive modernization’—that is, 
making a synthesis of traditional and modern African values. They decide what ideas and 
values to preserve or jettison, and they give their reasons. While sages are the ‘present-day 
exemplars of our ancestral philosophers’, that does not mean that they are untouched by the 
many changes and cultural influences found in contemporary Africa (Wiredu 1996). 
Moreover, professional philosophers who interview sages or read the interviews engage in a 
second layer of critical evaluation. Hence, for Presbey, the sages and professional 
philosophers are engaged in judgement and synthesis. 
Second, philosophic sagacity is based on the thoughts of identifiable individuals. This 
is different from ethnophilosophy, which implies that traditional Africa is free from 
philosophic, rational discourse and personalized philosophical activity. In presenting each of 
the sages, Oruka gives a brief biographical sketch, a photograph, and then the interview with 
the sage. This approach is in contrast with ethnophilosophy, where the thoughts of informants 
(often anonymous) are presented in a bid to search for a common denominator. 
Ethnophilosophy lays more emphasis on collective thought and looks for meaning in 
collective practices. It tends to downplay the dynamics of culture and the role of cultural 
criticism. In this context, philosophy here is treated as a general communal activity in which 
ready-made beliefs and emotions rather than reflection decide the outcome (Oruka 
1991:47).88 Presbey (2007) adds, in her defence of Oruka, that one needs both the individual 
sage and critical evaluation to constitute a sage philosophy project. She also thinks that the 
folk sage should be included in the sage philosophy project. 
 
                                                 
87 Philosophic sagacity, given its importance, is given an elaborate treatment in the next two chapters of this 
work. 
88 For more on this distinction, see Ochieng’-Odhiambo (2002b) and Presbey (2007). 
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3.5. Revisiting the critics of ethnophilosophy 
In this section, I make a few comments on some of the major criticisms against 
ethnophilosophy. I begin with Gail Presbey’s. Her opinion is essentially the rationalist one, 
which helps us to construct ourselves as rational philosophers but does not help us understand 
culture, ideology, ethics, morality, the appeal of truth, and so on. She induces us to adhere to 
the dream of constructing valid knowledge along Western modernist lines. We cannot 
interpret reality and search for wisdom just as abstract reality. 
The critique of ethnophilosophy as collective and community-owned, with the 
incapacity to produce valid philosophy, is untenable and focuses on the debunked 
anthropological and epistemological fallacy that African historical societies were holistic, 
self-contained, bounded, integrated, and locally anchored. This view posits a narrow, frozen 
idea of culture, reducing the African notion of community to an immobile essence. On the 
other hand, van Binsbergen (2001b) notes that the virtualization of human experience under 
contemporary conditions of globalization has rendered these previously explanatory models 
(in terms of the analyses of social formations and fissures), inappropriate. African 
communities today are trying to forge and sustain new links of community in a bid to 
overcome various economic and political hurdles. Van Binsbergen widens the 
epistemological sense of community in Africa from practices that enable them cope with and 
do away with solitude. African healing cults, anti-sorcery cults, varieties of imported world 
religions and local transformations thereof are all various avenues for forging and 
maintaining community. This implies that, contrary to Winch (1964), the rationalization of 
the processes of constructing community and solidarity need not always be intelligible. The 
African village that used to be the locus for community is now surpassed by the advent of the 
virtual village. Hence, Africans have found new ways of constructing communities beyond 
specific villages. 
Secondly, claiming a communal orientation for African traditional life and thought is 
not specific to Tempels, contrary to what the critics of ethnophilosophy claim. It is a standard 
notion in anthropology up to the 1950s. Philosophically, it goes back to Lévy-Brühl, with the 
idea that the African individual is insufficiently developed and is merged with the group and 
with nature. Tempels simply adopted this established viewpoint. What is new in Tempels is 
the discovery of the vital force as the hub of Bantu cosmology. In addition, I find Tempels’ 
insight, which cannot easily be dismissed, a good one. 
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Moreover, if Oruka, Hountondji, and their professional colleagues treat and criticize 
collectively held worldviews as if they should have been individually developed, original, 
and personalized philosophy, then all we can ever produce is fallacy. Their criticisms are all 
based on a confusion of categories and on the fallacies that spring from such a misconception. 
It is just like trying to use e-mail to communicate with your dog, or instructing the Moon to 
rise faster. 
Hountondji and the critics of ethnophilosophy may also dismiss the idea of a 
collective philosophy, with unanimity as its accompanying ingredient, as antithetical to 
philosophy as we know it in the Western tradition since Thales. Nevertheless, their 
conception is a sort of armchair philosophizing, and this does not take into consideration the 
social foundation of belief and cosmology. There is an underlying fund of shared 
cosmological views, of which the ontologies propounded by Tempels and Kagame are more 
or less standardized and distorted representations. Then, upon this fund, there are based 
numerous local beliefs and cosmologies which diverge in detail, yet converge in their main 
lines. The divergence means there does not have to be unanimity. Let us take Roman Catholic 
folk religion from simple, illiterate peasants in Cameroon, Italy, or Argentina, for example. 
Each believer will have his own specific interpretation, always at some variance with Roman 
specialist theology, yet they remain recognizable as Catholics. Hence, Hountondji et al. need 
to re-visit this issue. 
I think the position of Tempels and Kagame is rather sounder than Towa, Hountondji, 
Oruka, and the other critics of ethnophilosophy try to show. These latter critics show a 
mastery of the Western rationalist philosophical tradition, but cling to the erroneous 
assumption that it should be the only mode in other non-Western philosophies. The Western 
tradition of philosophy is only one of several traditions; there is also Indian, Chinese, Persian, 
Arabic, and Hebrew philosophy—to limit ourselves just to literate traditions. The claim to 
professionalization that Hountondji and other professional philosophers are making is really 
nothing but a submission to Western hegemony. This is because in the Western academic 
conception, philosophy is seen as the product of a unique, individual mind and is text-based. 
This conception of philosophy is defensible but by no means universal, or the only one. What 
poses as universal is often just hegemonic. There is, in every society, a set of largely tacit 
assumptions about the world, about man, which constitute standard tools for interpreting 
concrete situations and problems. We can draw a caricature of this by imagining people 
concocting this standard set as the product of some collective mind. The concept of culture, 
however, helps us out on this point: culture is something like the accumulated, transmitted 
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receptacle of such converging individual thoughts across the ages. One can say: ‘I do not 
accept as philosophical those ontological orientations implied in a specific culture’; but this is 
not the only possible position to take. Claiming the opposite is also defensible. Much of 
Hountondji’s so-called final solution to the problem of African philosophy as 
ethnophilosophy, in my opinion, is largely rhetorical and based on a deliberate 
misconception, one that insists by all means on ignoring the concept of culture. I find the 
criticisms of Hountondji, Towa, Oruka, and the other critics of ethnophilosophy overrated 
and promoted merely for the sake of the triumph of the Western, individual, text-based 
philosophy that they project. Conversely, if we accept that philosophical elements are implied 
in a collectively managed and owned worldview (elements such as notions of time, causality, 
personhood, space, etc.), then the idea of a ‘collective philosophy’ is more valid than the 
persistent critique by professional philosophers would lead one to believe.  
Moreover, the problem of African philosophy as ethnophilosophy hinges on an 
understanding of representation. Tempels and Kagame represent something whose 
independent ontological status (independent from their minds as authors) is contested by the 
opponents of ethnophilosophy. Yet, these opponents, who attempt to replace ethnophilosophy 
with professional philosophy, demonstrate that they themselves have no understanding of 
what representation is. Representation in its diverse forms is central to every field in the 
social sciences, and perhaps for this reason, the battle between modernism and post-
modernism rages savagely on this terrain. 
True representation is impossible, as there is always enormous distortion. That does 
not mean that representation is futile or meaningless. The whole history of Western 
philosophy, as an academic subject treating the succession of thinkers from Thales to Žižek, 
is an exercise in representation. No one would claim that we cannot adequately represent 
Thales or Plato. Yet all existing representations of these figures are critically contested. This 
suggests focusing not on the generalizable and the unified but on all that difference implies, 
in a bid to probe into both the difficulties and possibilities of intercultural representation. 
Why cannot we represent African cosmologies? Whether they are or are not philosophy is 
quite a different point, depending entirely on how we define philosophy. That can be 
nominalist and arbitrary, and we must first have an extensive argument on such a definition. 
At this point, I may agree with Mudimbe (1988:153), when he contests the ‘cultural 
uniqueness’ projected by ethnophilosophers. This supposed uniqueness could foster the 
untenable intercultural assumption that each culture is bounded and different from others in 
the production of knowledge. We cannot claim, for example, that colonialism and 
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Christianity have not influenced African ethnophilosophy. Nevertheless, we need to forge 
ahead beyond North Atlantic hegemony and unique ethnophilosophy in a bid to exploit this 
enriching intercultural encounter. 
 
3.6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, I have tried to present a review of the wider implications of the debate on 
ethnophilosophy. Tempels and Kagame are criticized by the so-called professional 
philosophers on the grounds that the former’s approach to the subject of African philosophy 
is based on the worldview of Africans. However, their criticisms need to be taken with a 
pinch of salt. The reason for this may be that in attacking ethnophilosophy, professional 
philosophers have not taken into consideration the historical background and circumstances 
of its emergence. Moreover, they have not taken account of the fluidity in the meaning of 
philosophy even in the Western tradition, in which they are so thoroughly schooled. 
Consequently, they have become so inflexible in their adherence to the conventional Western 
canons that African philosophy has to follow suit. In the light of recent developments, even 
within Western philosophy itself, such a position is unjustified. The negative consequence of 
their attacks was that the so-called ethnophilosophers spent too much time in defence of their 
own views concerning the nature of African philosophy, leaving the actual task of outlining 
traditional or cultural philosophy largely undone. Even though Tempels was naively 
philosophical, that does not make him a fool. He lived with Africans for years like an 
ethnographer and presented those realities of his experiences. The view by Hountondji, 
Towa, and Oruka that ethnophilosophy is totally defeated and obsolete is not true. While the 
professionals pretend to liberate the African mind from the delusions of ethnophilosophy, 
their game is to submit African thought to Western hegemony. I submit that ethnophilosophy 
has helped in the development of professional philosophy. Even though it acknowledges 
difference, it should not enmesh itself in such difference. The ethnophilosopher can imply an 
African identity, but intercultural philosophy reminds us not to be trapped in that identity. 
This can be a first step towards a viable African philosophy, which may have a humble 
particularist origin, but may cease to belong to a specific local African cultural orientation 
and eventually contribute to shaping a world culture in the making. Ethnophilosophy should 
be seen as other ethnosciences around the world are, as Sandra Harding (1994, 1997) would 
have it, and as a basis for a non-relativist unitary epistemology. Every knowledge system 
implies the notion of the possibility of truth, and of the perpetual quest for truth. This gives us 
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the possibility to interconnect the uniqueness of local knowledge systems, each containing a 
portion of what together will converge, beyond their limited domains, into an overarching 
Truth. Ethnophilosophy should not be replaced or judged by any external brand of 




SAGE PHILOSOPHY: BASIC QUESTIONS AND METHODOLOGY 
 
4.1. Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, we examined academic African philosophy from a historical 
perspective, with a special critique of ethnophilosophy and the rise of African philosophy. 
The main gain of the endless and tedious debate on African philosophy as ethnophilosophy 
has been the recognition of the need (a) to go beyond collective philosophy as worldview, 
and (b) to make room for academic, individual-based critical philosophy. However, the point 
was obvious from the beginning: since (a) and (b) are rather different things, there was never 
the slightest reason why the pursuit of (a) would preclude the parallel, or subsequent, pursuit 
of (b).This debate, to my mind, is a storm in a teacup. From this controversy a major problem 
arises: how can we render traditional African philosophy in a deliberate and systematic 
manner? 
Oruka proposes philosophic sagacity to show that African traditional societies had 
both folk wisdom and critical, personalized philosophical discourse. Oruka believes that he is 
creating a genuinely novel approach to the discipline that both suits the African context and 
rebuts the claims of those who insist that the philosophical enterprise in Africa must be a 
mirror image of philosophy in the West. Oruka’s submission brings forth this compound 
question: what is sage philosophy, and how does one distinguish it from the other forms of 
philosophy that are available in Africa? This chapter is an attempt to answer this question. 
We will also look at a methodology for investigating sage philosophy and several extracts 
from selected Kenyan sages. 
Let us now focus on Oruka’s philosophic sagacity, in a bid to show how he situated 
himself in the continental history of African philosophy. 
 
4.2. What is sage philosophy? 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, sage philosophy is about indigenous sages whose 
lives are enmeshed in the folk-cultural milieu of their societies. They have wisdom and great 
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intellectual acumen in critical deliberations on various issues of fundamental concern to 
themselves and to members of their society. 
According to Oruka: 
 
Sage philosophy consists of the expressed thoughts of wise men and women in any 
given community and is a way of thinking and explaining the world that fluctuates 
between popular wisdom (well-known communal maxims, aphorisms and general 
common sense truths) and didactic wisdom (an expounded wisdom and a rational 
thought of some given individuals within a community). (Oruka 1991: 33) 
 
Hence, sage philosophy refers to the body of thought produced by persons considered 
wise in African communities and, more specifically, to those who seek a rational foundation 
for ideas and concepts used by critically examining the justification of those ideas and 
concepts. 
Popular wisdom is generally conformist, while didactic wisdom is at times critical of 
the communal set-up and popular wisdom. The thoughts can be expressed in writing or they 
can be unwritten sayings and arguments associated with certain individuals. Sage philosophy 
is a type of philosophizing by those with no tradition in the art of writing. This explains why 
in traditional Africa, most of what could pass as sage philosophy remains largely unwritten. 
The concern in the sage philosophy project is to look for wise persons who are deeply rooted 
in traditional African culture. Some of these persons may have been partly influenced by the 
inevitable moral and technological culture of the West; nevertheless, their outlook and 
cultural belonging remain that of traditional rural Africa. 
 
4.3. Categorization of sagacity 
Sagacity or wisdom can be either sophia or phronesis, two terms associated with Aristotle in 
his attempt to classify intellectual virtue.89 Sophia pertains to the intellectual ability to 
theorize the nature of the world and also to discover a causal explanation of its existence. 
Sophia takes into consideration a deliberation concerning universal truth. It is specialist 
theoretical knowledge within the competence of the philosopher. Phronesis or wisdom, on 
the other hand, is ingenious practical knowledge. This form of wisdom is more pragmatic, 
                                                 
89 Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1140a-b, 1141a-b. 
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because it is linked to action and enables one to decide on a mode of life based on daily 
experiences. 
Oruka does not categorize sagacity into sophia and phronesis as Aristotle does. As we 
saw in the introductory chapter, he rather makes two divisions: the folk sage or popular 
wisdom, and the philosophic sage or didactic wisdom. The folk sage, according to Oruka, is 
one who has much knowledge about the popular wisdom of their community, but their 
thoughts do not go beyond this popular wisdom. They may not necessarily have the dexterity 
or aptitude to employ their personal critical objection to these popular wisdoms. Such a sage 
is a folk sage as opposed to the second type of sage, the philosophic sage.  
The philosophic sage, according to Oruka, may know all the popular wisdom of their 
community as the folk sage does, but they have the potentiality of making independent 
critical assessments of what people in their community take for granted. Consequently, while 
the wisdom of the folk sage stays at the level of philosophy of the first order, that of the 
philosophic sage is philosophy of the second order, that is, acritical and individual reflection 
on what is given in the first order.90 Philosophic sagacity is a reflection of a person who is a 
sage and a thinker.91 Philosophic sagacity distinguishes itself from ethnophilosophy in that it 
is based on a critical reflective individual. Philosophic sagacity maintains that there exist 
individuals in various African communities who have not had the benefit of contact with so-
called Western philosophy but who are nevertheless critical, independent thinkers who guide 
their thought and judgement by the power of reason and inborn insight, rather than by the 
authority of communal consensus.  
To explore sage philosophy further, let us begin with the place that wisdom occupies 
in philosophy. 
 
4.4. The relationship between wisdom and philosophy 
A close reading of Oruka’s sage philosophy project reveals the larger question of the rapport 
between wisdom and philosophy. In the history of philosophy, philosophers have tried to 
understand the nature of wisdom and how to attain it. Wisdom has always played a central 
role in philosophy, and so Oruka’s project is not new. Generally, wisdom pertains to the 
ability to think and act, by the use of knowledge, common sense, understanding, and insight. 
                                                 
90 Oruka (1991: 34). 
91 Ibid. p. 48. 
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It pertains to having knowledge and acting correctly in any given situation. Prior to 
philosophy in the ‘formal’ sense, the term ‘wisdom’ was used in several cultures to denote 
the ‘art of living’ and to show the different cultural achievements of the past. In the ancient 
Graeco-Roman, Mesopotamian, Egyptian, and Biblical traditions, wisdom was an important 
virtue linked to cosmological and theological worldviews. The history of Western philosophy 
was engrained in the Pre-Socratic wisdom context, as seen in the teachings of the Seven 
Sages and Hesiod. We see this in Socrates and Plato, who define philosophy literally as ‘the 
love of wisdom’. In The Republic, Plato proposes philosopher kings as those to rule—that is, 
rulers who know the Form of the Good and also have the courage to act in conformity with it. 
Aristotle in his Metaphysics defines wisdom as knowledge of the causes—that is, knowing 
why things are in a certain way, which is more profound than just knowing what and how the 
things are. He also draws a distinction between theoretical and practical knowledge. Stoic 
philosophy, in turn, reverted to a wisdom-centred stance, as did Neo-Platonists such as 
Plotinus and Iamblichus.92 In Continental philosophy, for example, we also see the central 
role wisdom plays in the works of Dilthey, Heidegger, Sartre, Gadamer, and Ricoeur. From 
the psychological perspective, Taranto (1989) views wisdom as the recognition and response 
to human limitation—‘knowing that one does not know’—while Kramer (1990) speaks of the 
‘primary of affect-cognition’ relations. Van Binsbergen (2008) identifies the necessity to 
recognize one’s finitude (Dilthey) in intercultural situations. In the field of education, 
Benjamin Franklin highlights the relevance of character education in the United States of 
America as training wisdom and virtue. This is what British philosopher Nicholas Maxwell 
endorses when he argues that knowledge be sought and promoted to acquire wisdom, which 
he explains as the ability to realize what is of value in life, for oneself and others.  
These examples show the variety of wisdom perspectives in the history of philosophy 
and modern thought in general. Let us examine some approaches to wisdom in Africa. 
 
4.5. Africanist expressions of traditional wisdom 
African indigenous peoples express traditional wisdom in various ways. First, this can be 
done through proverbs, riddles,93 and other oral genres.94 We can cite examples of oral 
                                                 
92 For a more general theoretical perspective on wisdom, see Brown (2005). 
93 Examples of Bakweri riddles are the following: 1) If a cock climbs a tree and lays an egg, will the egg break 
or bounce? Answer: A cock does not lay an egg. 2) I carry my house wherever I go. Who am I? Answer: A snail. 
3) My head is as heavy as my buttocks. Answer: A palm tree. 4) I have a box that cannot be opened by its 
501712-L-bw-Mosima
87 
African wisdom recorded by such anthropologists as Griaule, highlighting the lessons of the 
Malian village philosopher Ogotemmêli, and Hallen and Sodipo’s onisegun among the 
Yoruba (Hallen & Sodipo 1986),95 Kai Kresse among the Muslim community in Kenya 
(Kresse 2007),and Victor Turner’s account of the Zambian village diviner Muchona (Turner 
1967). In this genre we may cite Oruka’s ‘sage philosophy’ or ‘sagacity’-wisdom as one of 
the most promising in the relatively new field of academic African philosophy.96 In his study 
of Gikuyu proverbs,97 the Kenyan philosopher Gerald Wanjoyi distinguishes between wise 
‘sapiential’ proverbs and those that are philosophical. These proverbs have a ‘literal’ or 
‘symbolic’ meaning, but require more explanation and interpretation beyond these two levels 
of meaning than those which more directly speak about the culture and general way of life. 
For Wanjoyi, wise or sapiential proverbs either literally or symbolically state a universal truth 
or give practical counsel or advice. A philosophical proverb, as opposed to a sapiential one, is 
                                                                                                                                                        
owner. Answer: My stomach. 5) I hasten my death. Answer: Ripe fruits. 6) I meet two people on a journey. 
When I greet them, the dead one answers but the other does not. Answer: Dry grass and fresh grass.  
94Kai Kresse (2007), for example, explains that he was inspired by Oruka’s and Brenners’s (1984) approaches in 
his ethnographic accounts of three Swahili individual thinkers. Yet, unlike Oruka, he focuses on portraying the 
roles of these local intellectuals within the everyday life of Mombasa’s Old Town, according to their own self-
conception and that of their fellow citizens (Kresse 2007: 32). He presents three local Muslim intellectuals and 
some younger thinkers. Ahmed Sheikh Nabhany used poetry to conserve basic Islamic values and the moral 
values of the Muslim community. Nabhany was active in his proposals for the preservation of a moral code that 
was losing ground in contemporary society (ibid. 105-138). Ahmad Nassir’s poetical moral theory is on utu 
(being human)—how human beings ought to behave in everyday life. His poem Utenzi wa Mtu ni Utu sums up a 
moral code (ibid. 139-175). Kresse also listened to the Ramadan lectures of Sheikh Abdilahi Nassir and 
considered them a social critique by an Islamic-minded scholar (ibid. 176-207). 
95 The term onisegun refers to the professional group in Yoruba society with whose members Hallen and Sodipo 
worked. Literally, the term may be translated as ‘masters of medicine’, but in the relevant literature it has been 
translated as ‘herbalists’, ‘traditional healers’, and ‘native doctors’—that is, practitioners of non-Western 
medicine. 
96 Oruka’s approach has been carried on by several scholars and by his past MA and PhD students. This can be 
seen in the works of Gail Presbey, Kai Kresse, and Ochieng’-Odhiambo. 
97An example of a Gikuyu proverb is the following: ‘A tree by the roadside does not lack a scar’, meaning that 
‘anything or anybody that is exposed to other things or people will not fail to display a mark or effect of this 
exposure or interaction’ (Wanjoyi 1997:70-71). On the limitations of political power in Gikuyu society, 
Wanjoyi (ibid. 207-208) provides two proverbs: ‘A leader who does not heed advice is not a leader’, and ‘He 
who refuses to obey cannot command’. Another proverb with democratic relevance is this: ‘When the people 
have spoken, it is God who has spoken’ (ibid. 246,249), meaning the voice of the people is the voice of God. 
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a well-known statement in a language, either literal or symbolic, which is easily amenable to 
further and deeper analysis. According to Wanjoyi: 
 
philosophical proverbs […] unlike wisdom proverbs […] eschew practical matters 
and concentrate on stating how things are. (Wanjoyi 1997:40-44) 
 
Wanjoyi is probably taking his lead from Aristotle’s influential distinction between 
specialist theoretical knowledge (sophia) and creative practical knowledge (phronesis), as 
outlined above. For Wanjoyi, wisdom is practical and technical, while philosophy is 
theoretical and speculative. The Kenyan philosopher Dismas Masolo also draws a distinction 
between technical philosophy and deep wisdom. He maintains, like Oruka, that professional 
philosophers should limit themselves to academic, technical philosophy and leave out 
wisdom. Nevertheless, Wanjoyi maintains that this distinction is not cast-iron but plastic, 
because in his separation of wise and philosophical proverbs the difference is not very 
clear.98 
This interrelation between wisdom and philosophy suggests that philosophy is not just 
theory but also practice, or that phronesis is mere wisdom and not philosophy. Kwame 
Gyekye (1997:3) is correct when he agrues that to think that philosophy is only about theory, 
not practice, would be to indulge in the worst stereotypes of philosophy as irrelevant ivory-
towerism. Gyekye further argues that for Aristotle, the reason we want to know what virtue 
is, is so that we can become good (Gyekye 1997:13). This explains why some contemporary 
academic philosophers have tried to reassert wisdom’s centrality to philosophy.99 They 
suggest that the gap be bridged between academic philosophy and wisdom (Presbey 1999). 
Haig Khatchadourian (1992) complains of contemporary philosophy’s abdication of wisdom, 
noting in America the ‘profound impotence on the part of philosophy to influence the course 
of public affairs or even the private lives of this country’s citizens’ (ibid. 25). He calls upon 
Western philosophers to help create a global consciousness, by increasing mutual interaction 
and understanding by philosophers in Asia, Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. 
Khatchadourian posits that philosophers cannot be spectators from the sidelines of life but 
once again must become seekers of wisdom (ibid.26, 32). Nielson sees the necessity for sages 
                                                 
98 See Kimmerle (1997). 
99 See, for example, Khatchadourian (1992); Presbey (1999); and van Binsbergen (2008b). 
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and philosophers to come together in a bid to provide a guide for the perplexed (Nielson 
1993:16). 
The second way African indigenous peoples can express traditional wisdom is 
through symbols and rituals. Werbner (1989) uses the word ‘wisdom’ when he writes about 
divination among the Tswapong people of modern Botswana. The diviner uses skills and 
dialogues in a bid to heal and redress the contradictions in the life of the client. Here, wisdom 
in the ritual drama during a divination session goes beyond words. Divination sessions permit 
a client to express their pain, suffering, and distress, and diviners can discuss the causes and 
conditions of human suffering and then later help to reorganize hope and meaning into the 
client’s life.100 
Van Beek (2012) gives us a fascinating account of crab divination among the Kapsiki 
of North Cameroon and the Higi of Nigeria. Among the Kapsiki, diviners are usually 
blacksmiths, and the most widely known technique of divination is with the crab, even 
though they have other divination techniques such as one with the whistling bird, one with 
cowry shells, and another one with stones. For the crab divination, the standard procedure is 
as follows: A patient comes early in the morning and asks for a consultancy. The smith 
obliges and gets out his paraphernalia: a large pot (40–50cm diameter) filled with sand, a 
broken pot for a cover, a jar with one or more crabs, and a sack with sticks and calabash 
shards of several sorts and with various decorations. He heats up a fire to warm the water for 
the crab and then pours the lukewarm water into the large pot. Along the rim of the pot he 
stands straws upright in small bundles with a calabash marker in front of them: these 
represent the client, the client’s family and the various buildings in his compound, the 
persons he is asking about, and the ward and the village. In the middle of the pot the smith 
buries a small round fruit (kwakweme, i.e. Strychnosincuwa), and behind another calabash 
marker a small cord. He then loosely places five round and six oblong pieces of calabash on 
the wet sand, each decorated differently. Finally, the smith takes a crab out of a smaller pot 
that he keeps in his smithy. Holding the crab in his hands, he explains to it the matter at hand 
and what is expected of it. The crab is put in the pot, the lid is closed, and the client and 
diviner wait patiently, chatting away amicably. After 15 minutes, the smith looks to see how 
the crab has rearranged the loose pieces of calabash, interprets this as a first answer, and then 
asks a more precise question, puts the pieces back in the same order, and lets the crab have 
                                                 




another go. An entire session involves asking four or five questions and lasts a few hours. 
The final answer usually offers an analysis of the problem and a means of solving it, often 
involving a sacrifice of some sort. Sacrifices are usually performed on a sacrificial jar, which 
is, in fact, a small beer jar with narrow openings, and sacrifices are placed on the exterior of 
the jar, or the small offerings are placed at a crossroads. 
To close the divination séance, the smith puts the crab back in the pot, feeds him some 
grains of sorghum, pours some water from the divination jar over the feet of the client, and 
then empties the rest of the jar in the four cardinal directions. The diviner takes the loose 
pieces out of the jar and the client takes the straws that represent himself and his kin from the 
rim of the jar. The diviner receives his fee, about FCFA 100, and the client goes home to 
perform the sacrifice that has been suggested. Finally, the blacksmith rubs some rhwè jivu on 
the crab, a medication to prevent any bad luck that could stem from interacting with people 
who might be cheating on each other. 
In the introductory chapter, I mentioned that van Binsbergen became a sangoma 
(traditional healer). This had a profound impact in his personal and professional life. He 
explains: 
 
From an ancestor-less piece of flotsam of human history, I became a priest in an 
ancestral cult, in a decisive step not only of professional independence and Africanist 




[...] sangomas are people who consider themselves, and who are considered by their 
extended social environment, as effective healers: as mediators between living people, 
on the one hand, and the ancestors, spirits and God (Mwali) on the other—in a general 
context where most bodily afflictions and other misfortunes of a psychological, social 
and economic nature, are interpreted in religious terms. (Van Binsbergen 2003:202) 
 
Van Binsbergen suggests that sangoma divination is meant to release victims from psychic 
and existential schizophrenia. In his opinion: 
 
The aim of sangoma divination is primarily therapeutic: to reinsert the client in what 
may be argued to be her or his proper place in the universe, so that the life force in 
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principle available for that person but temporarily blocked by their drifting away from 
the proper place, can flow once more. (Van Binsbergen 2003:256) 
 
Before consulting his patients, van Binsbergen prepares himself by pouring a libation (a 
bottle of beer or part of a bottle of wine) on his shrine, and conducts an initial preparatory 
divination session in order to preview the client, whom usually he has not even seen at this 
stage. He uses four oracular tablets, each having distinctive marks, and on each tablet the 
front and back sides are clearly indicated, so that when all four tablets are cast they can 
produce 16 (2
4
) different combinations. Throwing the tablets constitutes a random generator 
capable of yielding 16 different values. Making a specific inspired choice from among these 
dimensions or their combination, the diviner interprets after each throw the resulting 
combination with an explicit verbal pronouncement which triggers specific reactions in the 
client. These reactions, consciously and subconsciously taken into account by the diviner, 
again inform the interpretational choice made for the subsequent throw. From the continued 
series of throws, a coherent story of diagnosis, cause, and remedy then gradually arises, in a 
subtle dialogue with the client who, however, remains largely unaware of his own input into 
the dialogue, and instead experiences the oracle increasingly as an independent, non-
manipulated, truth-producing authority. 
Van Binsbergen not only uses oracular tablets but has been able to translate sangoma 
divination to a modern setting by making use of information and communication 
technologies. He began consulting by e-mail using this procedure: 
 
My sangoma oracular program happens to be on a stand-alone Macintosh 
microcomputer without Internet connection. The intake form reaches me on a 
different, Windows-operated computer where all subsequent e-mail correspondence 
with the clients is also conducted. I use the keyboard and mouse of the stand-alone 
computer to enter the meagre details of a client’s intake form into the program I have 
written. A dialogue box appears. I type a question on behalf of the client (gradually, in 
subsequent throws, creatively refining the question while the client is and remains 
absent). I press the Enter button activating the computer’s random generator facility 
so as to let one of the sixteen oracular combinations appear. Next, verbally 
interpreting that combination as a reply to the question, I type the answer onto the 
dialogue box that appears subsequently. The sequence of question and answers 
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combines into an unfolding narrative. After a series of thirty to forty throws, i.e. 
combinations, the session’s narrative approaches its natural conclusion. (Van 
Binsbergen 2003:240) 
 
Finally, the program produces a full protocol document setting out all the successive throws, 
questions, and interpreted answers. It provides not only a more or less coherent interpretation 
(because the successive answers constitute a narrative) of the client’s predicament in 
ancestral and (rarely) witchcraft terms and ritual advice towards its redress, but also extensive 
and detailed biographical information which the client will recognize as partly correct—even 
though it was never provided by the client himself on the intake form. The distant client will 
receive this protocol by e-mail. 
 
We have seen some African expressions of traditional wisdom, such as proverbs, 
riddles, and divination. Nevertheless, Oruka subscribes to the North Atlantic conception of 
wisdom and thinks it is the only permissible one. Let us now turn to Oruka’s genre of 
sagacity, which he conceives and privileges as sophia. We begin with a brief historical 
account of the origins of Oruka’s sage philosophy as an approach to African philosophy in 
academic intellectual discourse. 
 
4.6. The historical basis of philosophic sagacity 
The question of African philosophy has now gone through many meaningful historical stages. 
The first stage was one in which the African was considered as one who was incapable of 
rigorous and dialectical inquiry. It was a stage where the black man’s culture and even mind 
was claimed to be extremely strange to reason, logic, and various habits of scientific scrutiny. 
This racist orientation led Europeans to refer to Africa as the ‘dark continent’, one with 
‘primitive’ knowledge systems, ‘savage or inferior mentality’, and inhabited by the ‘Other’. 
Hegel’s radical polarization of Africa/Europe prepared for a philosophical base which was 
exploited by anthropologists such as Lucien Lévy-Brühl to belittle non-white races. 
Nevertheless, some Western anthropologists later abandoned the idea of Western 
culture as a universal norm. The recognition of cultural relativism and the rejection of 
Western culture as a universal norm have been the hallmark of anthropology worldwide since 
the 1930s. From this point on, cultural relativism surfaced. The works of Marcel Griaule and 
Germaine Dieterlen should be mentioned here. In summary, both authors confirmed the 
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existence of thought systems in Africa. This had a profound influence on Tempels’ axial 
work, Bantu Philosophy. Tempels called for the need to recognize the rationality of so-called 
primitive man. This call marked an incisive refutation of the ideas of Lévy-Brühl on 
‘primitive mentality’. Tempels’ orientation, as we have seen, was criticized as 
ethnophilosophy. The professional approach, as seen in Towa and Hountondji, which 
criticizes ethnophilosophy, has also been criticized for not being African but European or 
Western. This ushers in Oruka’s new orientation, philosophic sagacity, which stands out to 
prove the contrary. Let us examine Oruka’s project of philosophic sagacity in the next 
section. 
 
4.7. Oruka’s project of philosophic sagacity 
According to Oruka, the philosophic sagacity project aims to show that the problem in 
traditional Africa is not the lack of logic, reason, or scientific curiosity. This explains why in 
1974 he formulated a research programme at the University of Nairobi in Kenya, entitled 
‘Thoughts of Traditional Kenyan Sages’. Oruka outlined the research programme in the 
following words: 
 
The real purpose in this project was to help substantiate or invalidate the claim that 
traditional African peoples were innocent of logical and critical thinking. Was 
traditional Africa a place where no persons had the room or mind to think 
independently and at times even critically of the communal consensus? If this claim 
were true, then it must follow that it is not possible to discover individuals in 
traditional Africa who can practise critical thinking. And whoever is considered a 
thinker or a wise man must simply be, at best, a good narrator of traditionally imposed 
wisdom and myths. Would it be possible to identify persons of traditional African 
culture, capable of the critical, second-order type of thinking about the various 
problems of human life and nature; persons, that is, who subject beliefs that are 
traditionally taken for granted to independent rational re-examination and who are 
inclined to accept or reject such beliefs on the authority of reason rather than on the 
basis of a communal or religious consensus? (Oruka 1991:17) 
 
Four years later, between 24 and 29 July 1978, during the commemoration of Dr 
William Amo Conference in Accra (Ghana), Oruka introduced the idea of philosophic 
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sagacity into the debate on African philosophy. He set out to reject three negative claims 
regarding the philosophical status of indigenous African thought: first, the claims of 
ethnophilosophy that Africa is a place of philosophical unanimity; second, that writing is a 
precondition for philosophy; and third, the Eurocentric claim that Greek sages are 
philosophical while African sages are not (ibid. 1). These three claims will be examined in 
the subsequent sections. 
 
4.8. Ethnophilosophy, unanimity, and African critical thought 
According to Oruka, ethnophilosophy is based on the assumption that traditional Africa is a 
place of philosophical unanimity. This implies that traditional Africa encouraged unanimity 
regarding beliefs and values and discouraged individual, critical thought. If this were true, it 
would allow no room for individual thinkers of the likes of, say, Socrates or Descartes, with 
their own views on such matters. Philosophic sagacity objects to this claim of ‘imaginary 
unanimity’ in Africa, a claim which Oruka regarded as absurd, by presenting empirical 
evidence of the ‘internal pluralism’ among indigenous African thinkers (Hountondji 1983). 
While rulers everywhere will always crave unanimity, thinkers thrive in dialogue and 
diversity of opinion. The fact that Africans disagree in search of solutions is a healthy 
indicator which militates against the ‘myth of unanimity’ projected by ethnophilosophy. 
Ethnophilosophy, according to Oruka, also endorsed an indigenous African thought 
steeped in anonymity and myths.101 His choice of individual thinkers invalidates the claim to 
anonymity. The individual thinkers in a given cultural orientation reflect upon and critically 
assess conventional beliefs. This explains why he categorizes Griaule’s Ogotemmêli as a folk 
and not a philosophic sage.102 According to Oruka, all that Ogotemmêli does is to summarize 
Dogon beliefs (no matter how esoteric) on a variety of topics, and there is minimal evidence 
of critical and independent reflection on the beliefs by Ogotemmêli himself.  
The element of individuality is crucial to Oruka’s conception of philosophic sagacity: 
 
Philosophy is a perspective of the whole or part of the human predicament and 
insightful suggestion on how to get out or conform.... This sort of perspective can be 
found in anybody (white, black, yellow, female or male). But in every community, 
                                                 
101 Oruka’s repudiation of myths is discussed in Chapters 1 and 2. 
102 We will come back to Oruka’s categorization of sages shortly. 
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there are always persons who specialize in offering or studying such 
perspectives.(Oruka 1990b: 35-36) [In traditional Africa this role was left to the 
sages.] 
 
4.9. Oral tradition and literacy in philosophic sagacity 
Oruka’s second subject of disagreement is the colonial bias against unwritten or oral thought. 
By publishing his interviews with the sages, he aimed to counter the claim: 
 
The second philosophical claim is that philosophy is and can only be a ‘written’ 
enterprise; a tradition without writing is incapable of philosophy. Therefore, any 
claim that there is philosophy (even when termed sagacity) in illiterate Africa is a 
non-scientific, mythological claim. This claim too is false. (Oruka 1991:1)  
 
He posits that there are illiterate African thinkers whose memories are, in terms of 
consistency and organization, as good as information recorded in well-composed books and 
better than poorly written books (ibid.53-54). Hence, to argue, like Bodunrin, that Africans 
have a late start in philosophy just because they are no written records and no one has ‘kept a 
diary’ (Hountondji 1983) of Africa’s past philosophical activities is, wrongly, to limit the 
sources from which we can detect traces of such activities(Oruka 1991:54). Furthermore, 
Oruka counters the views of his critics on the possibility of philosophic sagacity in the 
context of a lack of written philosophical treatises: 
 
To exist as a philosopher, it is not necessary that one’s thoughts must progress or be 
available to the future generation. Sufficient for the existence of a philosopher is that 
one’s contemporaries recognize one’s philosophical abilities and practice […] lack of 
knowledge about one’s or a people’s philosophy is not a proof of the non-existence of 
such a philosophy. (ibid.53) 
 
Hence, while systematicity is important to the structure and consistency of good 
thinking, neither it nor preservation of thought necessarily requires literacy. Literacy is not in 
itself a measure of the philosophical quality of someone’s thoughts. He also reminds us that 
Socrates’ philosophy did not exist just because Plato and others gave expression to it through 
their pens. Plato and others wrote it down (even if they distorted much of it) because it 
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existed in the first place (Oruka 1991:6). Therefore, there is no mutual exclusivity between 
the unwritten and the written because what is written can be reported orally, and what is oral 
can be expressed in writing (ibid.6). 
 
4.10. The African sage tradition and Eurocentric bias 
Oruka’s third cause of disagreement is based on the Eurocentric bias created by colonialism 
that Greek sages used reason while Africans do not philosophize. This hegemonic frame of 
reference explains why the sayings of numerous Pre-Socratic Greek sages such as Thales, 
Anaximander, Heraclitus, Empedocles, and other Pre-Socratics were paraded as 
‘philosophical’ and ‘unprecedented philosophical innovators of genius’ (van Binsbergen 
2012b:11), whereas those of traditional African sages were not. Western philosophy and 
natural science are commonly held to have begun in ancient Greece, with the Pre-Socratic 
philosophers each seeking to identify the nature of primal matter: Thales (Water), 
Anaximenes (Air), Heraclitus (Fire), Xenophanes (Earth), and Empedocles (Water, Air, 
Earth, Fire)—all flourishing in the middle of the first millennium BCE. 
This unjustified belief that the sayings of the Greek sages are ‘philosophical’, while 
those of traditional African sages are anything but philosophical (Oruka 1991:1), had further 
led to the image of philosophy as the restricted property of Greeks or Europeans and, even 
more exclusively, the property of white males. Oruka maintains that the apparently simple 
sayings of the Pre-Socratics, given the status of philosophy, were equivalent to the 
subsequent sustained commentaries by later philosophers. This explains why he does not see 
any difference between the ideas expressed by indigenous African sages and those of the 
earlier Greeks. When recorded in books, the sayings of the Greek sages came to be widely 
regarded as ‘philosophical’, and the people who made the utterances ‘philosophers’ (ibid.1-
2). This triggers Oruka to wonder why the sayings of Kenyan sages like Mbuya Akoko, 
Oruka Ranginya, and Osuru should not be similarly regarded after they are committed to 
writing by professional philosophers. He maintained, in an interview with Kai Kresse (1993), 
that rationality or reason is always a part of any culture, no matter whether the people are 
Chinese or African or from anywhere else. 
 Oruka justifies his comparison of the indigenous African sages with the Pre-Socratics 
by citing two methods that have contributed to the growth of philosophy in the West, 
beginning with its Greek roots. One direct method, that of using dialogues, is exemplified in 
the early Platonic works. Socrates asks primary questions, upon which the exposition of the 
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ideas of his interlocutor is based. Oruka views his own dialogues with the sages as an 
example of this practice in the African context. Socrates regarded himself as a ‘midwife’ of 
sorts, because he merely helped those with knowledge to bring it out. He brought out what 
was in each case really the property of his interlocutors, not his own. Socrates maintained that 
the sages he and his disciples interviewed were the owners of their own ideas. The 
professional philosopher, he says, ‘plays the role of philosophical provocation’ (Oruka 
1991:36). The other method, exemplified in the later Platonic works, involves direct 
engagement with the sayings of the sages through a commentary on their ideas. These can be 
derived from general acquaintance with the sages’ views.  
This section has presented the three negative claims regarding the philosophical status 
of African philosophy, which Oruka sought to obviate. In the next section, I present the basic 
themes of sage philosophy in Africa. 
 
4.11. Areas and persons of research 
A sage, according to Chambers English Dictionary, is ‘a man of great wisdom’. Oruka adds 
that a person is a sage in the philosophic sense only to the extent that he consistently 
articulates the basic ethical and empirical issues that are relevant to a society and 
demonstrates his ability to offer insightful solutions to some of those issues (Oruka 1991:3). 
This implies that in a given community, a sage must be capable of using wisdom to 
understand and make mature and objective judgements concerning the basic truths, values, 
and logic that guide the beliefs and practices of the people in that community. These 
definitions and attributes contradict the general description, even in learned circles, of a sage 
as a wise person in an illiterate or technologically underdeveloped community whose 
residents depend much on the oracular sayings of seers to keep up with the mysteries and 
surprises of life. This incorrect description may confuse a sage with a prophet and vice versa, 
but the two are not identical. The fact that a prophet has an ability to predict the future for a 
community does not make him sage. The sage’s ability consistently causes him to be 
preoccupied with the basic moral and empirical issues and questions in his society. His flair 
for offering wise solutions to these problems makes him different from the prophet. 
Sages can be found in all societies, even though some societies may feel a greater 
need for sages than others may do. A society, for instance, in which most people value 
libraries, books, and museums as the real sources of knowledge will feel it has less need for a 
living sage. Sages, however, exist in all classes and cultures. Oruka maintains that all 
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communities use their sages or at least their ideas to defend themselves and maintain their 
individual and collective survival. It does not matter that such sages bear the names 
‘philosophers’, ‘statesmen’, or ‘warriors’. A sage may be a Ghandi or a Nyerere (Oruka 
1991:3). 
When it comes to who qualifies as a sage, the best judge must be the community from 
which the person hails. Some may be popular in the community, while others may be 
unknown. This is because wise men do not often go about selling their wisdom. Therefore, 
the researcher ought to follow the guidance of a community in order to validate the alleged 
sages and dismiss others. This is because the community may be misled to treat some persons 
as sages. This is possible because as sage Stephen M. Kithanje says: 
 
There are three kinds of wise ones: 
a) those wise in the service of their stomachs only 
b) those wise for having learnt from the wisdom of the wise, and  
c) those wise because they were born wise. (Oruka 1990: 63) 
 
We have defined who a sage is, his role in the community, and what distinguishes him 
from a prophet. Now, what is the relation between a sage and a philosopher? 
The word ‘philosophy’ is derived from the Greek words philos (‘love’ or ‘pursuit’) 
and sophia (‘wisdom’). In this original sense, then, philosophy means ‘the love or pursuit of 
wisdom’, and a philosopher is someone who loves or pursues wisdom. According to Oruka, 
the thoughts of a given and named individual sage can be expressed and defended as 
philosophical counselling on various issues of nature and human life. The sage has at least 
two abilities: insight and ethical inspiration. He/she can employ these abilities for the 
betterment of their community. They can contribute basic moral and metaphysical advice. 
Their thoughts equally can form significant raw information for technical philosophical 
reflection by professionals. However, a philosopher may not have the ethical commitment 
and enthusiasm that we may find in the sage.  
What is common in real sages is the love of truth and wisdom. A sage may smother 
truthfulness only because of the prescriptions of wisdom and not because of any material 
benefits. This explains why Oruka thinks the definition Pythagoras gave of the philosopher as 
a ‘lover of wisdom’ ought to be set aside for the sage. Socrates, Oruka would argue, was 
wrongly labelled ‘philosopher’, for he was first of all a sage; he used philosophy to advance 
his wisdom and expose the hypocrisies of his time. For Oruka, Socrates qualifies as a sage-
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philosopher, as sage philosophers are to be valued over ‘mere’ technical philosophers, who 
have divorced philosophical speculation from the immediate questions of life. In Oruka’s 
view, it is important not only to have wisdom, but also to possess and practise it. A 
philosopher is one who has intellectual concern for wisdom, and who has this concern not 
just occasionally but as an integral part of life.103 
 
4.12. Methodology 
The method used in researching sage philosophy may be called philosophical anthropology. 
It entails identifying and dialoguing with traditional individuals. ‘Traditional’ here means 
areas wherein life is dominated by beliefs and practices not guided by written literature and 
advanced technology. The objective of such research is not to reach a communal consensus 
on a question or problem under discussion, but to find persons known to be among the wise 
ones in the community and carry on dialogue with them on various issues that are relevant to 
the life and culture of their community. These discussions or interviews are conducted in the 
native language of the supposed wise men or women in a given community. Such selected 
persons are capable of giving detailed explanations concerning the beliefs and practices of 
their community. They are also, at times, capable of offering reasonable criticism of some of 
these beliefs and practices. They go beyond the mere systematization of communal wisdom 
and provide relevant explanations and background to popular wisdom. Therefore, one major 
task of the professional philosopher becomes to identify the sages in a culture and then record 
their potentially unique insights on certain themes of fundamental importance to human life: 
the existence of God, the nature of death, the nature of time, the nature of freedom, the nature 
of education, and so on. The insights of some of the sages can be termed unique because they 
may very well differ from conventional beliefs in their societies. Oruka assumed that by 
using this technique he would be able to distinguish between true philosophy and popular 
wisdom. He credits his philosophic sages with such unique insights as opposed to folk sages. 
This explains why he does not regard Griaule’s Ogotemmêli as a philosophic sage. For 
Oruka, there is minimal evidence of critical and independent reflection on beliefs by 
Ogotemmêli himself. Hallen and Sodipo’s onisegun (masters of medicine, herbalists, and 
native doctors) do not qualify as philosophic sages either, because their ideas are 
representative of the thoughts of the ordinary Yoruba (Oruka 1991:49-50). 
                                                 




4.13. Wisdom and non-wisdom 
The first step in research into sage philosophy is based on the assumption that there are, in 
almost every society, certain statements that are wise sayings, while others are commonplace 
assertions. Further, it is assumed that wise statements are originally propositions made by 
men and women considered wise. Later, such propositions may become the sayings of almost 
every average person in the community; they become popular wisdom. Yet many of those 
who utter them hardly stop to discover from whom the sayings arose. 
The second step in research is to be able to distinguish three types of statements: (i) 
wise statements, (ii) commonplace statements, and (iii) foolish statements. The distinction 
between the three is often not as sharp as one might wish it to be. However, generally, a 
distinction should be made: wisdom is expressed by the first category of statements, while the 
second and third categories constitute the vast area of non-wisdom. 
Oruka’s attempt to make a clear-cut demarcation between wisdom and non-wisdom 
results in a rigid conception of wisdom. It gives the impression that wisdom is static. As we 
saw in Chapter 2, Derrida and Deleuze challenge us to think beyond binary oppositions and 
appreciate the unicity in plurality. Oruka needs to broaden his conception of wisdom. This is 
because he limits wisdom to statements and leaves out the art of living. He does not take into 
consideration the wider relationship between wisdom and philosophy we expressed earlier in 
this chapter. 
 
4.14. Cultural contexts 
Wisdom does not exist in a vacuum but in a context. A statement may be considered wise in 
one context and yet appear foolish in a different context. It depends on the beliefs and 
dominant activities of the culture under consideration. For example, a people who do not eat 
fish and never engage in fishing may not really appreciate wisdom that explains the art of 
fishing. Nor can a people who have never owned cattle see much wisdom in the utterances of 
the science of cattle rearing. Yet, there must be some sayings which are able to transcend 
their given cultural spheres and appeal as wisdom in all cultures. Let us consider the 
following three statements: 
 
1. As things come to be and cease to be, so our problems will come to an end. 
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2. Every human being needs food. 
3. I do not care what happens when I die, so I will make sure I spend all I have before 
I die. 
 
It should be clear that the first is a wise statement, the second a commonplace and the 
third a foolish statement (Oruka 1991:35). 
 
A person who makes a wise statement can be challenged to justify it. He can also be 
requested to apply it in practice. If the person has a philosophic frame of mind, he will no 
doubt be able to offer some rational answer to the challenge. If he lacks this gift, he is likely 
to offer an unimpressive answer or even refuse to give an answer. 
In a sense, Oruka remoulds and rechristens Wiredu’s ‘folk philosophy’ (Wiredu 1980) 
as ‘culture philosophy’, which he claims includes the shared, basic, conventional beliefs of a 
society or culture on a variety of important human concerns, topics, and questions of 
philosophical interest. Nevertheless, for this ‘culture philosophy’ to then metamorphose into 
‘philosophic sagacity’, individual thinkers (sages) in that society must also reflect upon and 
critically assess such conventional beliefs on the basis of their own experience and 
intellectual prowess, and on this basis possibly suggest either criticisms or novel alternatives. 
This shows the element of individuality that Oruka insists is a sine qua non of philosophy in 
any culture (Hallen 2009:72). 
The view that wisdom exists in a specific context largely depends on the North 
Atlantic anthropological conception of culture. This conception sees culture as bounded and 
holistic, with different societies living in separate worlds. It is the very basis of cultural and 
epistemological relativism.  
 
4.15. Provocation 
If the person is able to justify his statements and attempt to apply them, he can further be 
provoked by an offer of an alternative argument to his position. The alternative, he may feel, 
has completely contradicted his way of seeing things. Then, he may admit having been 
mistaken. On the other hand, the sage in question may respond by a counter-proposal, which 
indeed seriously challenges the alternative suggested, and this counter-proposal may still be 
consistent with his earlier view. The interview or discussion can go on endlessly through 
these twists and turns, forming a process which can be referred to as sagacious didactics 
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(Oruka 1991:36). This may be the case, as Oruka focuses on dialogue with individuals on 
abstract topics in search of wisdom. Our study goes beyond just that and shows that wisdom 
should be practical knowledge that allows one to solve daily problems in one’s life.  
 
4.16. The role of the interviewer 
The role of the interviewer is to act as the provocateur of the sage. The interviewer is to give 
birth to the sage’s full views on the subject under consideration. Oruka proposes that during 
the discussion the interviewer should use a tape recorder to record everything discussed 
(ibid.36). Some sages, however, may be annoyed by persistent provocation. Others, 
nevertheless, will enjoy it and wish to carry on. One of the folk sages in Oruka’s study 
(Muganda Okwako), for example, was asked what he thought about the concept of death. He 
reacted very negatively: 
 
Go and ask your dead grandfathers! They are very many. Why do you ask me about 
death? Do you wish to cause my death? Now, I will not answer any of your evil 
tricks. (ibid.) 
 
This sparked a disagreement, and both the interviewer and sage parted on this note. 
The same question was asked to a philosophic sage (Oruka Ranginya), who boldly argued as 
follows: 
 
Death is as good as life. If we imagine that there is God, and that we are his plants, 
then through death God uproots some plants to enable the rest to have enough food 
and to grow healthily. If there were no death, there would never be enough food and 
space for everybody. Indeed, God is very kind; he kills only a few and allows the 
majority to keep on. You, Odera (the interviewer), if you were God, you probably 
would even be more cruel! Unlike God, you would kill too many people. (ibid.) 
 
Such a cheerful opinion about death is contrasted with the negative approach earlier 




4.17. Distinguishing the philosophic sage from the folk sage 
An important aspect of Oruka’s technique is to distinguish the philosophic sages from the 
folk sages. This detachment is crucial in his conception of philosophic sagacity: 
 
The folk sage is versed in the common-place culture, customs and beliefs of his 
people. He can recite or describe them with much competence. However, he is neither 
able to raise any critical question about them, nor is he able to observe the inherent 
contradictions. The philosophic sage, like the folk sage, may equally be versed in the 
beliefs and values of his society. His main task is to make a critical assessment of 
them and recommend as far as the communal pressure allows, only those beliefs and 
values that pass his rational scrutiny. The folk sage is identifiable by his consistent 
inability to isolate his own opinions from the beliefs of the community and his ready 
inclination to take refuge behind the popular unexamined wisdom wherever he is 
intellectually challenged. The philosophic sage, on the other hand, is clearly able to 
isolate the given beliefs of the community from his own evaluation, rationalization 
and even criticism of those beliefs. He is also able to enjoy a dialectical or intellectual 
game with the interviewer. (ibid.) 
 
4.18. Oral practice and the practice of modern education 
Oruka’s research was carried out among people who had to depend on oral tradition. This 
does not mean that sages are possible only in a non-literate tradition; illiteracy is not a 
necessary condition for sagacity. It is possible to find sages in both literate and pre-literate 
societies. If this were not the case, then it would follow that very soon Africa would run out 
of her sages. This is because the old are dying, and governments are doing much to combat 
illiteracy. The point is that there are sages even with the modern form of education. It is on 
these grounds that Oruka endorses Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Mahatma Ghandi of India 
as sages. 
 
4.19. Subject matter: Extracts and commentaries on selected Kenyan sages 
In the following sections, we will present and comment on some of the extracts from selected 
Kenyan sages. Oruka presents a brief biography and photograph of each of the sages and their 
responses on certain topics, in a bid to appreciate the philosophic depth of each sage. He 
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insists on giving details of the sages as individuals, publishing their original oral 
philosophical thoughts. 
 
4.20. Paul Mbuya Akoko 
Paul Mbuya Akoko was born around 1891 in Karachuoyo, South Nyanza, Kenya. He served 
as paramount chief and also as a member of the East African Legislative Assembly. He 
believed in both Christianity and Luo traditional religion. He postulates God as Supreme 
Being: 
 
Godin my language is Nyasaye. But God is one for all communities and races. The 
Luos thought differently. They thought their god was not god over other ethnicities. 
They were wrong. God is one Supreme Being for all peoples. This I can show by 
reference to the fact of the uniformity of nature. If there were many gods with similar 
powers, nature would be in chaos, since there would be conflicts and wars between 
the gods. But nature is uniform not chaotic: adog, for example, brings forth a dog not 
a cat. And a cat produces a cat not a dog or a hen. All this is a proof of one Supreme 
Mind ruling nature. But what exactly is God? This nobody knows or can know. 
(Oruka 1991: 37) 
 
Paul Mbuya Akoko postulates that nature is uniform and, consequently, he uses the 
principle to prove the existence of one Supreme God. He cites uniformity in nature and the 
peace and tranquillity which hold the universe together. This position calls for a serious 
philosophical consideration, given that Aristotle, and later St Thomas Aquinas, used the same 
principle in formulating the cosmological argument used in Western philosophy to prove the 
existence of One Supreme Being. The sage reasons that if there were many opposing gods 
ruling the universe, there would almost necessarily be rivalry and jealousy among the gods, 
with subsequent chaos and destruction. Mbeya’s account reveals the philosophic ability of 
this sage. Here is a sage involved in deliberate thinking. He goes against the general Luo 
belief in the concept of God and offers his personal opinion with a balanced argument. 
On a question relating to man and woman, Mbuya states: 
 
There is a popular Luo belief that the man is owner and master of the homestead, the 
whole homestead, but I think this belief is wrong. For, when we come to the house, 
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the woman is in control there. In the house, the man can only ask for things. He 
cannot do as he pleases without any restraints. However, the woman too cannot do 
anything without asking her husband. Thus, husband and wife help each other. Where 
peace is desired, each person tries not to overstep the boundary which common sense 
determines in relationships. (ibid. 139-140) 
 
Oruka notes that philosophic sages are capable of conceiving and rationally 
recommending ideas, which offer alternatives to the commonly accepted opinions and 
practices (ibid. 57). They transcend the communal wisdom and use ratiocinative second-order 
reasoning. The individual insight and ability to go beyond communal wisdom become the 
personal philosophy of the sage. 
The philosophic sage reflects on and re-evaluates a culture’s philosophy. This is 
because every culture has basic and justifiable ideas and beliefs. Generally, in every free or 
well-informed society, every reasonable person is conversant with the culture. The sage has a 
mastery of the culture philosophy of his people. However, few sages possess the philosophic 
inclination to make critical assessments of the culture and the basic beliefs and ideas that 
underlie it. This is precisely what philosophic sages do: they use reason rather than popular 
beliefs to explain things. In so doing, they produce a system within a system, an order within 
an order (ibid. 49). 
The first system is that of culture philosophy. This system harbours unquestionable 
ideas and truth claims. There is a firm grip on these assertions, such that any opposition faces 
a stiff resistance from folk sages. Their descriptions or judgements do not transcend the 
premises and conclusions provided by the prevailing culture. As opposed to the first system, 
the philosophic sage produces the second order. This is what philosophic sagacity is all about. 
It is a critical defiance of conventionalism and archaism as maintained by the first order. 
Oruka presents the sharp contrast: 
 
In contrast, the second order is that of philosophic sagacity. It is a critical reflection on 
the first order. In many other cases, it is a critical rebellion against the first order 
conformity and anachronism. While the first order glorifies the communal conformity, 
philosophic sagacity is skeptical of communal consensus, and it employs reason to 
assess it. While the first order is purely absolutist and ideological, the second order is 
generally open-minded and rationalistic. Its truths are given as tentative and 




Mbuya goes further to explain the question of equality of the sexes in political and 
social terms; he posits that if it is not properly handled, unnecessary problems may crop up. 
He argues that equality can only be sought after several years of education and orientation. If 
this is too hastily done, there could be chaos. He argues:  
 
Education will in time help to redress this imbalance since men and women are 
inherently equal. We see that woman can be more intelligent than man just as man can 
also be more intelligent than woman. (ibid. 140) 
 
He castigates traditions in which women are portrayed as inferior to men. This makes 
women feel they are so, which Mbuya labels laziness. Mbuya’s view on the question relating 
to man and woman is convincing and original. He goes against normal Luo beliefs and 
proposes a thesis of ‘balance of forces’. He argues with cogency that the conspicuous 
differences in man and woman are only apparent, since, in reality, man and woman have their 
particular attributes equated by nature. Thus, man has the irrefutable ability to do certain 
things better than a woman or do heavier kinds of work, on the other hand, while a woman is 
bequeathed with the matchless capacity to carry, bear, and suckle a child. It is for this reason 
that man is neither superior to nor master of woman. Mbuya sees no inequality between the 
genders and so offers proof to discount the thesis. He criticizes those traditions that say that 
women are inferior to men. His thesis invalidates male chauvinism and is an outright call for 
female emancipation. 
On the concept of time, Mbuya postulates that the Luos could speak of things that 
happened in the past by use of specific events that happened. The past, in the Luo language, 
is chon, the present tinde, and gi ma nobi is the future. He specifies that the future can be 
definite, as when people may have some idea when they expect an event to take place.  
Mbuya’s exposition of the Luo concept of time shows the relationship between time 
and history. It is this compatibility which affects the way the concept of time is used. The 
time described is approximate, because in a traditional environment time is conceived in 
psychological terms. This is opposed to modern, science-oriented societies, where time is 
mechanical and people use clocks and watches. The sage, however, explains that for the Luo 
the concept of time is linear, for people to make reference to the past, present, and future. 
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Mbuya’s view on time is very valuable and revealing, particularly because it invalidates John 
Mbiti’s (Mbiti 1970:23-23) assertion that Africans lack the concept of future time.104 
 
4.21. Mzee Oruka Ranginya 
Mzee Oruka Ranginya was born in Ugenya in Siaya District in Kenya. He had no formal 
education but taught himself to read and write. He was a local wrestler and an acknowledged 
sage. He was adviser to the chiefs and the community. He married ten wives and raised 36 
children. He died in 1979 at the age of 79 years. 
On the question of God, Ranginya asserts that God is an idea. He explains that God, 
however, had no likeness to man. God is like wind (yamo makudho) and He can be anywhere. 
But God is also the same thing as moral goodness (chung kata tim maber, maber). God is not 
a concrete object; it has no substance. God is the idea of Goodness or power that man wishes 
or seeks to attain. It is wrong to personify God—God is the concept of open-heartedness 
(chuny mathuolo). God is the idea which represents Goodness itself. Without this idea, evil 
would be permitted and practised everywhere. But God is not a body (Oruka 1991: 119). 
Ranginya cites two contradictions which posit that God exists in idea and in 
substantial form. This for him is fictitious. He sees God as an idea, an ideal in the absolute 
sense. God is an idea that represents Goodness in an abstract sense. Furthermore, since God is 
thought to be both in Heaven and on Earth simultaneously, he cannot be a material object and 
therefore cannot logically have the image of man. 
On the question of death, Ranginya does not necessarily perceive of the phenomenon 
of death as something bad.105 He expresses the view that death has its utility. He sees death as 
nature’s way of easing congestion on Earth. He explains that each person’s existence on 
Earth ends at death. God does this in good faith, as He is the sole giver and taker of life. 
Ranginya’s position dwells upon leading a moral life on Earth. His cheerful notion of death is 
opposed to that of some folk sages. Muganda Okwako, like other folk sages, is enmeshed in 
the popular notion of death. His notion of death is one of negativity and anger/irritation at 
                                                 
104 Mbiti (1970:21) considers that what is now happening or certain to occur immediately belongs to the 
category of ‘No-time’, such that ‘time is a two-dimensional phenomenon, with long past, a present, and virtually 
no future’. However, Mbiti’s conception of time has been criticized by several scholars. See, for example, 
Gyekye (1975); Kagame (1976); Makinde (1988); Gbadegesin (1991); Munda Carew (1993); Masolo (1994); 
and Oke (2004). 
105 Muganda Okwako’s and Oruka Ranginya’s opposing perceptions of death are cited in 4.16.  
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being asked about death. He thought that being asked about death and answering could lead 
to one’s own death, and that being asked is a matter of evil trickery (ibid.36). Another folk 
sage, Chege Kamau, says death is the end of life. He asserts that death is the enemy of all 
things and everybody hates it (ibid.91).For Ali Mwatani, life ends at death, which is ‘very 
bad’ and evil (ibid.94). 
 
4.22. Njeru wa Kanyenje 
Njeru wa Kanyenje was born in about 1880 and died in 1976. He hailed from Emba District, 
Kenya. He was an experienced blacksmith who was greatly respected as a man of strong 
principles. He was conscripted and fought during the First World War. He hated the 
Europeans for making Africans fight a European ‘tribal war’ between the British and the 
Germans. He had no formal schooling and had one wife, three daughters, and one son. In the 
1970s some of his grandchildren persuaded him to become a Christian. To please them, he 
said, he was baptized as a Christian on condition that it was done at his home and that he 
would not be required to accept any Christian name. He considered religion to be witchcraft: 
 
I do not care much about God or religion. Right from the beginning (i.e. when the 
muzungu [whiteman] first brought organized religion), I saw religion as a bluff. It is a 
whiteman’s witchcraft! But this witchcraft has today triumphed over the traditional 
African witchcraft. Today, I recognize its victory but not its truth. It is still a bluff. I 
do not pray to God nor do I consult witchdoctors. Both religion and witchcraft are 
bluffs. They have no truths in them. My great wish is that I should be spared the 
interference from religions and witchcrafts. (ibid. 38) 
 
Njeru wa Kanyeje’s view that religion is a form of witchcraft and that all witchcraft is bluff 
ties in with the Marxist maxim of religion as the opium of the people. 
The sayings of the sages listed above, apart from there being value in them, can 
provoke vigorous philosophical discussions. They are presented as individuals with opinions 
that go beyond what obtains in their local communities. One defining characteristic of 
Oruka’s sage philosophers is that they may be inspired by their culture, yet they go beyond 
that culture. In this way they may make wise statements that could be applicable in all 
contexts. In that respect they are one hundred percent comparable with Descartes, Hegel, 
Kant, and even the Pre-Socratics. Yet, we must also realize the peripheral situation of these 
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sages, which constitutes the essential difference from Western philosophers. Kant, for 
example, was trained as a philosopher in a scholarly tradition with the dominance of the text, 
the presence of the state and the market as a distant context, and the presence of an academic 
philosophical tradition in which such an academic philosopher could articulate himself in 
both continuity and originality. For the Pre-Socratics, there was ultimately the distant 
presence, in Mesopotamia and Egypt, of far more specialized, literate centres of learning 
established for millennia. Hence, it would make sense for African sages to be conceived of as 
predicated on the distant presence of the great traditions of Christian, European, Indian, and 
Chinese thought, and so on, and not just in their own context. From the comments of the 
various sages we realize that Western culture and philosophy are evident in the appraisal each 
sage makes.  
 
4.23. Conclusion 
In this chapter, our main concern has been to present sage philosophy and show the relevance 
of wisdom in philosophy. Oruka brings out a viable methodology in searching for traditional 
wisdom by using oral interviews based on dialogue on abstract topics with individual sages. 
The extracts from the Kenyan sages he interviewed showed their degree of competence on 
the specific questions he posed. Oruka succeeds in showing an African system of thought, 
which he considers indigenous and philosophical. These sages do not just recite the common 
beliefs of their people but go beyond them in critical analyses. The implication is that 
criticism and analyses are not an exclusive preserve of the North Atlantic mind. The African 








This chapter deals with a number of objections that have been brought against Oruka’s 
philosophic sagacity. These criticisms come from philosophers who primarily bring forth 
definitional and methodological problems. Oruka’s project is surviving and flourishing after 
his premature death, but his conception of wisdom needs to better fit the present globalized 
intercultural world. His sage philosophy is centred on indigenous thinkers and the modern 
debate on African philosophy. I will critically examine Oruka’s vision of sagacity from a 
different philosophic position and aesthetic style; namely, post-modernism. This will enables 
us to see if Oruka’s modernist position is still valid in our search for African traditional 
wisdom in contemporary times. I will first attempt a definition of post-modernism and 
delineate some of its key characteristics and positions. 
 
5.2. What is post-modernism? 
Post-modernism is predominantly of French and German descent and arose notably in the 
1970s. It haunts social science today and is often described as one of the most intellectual 
movements to appear in the last 40 years.106 Modernity entered history as a progressive force 
promising to liberate humankind from ignorance and irrationality,107 but one can readily 
                                                 
106 For clear descriptions of post-modernism, see Harvey (1990); Rosenau (1992); Bauman (1993); Powell & 
Owen (2007). 
107For more on modernity see Giddens (1990); Heller (1990); and Toulmin (1990).African academic philosophy, 
having started in the 1950s with the works of Kagame and Diop, saw much debate on its ontological status and 
appropriate method. For moreon this debate see, for example, Oruka (1975, 1983, 1987); Wiredu (1980); 
Bodunrin (1981); Hountondji (1983); Mudimbe (1988, 1994, 1997); and Gyekye (1995). A considerable number 
of professional African philosophers have endorsed the modernist methodological approach, arguing that 
African philosophy should be a model of understanding what is rational, critical, and common in every culture. 
This view is defended by Oruka (1975); Wiredu (1980, 1990, 1996, 1998); Bodunrin (1981, 1985); Hountondji 
(1983); and Gyekye (1995). Others have subscribed to the post-modern orientation, arguing for a philosophy 
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wonder whether that promise has been fulfilled.108 Most of what applies here to post-
modernism also applies to post-structuralism. Although the two are not identical, they overlap 
considerably and are sometimes considered synonymous. Few efforts have been made to 
distinguish between the two, probably because the differences are of little consequence. 
While some scholars argue for the fundamental non-identity of the two, others see them as 
similar. Rosenau (1992), for example, sees the major difference as one more of emphasis than 
of substance. Post-modernists are more oriented towards cultural critique, while post-
structuralists emphasize method and epistemological matters. While post-structuralists 
concentrate on deconstruction, language, discourse, meaning, and symbols, post-modernists 
cast a broader net. The post-structuralists remain uncompromisingly anti-empirical, whereas 
the post-modernists focus on the concrete in the form of le quotidien, daily life, as an 
alternative to theory. Those post-modernists who hark back to the pre-modern are classical 
empiricists, privileging sense experience, and a highly personal, individual, non-generalized, 
and emotional form of knowledge. 
Post-modernism opposes perspectives that make absolute and timeless claims. It 
reminds us that knowledge is always provisional and incomplete. It undermines 
foundationalism, realism, objectivity, and impartiality, and it promotes difference, 
multiplicity, and fragmentation. According to post-modernism, knowledge production has to 
call into question the grand narratives and rather seek to elevate cultural difference, the local, 
and the particular. This is because grand narratives will always foster authoritarianism and 
omit differences. The main proponents of post-modernism include Derrida, Foucault, and 
Lyotard, who were largely inspired by German philosophers such as Nietzsche and 
Heidegger. 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
that is African in content—i.e. relevant to tradition, history, culture, and contemporary struggles; see, for 
example, Senghor (1964) and Sogolo (1993). Subsequently, cosmopolitan philosophers from Africa have 
successfully broken through the continental boundaries of African philosophy’s orientations in their critiques of 
North Atlantic knowledge production on Africa. See, for example, Mudimbe (1988, 1994, 1997); Appiah 
(1992); and Mudimbe & Appiah (1993). 
108 Some maintain that the modern age ranged from the 15th to the 19th centuries and that post-modernism has 
been evolving for the last 150 years. Others contend that post-modernity originated in the late 1960s and the 
early 1970s (Ferry & Renaut 1985, 1987). Scholars also disagree about whether the modern and post-modern 
overlap or are distinct, whether post-modernism signals a genuine break with modernity or is merely its logical 
continuation (Hassan 1987). 
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5.3. Sceptical and affirmative post-modernism 
There are probably as many forms of post-modernism as there are post-modernists. Within 
this diversity, there are two broad orientations: sceptical and affirmative post-modernists 
(ibid.14-17). 
Sceptical post-modernists (or merely sceptics) offer a pessimistic, negative, gloomy 
assessment of the post-modern age. They argue that the post-modern age is one of 
fragmentation, disintegration, malaise, meaninglessness, vagueness or even an absence of 
moral parameters, and societal chaos (Baudrillard 1983; Scherpe 1986-87:101). They posit 
the immediacy of death, the demise of the subject, the end of the author, the impossibility of 
truth, and the abrogation of the order of representation. Even where there is room for 
happiness, farce, parody, pleasure, and ‘joyous affirmation’ (Derrida 1978: 292), these are 
only temporary, empty, meaningless forms of gaiety that merely mark a period of waiting for 
catastrophe (Scherpe 1986-87). For the sceptics, there is no truth, for all that is left is play, 
the play of words and meaning. 
Affirmative post-modernists agree with the sceptics’ critique of modernity, but they 
have a more hopeful, optimistic view of the post-modern age. Most of them seek a 
philosophical and ontological practice that is nondogmatic, tentative, and nonideological. 
Many of them would argue that certain value choices are superior to others, a line of 
reasoning that would be disapproved of by sceptical post-modernists (Bordewich 1988; Frank 
1988). 
The dichotomy sketched above of the sceptical and affirmative post-modernists 
should not be seen as completely authentic or adequate. This should be no surprise because 
post-modernism itself is not static and unchanging; rather, it is endlessly dynamic and always 
in transition.  
 
5.4. Some common features of post-modernism 
Even though we have noted that post-modernism is made up of different strains of thought, 
there are some general common features. 
In its most extreme formulations, post-modernism is revolutionary. It goes to the very 
core of what constitutes social science and is radically critical of it. In its more moderate 
proclamations, post-modernism encourages substantive redefinition and innovation. It 
proposes to set itself outside the modern paradigm, not to judge modernity by its own criteria 
but rather to contemplate and deconstruct it. Hence, it is about loosening modernity’s grip on 
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the old authorities and opening up to a new diversity. It is sceptical towards modernism and is 
a way of going beyond or moving ahead of modernism. The worldviews and perspectives of 
the Enlightenment period, such as the subject, reason, representation, and reality, are 
critically re-thought. Post-modernists argue that modernity is no longer a force for liberation 
but rather a source of subjugation, oppression, and repression. In the domain of philosophy, 
post-modernism has a renewed respect for the subjective and an increased suspicion of reason 
and objectivity. 
Recurrent themes in post-modernism include anti-foundationalism, difference, anti-
realism, and the subjectivity of all knowledge and values. This means that philosophical 
theory and knowledge cannot be built on firm and immovable foundations. In other words, 
there are no metaphysically and epistemologically unproblematic conceptual building blocks. 
Knowledge production is always relative, temporary, and replaceable. Post-modernism’s 
distrust of foundationalism is evident in Leotard’s definition of post-modernism as 
‘incredulity towards meta-narratives’ that claim to be scientific and objective.  
Having offered a general introduction to post-modernism, to its intellectual 
precursors, and to the distinction between sceptical and affirmative post-modernists, we now 
proceed to use post-modern arguments in the objections to Oruka’s conception of philosophic 
sagacity.  
 
5.5. Criticisms of sage philosophy 
This section deals with Oruka’s own doubts about his sage philosophy project, then deals 
with his supposed anti-feminism in relation to an entirely different project. Several criticisms 
have been levelled against Oruka’s project by Oruka himself and by other scholars. Gail 
Presbey (1997) refutes Oruka’s project on three counts. First, she examines Oruka’s 
criticisms of his own project. 
She argues that despite Oruka’s pride in launching the sage philosophy project, he 
himself had some doubts about it. An example can be seen in Oruka’s essay ‘Philosophy in 
East Africa and the Future of Philosophical Research in Africa’, where he refers to his sage 
philosophy project and that of Claude Sumner (who did a lot of research in Ethiopian 
philosophy) as projects that were limited to a historical context and would soon give way to 
other trends which he considers central to the future of African philosophy—such as 
professional philosophy and nationalist–ideological philosophy. Moreover, even though 
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Oruka criticized the work of Tempels and other ethnophilosophers, he confesses that his own 
analysis is a combination of anthropology and philosophy.  
Oruka affirms, in Sage Philosophy Revisited, that he started his sage philosophy 
project as a counter to the negative claim by Europeans that Africans are not capable of 
philosophizing. If this negative perception by Europeans changed, would it suggest that 
professional philosophers cease looking for wisdom among indigenous African sages? Yet, 
Oruka continues to suggest that his project serves just as a ‘base’ or ‘raw materials’ for other 
forms of philosophy which will emerge in the future which he cannot imagine right now. By 
‘base’ or ‘raw materials’, he implies that he is collecting indigenous African texts on which 
professional academic philosophers can base their research, rather than always choosing from 
European texts for their future works (Oruka 1997:184-185). Furthermore, Oruka posits that 
even though analysing the thoughts of indigenous Africans who are deeply rooted in their 
culture would be an important input of Africa to the rest of the world, he contradicts himself 
when he notes that analysing ethnological beliefs would be of little or no impact in the 
modern debate on philosophy or science (ibid.237-238). In other words, Oruka seeks to 
reinforce his modernist position by asserting that the ethnological beliefs epitomized by those 
he calls ‘folk sages’ would hardly make much impact on modern science and philosophy.  
In Gail Presbey’s opinion, Oruka’s criteria for one’s eligibility as a sage are 
discriminatory. Oruka insists in Sage Philosophy that neither age nor gender is a necessary 
condition for one to become a sage. However, in his book (Oruka 1991:87-157) we see that 
of the 12 sages, there is only one young man (Chaungo Barasa, born in 1960) and one woman 
(Peris Njuhi Muthoni, who happens to be a folk sage). This lends credence to Presbey’s 
critique and calls for suspicion on why sages are generally referred to as ‘wise old men’, in 
line with the general cultural prejudice that men are superior to women. Oruka (1991:5) cites 
some anti-feminist philosophers such as Nietzsche and Schopenhauer, and some of his sages 
to justify the influence of culture on people whether they are sages or philosophers. He cites 
the influence of Ancient Greek culture on Plato and Aristotle, who did not see slaves as 
having the worth of human beings, and the racist attitudes of Kant and Hegel (Oruka 1991:4-
5). However, I think Oruka clearly states non-discriminatory criteria when he notes that 
neither age nor gender is a necessary condition for one to become a sage. The fact that in 
practice he did not find or list many women or young people is emphatically not evidence of 




5.6. Methodological and definitional objections 
Kaphagawani (1987) contends that philosophic sagacity is second-order philosophy to 
ethnophilosophy and could not exist without the latter: 
 
What is said to hold for culture philosophy, particularly the claim to provide a picture 
as representative as theoretically possible, is also true of ethnophilosophy. Philosophic 
sagacity, in this case, becomes therefore a second order system of ethnophilosophy. If 
that is conceded, then philosophic sagacity cannot survive in the absence of 
ethnophilosophy. […] Philosophic sagacity, therefore, is not antagonistic to 
ethnophilosophy; it seems, rather, to be complementary to ethnophilosophy or culture 
philosophy. The fundamental difference, however, lies in the difference in 
assumptions; ethnophilosophy is premised on the holistic assumption whereas 
philosophic sagacity sets out from the assumption of non-holism.109 
 
Kaphagawani’s position equates culture philosophy to ethnophilosophy and postulates 
philosophic sagacity as second-order philosophy to ethnophilosophy. This explains why he 
does not see any contention between the two, and so he negates Oruka’s exclusionist and 
antagonistic polarization of the two approaches. Even though there is a basic difference in 
both approaches, he thinks that a reconciliation of both approaches could benefit African 
philosophers. Oruka (1991) contests Kaphagawani’s position by arguing that philosophic 
sagacity is a consequence of culture philosophy and not ethnophilosophy. As a trend of 
thought, Oruka argues, ethnophilosophy is much more recent than culture philosophy, which 
dates back to the days of the ancients. Such a position only validates our project in 
intercultural philosophy, which questions the very conception of ‘culture’ on which 
philosophic sagacity is based. 
Lansana Keita (1985) rejects Oruka’s claim (Oruka 1983:384) that philosophic 
sagacity is the movement in African philosophy best equipped to give an acceptable-to-all 
decisive blow to the position of ethnophilosophy. Such a view, Keita argues, is not fully 
defensible since it can be shown that philosophic sagacity as defined by Oruka himself is a 
mere revision of the principles of ethnophilosophy. Furthermore, the thesis put forward by 
Oruka that philosophic sagacity differs from ethnophilosophy (culture philosophy) because 
philosophic sagacity entails critical personal thought, while ethnophilosophy does not, cannot 
                                                 
109 Kaphagawani (1987) in Oruka (1991:187). 
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be sustained. This is because, as Keita continues, an individual thinker or a restricted group of 
thinkers must have first initiated any belief system before it becomes a generally accepted 
belief system. Moreover, the novelty of such belief systems would derive their 
characterization from the fact that they must have been founded on critical analyses of 
existing belief systems. 
Again, Oruka’s thesis that philosophic sagacity has a stronger claim than professional 
philosophy and nationalist–ideological philosophy to helping in the development of a genuine 
African philosophy—on the basis that these are ‘generally suspected of smuggling Western 
techniques into African philosophy’ (Oruka 1983: 384)—is surely open to criticism. In the 
first place, it is unclear what Oruka means by ‘Western techniques’. Professional 
philosophers are accused of smuggling Western techniques into African philosophy. Is 
smuggling these Western techniques into African philosophy not inevitable? Writing, 
academic organizations, publication of journals, and conferment of degrees are among some 
Western techniques that create and maintain philosophy. Could we do without such Western 
techniques and still have African philosophy, of whatever designation? Moreover, could the 
meeting of the so-called Western techniques and African ones not produce newly enriching 
techniques for contemporary human experience? 
 
5.7. Orality and writing in sage philosophy 
The influence of colonial bias against unwritten thought was also challenged by Oruka’s 
project. By publishing his interviews with sages, he aimed to counter the denigration of 
African thought and the claim that: 
 
[p]hilosophy is and can only be a ‘written’ enterprise; a tradition without writing is 
incapable of philosophy [and that any claim to the contrary][…] is a non-scientific, 
mythological claim. (Oruka 1991:1) 
 
Oruka’s project revealed that one is likely to find indigenous thinkers who are 
illiterate. His stance is contrary to the views of his fellow professional philosophers such as 
Hountondji, Bodunrin, and Keita, who maintain that there can be no philosophy without 
writing.110 
                                                 
110 See Bodunrin (1981); Hountondji (1983); and Keita (1985). 
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Oruka asserts that to exist as a philosopher it is not necessary that one’s thought be 
written down or that one must progress—meaning that a philosopher must be commented on 
and available to future generations. Sufficient for the existence of a philosopher is that one’s 
contemporaries recognize one’s philosophical ability and practice (Oruka 1991:53). Oruka’s 
position implicitly contests the central point in the long tradition of Western scholarship, 
popularized by the works of Lévy-Brühl, which denied Africans the existence of organized 
systematic philosophical reflection and was against unwritten thought. 
Nevertheless, the implications of this tradition of scholarship prompt a call for 
epistemological vigilance on our part. As mentioned in the introductory chapter, I think it is 
necessary to promote African philosophy today through writing, even though it is not a 
prerequisite for philosophic thought. Moreover, what Oruka implies is that it is not necessary 
for philosophers to have access to or knowledge of the views of their predecessors. The 
counter-argument to this view is that it is necessary for a philosopher’s view to be available 
to a future generation. Bodunrin (1981) asserts that writing permits the systematic 
organization of philosophical reflections and helps in conserving ideas for eventual 
transmission for future generations. Even if writing is not a precondition for philosophy, its 
relevance cannot be underrated. It is therefore necessary for past philosophers to survive in 
the form of texts into the present so that philosophers will be abreast of past issues. The 
intersection between contemporaries and their predecessors makes philosophy a joint, 
enriching enterprise of philosophers of all epochs. Philosophers in every epoch give perfect 
answers to some questions and insufficient answers to others; so, when philosophical epochs 
intersect, it provides a platform for philosophers of a contemporary epoch to take what is 
good from their predecessors and make it theirs. In other words, contemporary philosophers 
should seize the opportunity of intersection of epochs not only to incorporate the best of their 
predecessors, but also to distinguish themselves from their predecessors and to judge them by 
reformulating, refining, and refocusing the problems of their predecessors. 
In my opinion, historical pragmatism is philosophically laudable in that it 
recommends that historical experiences be taken seriously to learn from their strong points 
and avoid their weaknesses. Each society can learn much from their history, as the lessons of 
the past are indispensable for a better future. Historical realities, as painful or glorious as they 
may be, should not be relegated to the background as Oruka maintains. They must form part 
of our present reality. They give us the opportunity to correct mistakes of the past and to 
exercise the moral virtue of reconciliation, which is necessary for a collective and global 
survival. The position of historical pragmatism endorses the past as a reality, and learning 
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from the past does not imply that one becomes a prisoner of the past. Referring to 
colonialism, Senghor appreciates the lessons that blacks learned from the colonial powers and 
the contributions of Europeans towards the growth and development of Africa. The 
profundity of Senghor’s appreciation and acknowledgement of Europeans is articulated in his 
book dedicated to Pierre Teilhard de Chardin. Here he compellingly and passionately writes:  
 
I repeat it; it is Europe, France who saved us. They did this by developing in us a 
reflection supported by facts and their comprehension, and auto-criticism and above 
all, by teaching us the values of black Africa […] It is Europe (such is the dialectic of 
life) […] who would make us discover the values of Negritude activating in us, to 
speak like Teilhard de Chardin, with the powers of the heart, the powers of reflection: 
co-reflection. (Senghor 1962:18-19) 
 
The German philosopher Hans-Georg Gadamer (1900–2002) defends the idea of 
philosophers knowing or having access to the views of their predecessors. He adds that not 
knowing what the past philosophers have said is arrogant. On the contrary, knowing what our 
predecessors have said is a mark of respect for them and it bodes well for philosophy. 
Moreover, some philosophers may not even be recognized by their contemporaries but by a 
later age. The appeal of a philosopher’s work may go beyond his contemporaries. Socrates 
and Jesus Christ, for example, were despised by their age but were recognized later as 
philosopher and messiah, respectively. Being a philosopher begins when a philosopher lives 
to a future age; itis not a matter of a consensus by the contemporaries of a philosopher as 
Oruka (1991:53) asserts. If the ‘consensus’ 2,000 and 2,400 years ago was no guide to the 
stature of Jesus Christ and Socrates, of what use is it likely to be in identifying sages in 
contemporary Africa? Hence, Oruka’s ‘consensus’ criterion needs to be very strictly defined, 
and he should not limit a philosopher’s readership to his/her contemporaries. 
Oruka prefers the modern analysis of focusing on speaking and the oral text. Derrida 
criticizes this tendency and labels it phonocentric (Derrida 1981). The post-modern reader is 
the observer who has the power of interpreting a text (an event) that in modern terms 
belonged to the author. Oruka’s wisdom piece is a readerly text (lisible), written with the 
intention of communicating a specific, precise message. Oruka’s text is enmeshed in a 
situation, a historical period, and a culture, and it must be understood in its context. It 
assumes a passive reader that merely takes in the message. The modern reader is passive, 
unlike the post-modern one who is active in the production and construction of the text. 
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Given that post-modernism is text-centred, we cannot limit sources of traditional wisdom to 
speech only. Our daily practices can also be valid sources of African wisdom. 
The use of language by Oruka is also problematic. Language transforms truth into 
largely linguistic conventions, and truth can never be independent of language. According to 
Derrida, the relationship between name and meaning, the signified and signifier, is 
problematic (Derrida 1976). Meaning can never be clear, transparent beyond questioning or 
doubt. This process is one that is relational and always fluctuating. Even though language 
allows Oruka to identify, organize, and give meaning to a specific form of sagacity, at the 
same time it obscures the existential thrust of that sagacity. Mall also dismisses the 
ontological prejudices inherent in language-based philosophical interpretations:  
 
No thought is the messenger of Being itself, and no language is the original mother-
tongue of Being. (Mall 1995:89)111 
 
Philosophy is not immanent to language. [...] That is why translating is in itself a 
process which deserves as much attention as the process of communication. (ibid.)112 
 
Hence, language has limitations when it comes to expressing the essentials of human 
experience. Moreover, the multiplicity of human languages hinders perfect transmission from 
one language to another. 
 
5.8. Greek sages and traditional African sages 
Oruka was concerned about the Western image of Africa created under colonialism. While 
the sayings of numerous Greek sages, such as Thales, Anaximander, Heraclitus, and others 
Pre-Socratics, were regarded as philosophical, those of traditional African sages were not. He 
maintained that the ideas expressed by indigenous African sages were no different from those 
of the earlier Greeks. When recorded later in books, the sayings of Greek sages came to be 
                                                 
111 Original: Kein Denken is vom Sein selbst geschickt, und keine Sprache ist die eigentliche Muttersprache des 
Seins. (Translated from the original by van Binsbergen (2003: 388)). 
112 Original: Philosophie ist nicht reine Sprachimmanenz. [...] Die Übersetzung ist daher selbst ein Prozeß, der 




widely regarded as ‘philosophical’, and the people who produced them as ‘philosophers’ 
(Oruka 1991:1-2).  
Oruka brought out what was in each case really the property of his interlocutors, not 
his own. He maintained that the sages he and his disciples interviewed were the owners of 
their own ideas. The Western-trained philosopher, he says, plays the role of philosophical 
provocation. 
This raises a fundamental problem: Oruka relies very much on the Western model in 
searching for traditional wisdom in Africa. He falls prey to the hegemonic and totalizing 
pretensions of modern science. The canons of modern scholarship include objectivity, 
universality, and rationality. This Eurocentric bias is traceable in Early Modern times, when 
Europe’s military, economic, and political power began to extend effectively to many parts of 
the world. This culminated in the 19th century in the Age of Colonialism. The intellectual side 
of this process was the view that European (and soon, general North Atlantic) culture, art and 
science (then mainly viewed as the legacy of Ancient Greece), religion (mainly Christianity), 
languages (mainly ‘Aryan’, i.e. Indo-European), and even bodily characteristics 
(‘Caucasian’) were considered incomparably superior to those of the rest of the world, and 
without historical debts to other continents. This hegemonic perspective has persisted even in 
the history of philosophy and science. The emergence of these two disciplines has continued 
to be attributed to the Pre-Socratic philosophers in the eastern and western fringes of the 
Ancient Greek world (Ionia, i.e. south-western Turkey, and Graecia Magna, i.e. South Italy). 
However, this hegemonic perspective is obsolete today. In the last few decades, there has 
been a decline of Western hegemony in the military, economic, scientific, artistic, and 
religious fields. In such fields as archaeology, cultural history, ancient history, anthropology, 
and philosophy, Eurocentric views have gradually been discarded in the course of the 20th 
century for a number of reasons: the impact of the decolonization of Asia and Africa; the 
increase in transcontinental migration; the emergence worldwide of the multicultural society 
with an eclectically globalizing culture; and counter-hegemonic intellectual movements such 
as Orientalism, post-modernism, Afrocentricity (including the Black Athena thesis), post-
colonial theory and its African variant as represented by Mudimbe, and intercultural 
philosophy. 
The point is that Oruka himself is aware of the hegemonic situation that has a certain 
Eurocentric bias. Yet, like many other African philosophers, he does not explicitly situate 
himself in the counter-hegemonic context. When Oruka distinguishes the folk sage from the 
philosophic sages, is it not a subtle way of strengthening the very hegemony he sets out to 
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challenge? His reaction is not counter-hegemonic enough but is based on a sameness with the 
West. This explains why he attempts to construct an African version of Western sagacity. He 
chides ethnophilosophers for starting with the strong and ‘fallacious’ assumption that African 
philosophy and Western philosophy must and can only be different (Oruka 1991:5). In his 
attempt to deconstruct the claim that Greek sages were philosophical while those of 
traditional Africa were not, Oruka finds philosophy among indigenous Africans who have not 
benefitted from modern education. Yet, it looks unfair that he does not extend this to 
ethnophilosophy, to the social organization, communal life, and practices of the people. Why 
would Oruka think that we could not derive wisdom from African knowledge traditions with 
global value? Did Africa receive only, and not give anything suitable for intercultural 
knowledge production? There is no need to appropriate African sagacity into the North 
Atlantic intellectual tradition or model as Oruka does. He could use the North Atlantic model 
as a resource, but there is no need to become subservient to that model alone. It would be 
more rewarding for Oruka to affirm the local wisdom tradition in the African context and 
then try to cross-fertilize it with other globally available wisdom traditions. 
African sages, in post-modern times, should rather be different and, yet, 
complementary to the Ancient Greek sages. Difference implies multiplicity and 
fragmentation and highlights the local and the particular. This is opposed to universals that 
foster authoritarianism and destroy diversity and pluralism. For Derrida, any attempt to 
ground reality in one method or perspective is dubious because there are infinite and different 
realities. No particular worldview can claim to have a monopoly on the truth. Even though 
difference involves diverse cultural orientations, intercultural philosophy enables us not to 
limit our vision of philosophy. We need to go beyond these differences, but at the same time 
African sages must not necessarily be made to resemble the Ancient Greek sages. Hence, the 
method of our search for African wisdom must not only corroborate the Western model; both 
ought to be in perpetual exchange.  
In the context of globalization and increasing interconnectedness, newer modes of 
wisdom become evident. Sages may be born, acquire, and administer wisdom in this context, 
and there is the possibility of mediating this wisdom beyond its initial society to a wider and 
even global society. This has recently been intensified by the spread of education, literacy, 
and the Internet. Intercultural philosophy respects cultural differences but goes beyond these 
differences and searches for universal elements in the different cultural orientations. This can 
be found through dialogue, in a bid to mutually enrich each cultural orientation. In this case, 
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there is a need for a kind of globalized sagacity, one that is not just limited to one context but 
transculturally relevant.  
Bodunrin (1981) does not see why Oruka rejects two approaches that he likens to 
philosophic sagacity in Africa. These approaches are those of Marcel Griaule in his famous 
Conversations with Ogotemmêli, and the type of research carried out among the Yoruba of 
Nigeria by J.O. Sodipo and Barry Hallen, both of the University of Ife at the time. To these 
examples we may add sangoma wisdom (van Binsbergen 2003). Bodunrin sees Ogotemmêli 
as a custodian of ancestral tradition who displays a great philosophic sagacity in his 
exposition of the secret doctrines of his group. The research carried out by Sodipo and 
Hallen, according to Bodunrin, is similar to Oruka’s work on philosophic sagacity. This is 
because the Yoruba onisegun (informers) selected are versed in Yoruba thought and so 
deserve philosophical attention. Sodipo and Hallen visited the informers and conducted a 
dialogue with them on, for example, the Yoruba concept of a person and other concepts of 
philosophical interest (Bodunrin 1981:162,168).  
Bodunrin may endorse the work of Griaule, Hallen and Sodipo as forming part of the 
philosophic sagacity project. However, our study proposes wisdom that goes beyond just 
pronouncements or simply recording the beliefs and values of a people. How does this 
wisdom help the Dogon and the Yoruba? Would it not be better to look at this sagacity as 
practical knowledge (as in sangoma wisdom) which can be at the service of both the 
informants and the researchers? Could the rest of humanity not benefit from such wisdom? 
Moreover, these belief systems are not fixed but always ‘at play’ and changing. 
Bodunrin pursues his critique of philosophic sagacity when he notes that it is 
confronted with a serious methodological problem—that of authorship (Bodunrin 1981:170). 
In his view, when a trained philosopher interviews a sage who in the end unveils his 
philosophical ideas, the product is a new creation. It is neither wholly the sage’s nor the 
philosopher’s. Against this background, we can postulate philosophic sagacity as a ‘passive 
philosophy’. Must sages be provoked each time before they philosophize? Moreover, Oruka’s 
focus on interviews with individual sages is rather abstract and the philosophical questions 
that the sages were confronted with are socially disconnected. A better approach could be 
from fieldwork experiences, sharing in the everyday life of the locality and personal contacts. 
This would create a better forum for an active interpretation of wisdom in society. 
Interviews and participant observation as theories and methods used by Oruka are 
most likely to be utterly alien to the community under study. Interviews (with questions such 
as ‘why’, ‘what’, ‘how’) are violently intrusive for African subjects of study. These questions 
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violate the intimacy of the people concerned, place them continuously in a defensive position, 
and give the impression that the sages owe the professional philosopher an answer at all 
costs. African peoples, with the pain and sufferings of the colonial past, of slavery, and of the 
numerous practical dilemmas of individual and collective life do not deserve such pressure to 
answer basic questions about their lives and existences. Moreover, the interviews are 
conducted and oriented by the professional philosopher. It could have been more profitable 
and psychologically rewarding for Oruka to live and interact with the local community and to 
become involved in plain conversation with its members. This would underline the equality 
of researchers and their empathy with research subjects. In such encounters, there is no sense 
of superiority; they are facilitated by the fact that the researcher and the researched share the 
same position, unlike the case (as in interviews) where one operates from a hegemonic 
position. Hence, I do not think we need to totally endorse Oruka’s fascination for oral 
wisdom from selected sages. It would be more profitable to also include practical wisdom, 
which helps the individual and community in their daily problems. This wisdom is practical 
in the sense that it can inform social action in an appropriate setting and even beyond. 
In spite of Oruka’s interviews and professionalism, the use of fieldwork is naively 
inductive and poses problems of access and representation. First, how does the interviewer 
gain access to cultural facts as they really are? Second, is the framing of these so-called 
findings in academic text not distorting? This is what van Binsbergen thinks about some 
anthropologists and the use of fieldwork: 
 
Anthropologists manage to do their work in fieldwork locations that tend to be distant 
and inhospitable, and here they think up spartan alternatives for the standard North 
Atlantic comforts that are temporarily denied to them. By the same token, they are 
inclined to improvise their way when it comes to epistemological and methodological 
foundations, thinking up their own solutions and, if they seek help in the process, 
limiting their search to the writings of fellow anthropologists. But often this does not 
yield enough. (van Binsbergen 2003:497-498) 
 
Even with a completely emic approach, including the continuous validation of the 
researcher’s interpretations in day-to-day actions and communication in a community, one 
cannot claim to reach an unproblematic, untainted understanding. Moreover, there is a need 
for what German sociologist and philosopher Jurgen Habermas (1984) describes as 
‘communicative action’, which is acting in conjunction with others, based on mutual 
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deliberation and argumentation. This is possible because all human beings have the capacity 
for rationality, but Habermas recommends an intersubjective rationality that can make mutual 
understanding and communication possible. In this case, there is no hegemony between the 
researcher and the researched subject. The subject gains access to the object, the people 
studied can ‘speak back’, and interpretations can be questioned, confirmed, or adjusted as 
necessary. This process can become a source of pride and identity to the people studied. 
Cameroonian philosopher Godfrey Tangwa (1997) does not see any reason for 
Oruka’s qualification of philosophy and philosophers as ‘sagacious’ and his categorization of 
sages into folk and philosophic sages. This is because since sagacity is synonymous with 
wisdom, and since there is no definition of philosophy that does not include or, at least, imply 
the idea of wisdom, the term ‘philosophic sagacity’ is a somewhat redundant tautology. 
Secondly, Oruka’s categorization of sages into folk and philosophic sages also bristles with 
problems. This is because within traditional African culture, strict compartmentalization of 
knowledge and specialization are not so pronounced. The philosophic depth and degree of a 
thought, statement, work, or discourse (verbal or written) can be determined by critical 
appraisal. Yet, one cannot be sagacious or wise all the time. There is no good philosopher 
who has not, at least sometimes, made questionable or even out rightly false or foolish 
statements. Hence, such compartmentalization should not be cast iron but plastic. Thirdly, 
Tangwa contests the erroneous assumption, largely shared by so-called academic 
philosophers, that any philosophy worth the name must be the work of some identifiable 
individual. This view is received from Western philosophy and culture, which are fiercely 
individualistic in theory and practice. He posits that African cultures and philosophies are 
deeply communal in outlook and practice. This explains why, in African culture, inventors 
and specialists usually do not take any personal credit for their ideas and work in society. 
Finally, like Lansana Keita, Tangwa counsels that Oruka’s tendentious denigration of folk 
philosophy is missing the point. This is because if an individual’s philosophy is really 
convincing, it will be influential; and, if it is influential, it will tend to become a folk 
philosophy within the community where it is influential. This implies that a successful 
individual philosophy will normally become a folk philosophy. To look down on folk 
philosophy is therefore to denigrate successful individual philosophies and to hold in high 
esteem rather those which, by their failure to convince, have remained the exclusive property 
of their proponents. In brief, each culture or community has its own folk philosophy, which is 




5.9. Oruka’s interviews with individual sages 
Oruka’s project of sage philosophy focuses on texts from many interviews with individual 
sages. A brief biographical sketch and photograph precedes each interview. This practice 
stands in contrast to the ethnophilosophical practice, in which the views of informants (often 
anonymous) are summarized in the search for a common denominator (Presbey 2007), 
collective thought is emphasized, and meaning is sought in collective practices.  
Oginga Odinga: His Philosophy and Beliefs (1992) is the first book in the Sage 
Philosophy Series, edited by Oruka. The main purpose of this series is to demonstrate the 
existence of individualized philosophies in Africa (Oruka 1992:21). By detecting the African 
sage and acting as midwife, Oruka helps the sage produce his or her wisdom for posterity. 
Oruka’s conversations with Odinga focus on diverse issues, such as truth, morality, and 
compromise in politics. The individual sage Odinga is presented in this book as one such 
African sage renowned for his Africanist and international role as a staunch nationalist 
thinker and activist. Oruka even thinks Odinga is very much like the British philosopher 
Bertrand Russell in his unfaltering ‘love for truth’, unrelenting ‘will for independence’, and 
‘deepest sympathy with the suffering masses’ (ibid.3). 
Oruka’s method in identifying individuals is greeted by Wiredu as the first to give 
‘substantial notice’ of individual philosophical thinkers in Africa (Wiredu 1996:116), and 
Nigerian philosopher Emmanuel Eze (1999) credits Oruka with correctly emphasizing the 
importance of retaining the identity of individual thinkers. Hountondji (2002), in spite of his 
fierce criticisms of ethnophilosophy, claims he was impressed with Griaule’s work because it 
focused on an individual. He also credits Griaule for transcribing the words of one man, the 
guardian of ancestral tradition and the slavish mouthpiece of group wisdom. Hountondji does 
not hide his appreciation for Griaule: 
 
Voluntarily assigning to himself the humble task of a secretary, custodian, transcriber 
of the worldview of a black sage, of one spiritual master among others, the French 
ethnologist gave the example of scientific patience and, in my eyes, did more useful 
work than the ethnophilosophers proper who were in a hurry to reach definitive 
conclusions on African philosophy in general. (Hountondji 2002:99)  
 
The quotation shows that Hountondji does not hide his preference for the individual 
over the communal and anonymous views held by ethnophilosophers. Hountondji also 
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appreciates Oruka’s emphasis on the merits of individual sages in his sage philosophy 
project. Here is Hountondji on Griaule: 
 
He showed the possibility of a long-term project which would consist of a systematic 
transcription of such speeches, at least as a starting point of a critical discussion—
what my Kenyan colleague the late Odera Oruka would later call ‘philosophical 
sagacity’—rather than as a reconstruction of implicit philosophy behind the habits and 
customs of the host society through a lot of non-verifiable hypotheses which always 
amount to overinterpreting the facts. (Hountondji 1996: ix) 
 
I think Hountondji missed the updates on Dogon studies highlighted in Chapter 2. It is 
not a folk sage producing myth, nor a philosophic sage Oruka is hunting for. The story in 
Conversations with Ogotemmêli is typical of the hegemony of the West and the 
hermeneutical problems of fieldwork I mention in this work. Griaule started with notions of 
négritude, already discernible in his Masques dogons (1938), assuming he would find in 
Africa a philosophy on a par with the best Greek and Indian philosophy had to offer(Griaule 
& Dieterlen 1954:83). And so he did, with Ogotemmêli, after long prodding and much re-
structuring and re-writing. Yet, it is Griaule’s definition of what ‘deep philosophy’ is, and 
Greece and India are still the models. He then disguises this process as ‘the humble task of a 
secretary’, not as some sleight of hand, in my opinion, but out of genuine belief (the 
‘prejudice’ of Gadamer) that he had found the deep structures of Dogon thought in a 
spectacular and coherent myth. As we mentioned in Chapter 2, the Dogon do not know 
anything about this myth, and Hountondji does not take this up. So the Ogotemmêli case 
illustrates very well the Western power-of-definition (Foucault) of what constitutes 
sagacity/wisdom and what constitutes a proper myth. It also demonstrates the hermeneutic 
hegemony of North Atlantic views of what ‘constitutes’ Africa: Africa as the source of deep 
wisdom—but of a kind that is defined, judged, and appreciated by the West. 
Presbey (2007) defends the view that Oruka did not just cite anyone as a sage, 
because even his folk sages had standing and reputation in their communities. She asserts that 
by naming individual sages, Oruka thought the sages were unique and interesting individuals 
who deserved to be known beyond their local communities. The worth of these sages, she 
maintains, is found not only in their ideas but also in the way they live, embody philosophy, 
develop their character over the years, and have affected their communities. Hence, the sages 
do not just articulate wise sayings but also have practical relevance in their respective 
501712-L-bw-Mosima
127 
communities; they are wise men and women committed to the moral betterment of their 
communities (Oruka 1991:3).113 Oruka even challenges Tempels’ followers to identify the 
individual philosophers in the Bantu community: 
 
Since the affirmation of an African philosophy is logically the affirmation of the 
existence of African philosophers, it is important that Tempels’ followers go ahead 
and identify those philosophers. It is not too late to do so even forty years after 
Tempels, as we have done through our study of the sages. (Oruka 1990:11) 
 
5.10. Beyond the modern individual author 
In this section, let us try to see why Oruka is fascinated with the individual as the philosopher 
par excellence. The reason is that in a modern context, the individual is the subject, the 
author. He is the one who produces books, articles, and pamphlets. If the resulting text is 
regarded as the product of genius, and if it is approached with reverence and the expectation 
of revelation, then the prestige of the author is enhanced. The modern individual author is a 
specialist, a professional educator, and an intellectual. He has a superior position to educate, 
instil moral values, or enlighten the reader, who is not held in such high regard. These 
individuals assume privileged access to truth, reason, and scientific knowledge. The modern 
subject has confidence in reason, rationality, and science, and puts all of these above emotion. 
The above presentation of the modern individual author is largely exploited by Oruka 
in his distinction between the folk sages and philosophic sages. As we have seen earlier, the 
folk sages are second-best to the philosophic sages, who are said to have superior qualities. 
Folk sages engage in ‘popular wisdom’ and are first-order thinkers and conformists, while the 
philosophic sages engage in ‘didactic wisdom’ and are critical, second-order thinkers (Oruka 
1991:33). Folk sages do not engage in critical thought, see any inherent contradictions in 
traditions, or isolate their opinions from the communal beliefs (ibid.34). They can be 
herbalists, poets, medicine men, musicians, or fortune-tellers. Their explanations or thoughts, 
according to Oruka, do not go beyond the premises and conclusions provided by the 
prevailing culture. The philosophic sage, on the other hand, engages in critical reflection on 
the first order. Whereas the first order seeks and enhances the communal consensus, the 
                                                 
113 For more on the ethical relevance of sagacity, see Presbey (1996, 2000, 2002). 
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second-order philosophic sagacity is doubtful of communal consensus and employs reason to 
assess it (ibid.48-49). 
Oruka justifies this distinction in his comparison of Griaule’s Ogotemmêli, whom he 
considers a folk sage, with Paul Mbuya Akoko, whom he considers a philosophic sage. For 
him, Ogotemmêli says hardly anything that suggests a thought beyond the generally given 
and revered Dogon beliefs. Oruka is also quick in dismissing the Sodipo–Hallen approach, 
who had Yoruba onisegun as the professional group with whom they primarily worked. The 
views of the onisegun, Oruka contends, are representative of the thoughts of the ordinary 
Yoruba. They remain at the level of culture philosophy, which nasty observers can call 
cultural prejudices (ibid. 50). 
The distinction between popular and didactic wisdom, according to Oruka, is not cast 
iron but plastic, as it fluctuates (ibid.33) between the two poles. This means that there are folk 
sages that can be philosophic sages as well. Nevertheless, Oruka does not respect that 
qualification in his categorization of sagacity. This explains van Hook’s (1995) proposal that 
Oruka’s categorization of sages into ‘folk’ and ‘philosophic’ be more flexible than Oruka 
advocates. He wonders why Oruka does not consider their views as philosophical (ibid.58). 
Gail Presbey thinks that the folk sages even show talent that is more philosophical that 
Oruka’s description of them would make us believe. She thinks folk sages should be included 
as philosophic sages because some of the sages distinguish their views from those of their 
communities on at least one topic (Presbey 2007:142-143). Instead of distinguishing folk 
sages from philosophic sages, she thinks that the distinction often occurs within the same 
individual sage. The individual sage is even an ‘active interpreter of tradition’ (ibid.143). 
Presbey may be right in her refutation of Oruka on this point, but our study shows that we 
cannot limit the construction of wisdom just to the individual. A culture is, by definition, a 
collective thing, being shared by thousands and usually millions of people. Such a cultural 
orientation is inherently diverse and inconsistent. Moreover, the individual merges with the 
ever-changing community in a bid to face daily problems. Hence, Presbey needs to broaden 
her conception of community. She could include the onisegun, for example, who are African 
avenues for forging and maintaining communities and not just individuals. The fact that the 
folk sages have a mastery of their cultural beliefs suggests their interest in their respective 
communities. Could this not be a valid base for an African social and political philosophy? 
Furthermore, we need to revise who the individual author, text, and reader are in this 
globalized post-modern world. For Foucault, there is no author among primitive people. 
Authorship, he contends, is a concoction of modern bourgeoisie hegemony, which 
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emphasizes the importance of the individual. A post-modern author has a more modest role, 
making no universal truth claims and having no ready-made prescriptions to offer. This 
suggests that no philosopher or empirical researcher can claim to have a privileged position 
from which to survey the world and obtain authority for their pronouncements (Guattari 
1992). In an unexplored, global world, the author strives to bring a text with diverse 
meanings and interpretations. It is a text that does not pursue the truth but one that elevates 
the experience alone. 
Nietzsche doubts the existence of a thinking, feeling subject who reasons logically 
and causally. For him, the subject is viewed as self-deceptive, lacking in consciousness, 
wilful, vengeful, and power-seeking and manifesting a ‘repressed, nihilistic will to power’ 
(Booth 1985:132-133). The Austrian neurologist Sigmund Freud (1856–1939) also 
questioned the status of a coherent, integrated, unified, modern subject. He eliminated the 
self-conscious subject and substituted a decentred, fragmented, and heterogeneous subject 
who was often unaware of their unconscious. His was not a ‘knowing’ subject but rather a 
psychoanalytical subject better characterized by multiplicity, disunity, and self-deception 
than anything else. The post-modern individual is relaxed and flexible, oriented towards 
feelings and is a ‘subject-in-progress’ à la Kristeva(1986), an intercultural subject with no 
stable identity. Deleuze and Guattari assert that post-modernism effectively means the end of 
the subject (Deleuze & Guattari 1972, 1980, 1994). 
Oruka’s over-emphasis on the individuality of the philosophic sage, along with the 
sage’s criticism of the community, is contested by some critics who qualify the entire project 
as ‘un-African and subservient to the Western idea of philosophy’ (Presbey 2007:144). The 
Nigerian philosopher Segun Gbadegesin contends that ‘it is the view or belief of [some] 
Western philosophers that philosophy must be an individual enterprise’, and he points out the 
contradiction in this Western philosophical idea of the importance of the individual: 
individualism as a value, he maintains, is dependent on a group consensus (Gbadegesin 
1991:9). The South African philosopher W.J. Ndaba agrees that the ideal of philosophy as ‘an 
individual, explicit, critical and self-critical ratiocinative consciousness’ is a Western notion. 
Hence, laying emphasis on such Western foundations is ‘counterproductive for the 
emergence of a genuinely rooted African philosophy’ (Ndaba 1996: 17). 
Furthermore, Oruka claims that the sages had not had any external contact or the 
benefit of modern education. How, then, does dialogue obtain between the sages and the 
visiting stranger anthropologists? Does this not suggest an ideological construct? Does this 
not portray the impact of globalization on contemporary Kenyan society? In this regard, Jay 
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van Hook (1995) argues that it is impossible in contemporary times for Oruka to claim that he 
interviewed indigenous thinkers who had not benefitted from Western education or values, or 
on whom these had not made an impact. Van Hook makes these significant remarks 
concerning the 12 sages presented by Oruka in Sage Philosophy: 
 
[...]three are identified as Christians, one a preacher in the Anglican church; one 
attended a colonial school; another talks about Socrates; one is identified as the son of 
an anti-European activist; and still another is described as inseparable from his radio 
and as having satisfied all his ambitions except owning a car. (van Hook 1995:54-65) 
 
Oruka compliments one of the philosophic sages—Paul Mbuya Akoko— when he 
goes against the common Luo beliefs in their god and other gods, as Akoko claims that all 
these gods are one and that there is only one God(Nyasaye) (Oruka1991:137). However, this 
shows the influence of European missionaries on indigenous Luo concepts of religion and 
God. Gail Presbey opines that the idea of one God was what the missionaries taught the Luo 
when they entered Luoland. If Akoko said he learned it from foreign missionaries, however, 
it would have undercut the evidence adduced in the study. Moreover, Oruka does not 
explicitly show how Akoko negotiates the tension between his multiple identities. Oruka 
(ibid.134) states that Akoko was a member of the East African Legislative Assembly and 
believed in both Christianity and Luo traditional religion. He married two wives and had 
several children. In 1938, he published a book in the Luo language, Luo Kitgi Gi Tembegi 
(‘Luo Customs and Habits’), and at the time of his death in 1981 he was the Ker (ultimate 
moral or spiritual leader) of the Luo. Akoko’s case and the others noted by van Hook not only 
provide sufficient proof of external contacts but seriously undermine Oruka’s claim for the 
existence of an indigenous isolated-from-the-West sagehood. 
Oruka’s monism and simplicity is interculturally untenable, as intercultural 
philosophy operates from a plural and complex platform. His sages were interviewed and his 
findings are limited to a ‘culture’, for these sages’ wisdom exists in a specific context and is 
tied to that lone ‘culture’. In a globalized context, where people, cultural values, and 
commodities are flowing in all directions and many boundaries are dissolving, we need to be 
cautious about Oruka’s orientation on sagacity. Van Binsbergen, for example, merges a wider 
intercultural terrain in his conception and practice of sangoma wisdom. In his professional 
life as an anthropologist, he has been conversant, at the cultural and linguistic level, with at 
least four regional cultural complexes in Africa and Asia, in addition to the European 
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complex into which he was born. This explains why he negotiates sangoma wisdom from 
exchanges and cross-cultural influences to postulate a non-relativist epistemology—as 
opposed to Oruka’s self-evident relativism, which is that of a researcher claiming his sages 
had never had the benefits of modern education or any external influence, when in fact a 
number of them had.  
Furthermore, even though Oruka provides an acceptable modernist basis for an 
African philosophy, his interpretation of the concept of culture in contemporary times is 
mistaken. He recommends cultural anthropology as the method in sage philosophy and 
invites all philosophers to devote more time to it rather than create an ‘iron curtain’ between 
philosophy and anthropology (ibid.8-10). This conception of culture, and by extension 
cultural anthropology, is largely influenced by North Atlantic paradigms. Van Binsbergen 
(2003), for example, analyses anthropological research as a problematic mode of intercultural 
knowledge production. He argues that anthropological research depends on manipulated face-
to-face relations, personal history, transference, and North–South hegemonic power. 
Moreover, relying on these anthropological paradigms, according to van Binsbergen, 
generates only more ethnic and political problems than it can solve. The paradigms breed a 
concept of ‘culture’ that displays only heavily holistic and essentialist traits, rendering the 
problematization of performative aspects of cultural identity naïve. Intercultural philosophy, 
on the other hand, reminds us that culture is not bounded, but performative. 
 
5.11. Ethnophilosophy, unanimity and individual African critical thought 
Another negative claim that Oruka aimed to challenge pertains to the philosophical status of 
indigenous African thought. Oruka sustains his challenge by joining Hountondji and Towa in 
criticizing ethnophilosophy.114 Even though Ochieng’-Odhiambo (2002:19-32) claims that 
Oruka’s position vis-à-vis ethnophilosophy evolved from an unwillingness to compromise, 
the founder of sage philosophy generally maintains a radically different position from 
ethnophilosophy. Oruka distinguishes sage philosophy from ethnophilosophy because 
ethnophilosophy had falsely popularized the view that traditional Africa was a place of 
philosophical unanimity and that African traditions encourage unanimity regarding beliefs 
and values. 
                                                 
114 We discussed these criticisms in Chapter 2. 
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Oruka’s critique of ethnophilosophy requires some comment here. First of all, he 
implicitly takes for granted the Western form of rationalist philosophy as the standard and 
universal mode. The misguided attempts he makes to champion supposed African equivalents 
of Socrates and Descartes perpetuate the erroneous idea that African societies are primitive, 
with an inferior form of rationality relative to some North Atlantic thinkers such as Kant and 
Hegel. Oruka, from his academic Western conception of philosophy, sees philosophy as the 
unique individual product of a unique individual mind. The rationalist position, from Plato to 
Descartes, constructed philosophy as a rational enterprise with mind over body. Plato’s 
epistemology and metaphysics are intertwined and relate to his theory of Forms. These Forms 
are universal, stable essences that can be contemplated by detaching oneself from sensibility 
and establishing oneself in the intelligible world, where one can contemplate the Forms. 
Philosophy is reasoning and not in the senses. This explains why Descartes says, ‘I think 
therefore I am’ (cogito ergo sum). Oruka’s fascination for this form of philosophy probably 
explains why he endorses the rationalist individual mind in his conception of philosophic 
sagacity. 
Secondly, Oruka also subscribes to the immensely alienating myth of the human body 
as a machine (Sharp 2000; Smith et al.2004). In the Western tradition, the human body is 
seen as an industrial product which is uniform, standardized, and can be used as a model for 
advertisements. This explains why advertisements emphasize the young, healthy and perfect 
‘body’. Such a body is likened to a machine that has an ‘engine’ and needs ‘check-ups’. 
Thirdly, the Western conception endorses the myth of the fundamental closedness of 
the human person (van Binsbergen 2008). The human person is envisaged in two ways: in the 
first place, as a unique person or individual rather than as a person belonging to a group; and 
in the second place, as one whose mind is a closed system that cannot be penetrated by other 
minds. Hence, knowledge production is limited to the individual mind, as a rationalist thinker 
like Descartes would have it, and not the body.  
However, African examples go beyond this Cartesian epistemology. Senghor refutes 
the rigid distinction between reason and emotion. He argues that Cartesian philosophy 
provides a rather distant, objective relationship between the thinking subject and reality. Such 
visual reasoning distinguishes subject and object and analyses the realm of objects in a rather 
sober way, reducing the possibilities of human emotional and social life. Senghor therefore 
complements visual reason with embracing reason, arguing that embracing reason is not an 
inferior but a complementary reason (Senghor 1967). This implies that we need not eliminate 
or ignore the human body in our conception of the search for wisdom as Oruka contrives to 
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do. African divination—sangoma divination, for example (see van Binsbergen 2003, 
especially Chapters 5, 6 and 7)—produces trance-like techniques of trans-individual 
sensitivity which can bring about a valid basis for non-sensory forms of knowledge 
transmission. In addition, we find much of African traditional wisdom centred on the human 
body. Africans use their bodies to celebrate their entire life cycle, death, and fertility. These 
rituals also include the symbolic relationship between the body and the land, the body and 
socio-political institutions. When the body moves in space and time during dance and music, 
it enables the individual to experience its social and cosmological status. During healing 
practices, the link between worldview, social organization, and body are restored. In this 
process Africans not only redress and restore, but also recreate the human individual. The 
African traditional wisdom of the body, expressed and mobilized in every ritual act of 
therapy, contrasts with the alienating bodily practices of the North Atlantic region (often 
more restrictive and rigid) and of a world religion such as Christianity (as it developed after 
Christ, from Paul onwards), which have dominated the world to date. African corporeal 
wisdom today, such as healing, music, sexual practices, and dancing, has not only continued 
to be important to African people but has also been reformulated into a global format (van 
Binsbergen 2008).  
 Oruka’s final criticism of ethnophilosophy is that it is largely grounded in mythical 
representations of reality. First, he separated myths from the clearly thought out and logically 
valid philosophical ideas of indigenous individual thinkers to make clear what he frequently 
refers to as the ‘anthropological fogs’. Secondly, he contested the idea that a qualitative 
mental leap from myth is required for Africans to embrace philosophical thought (Oruka 
1972, 1975, 1997). As we discussed in Chapter 2, Oruka’s position on myth as falsehood is 
naïve and superficial. It is essentially the rationalist position, which helps us to construct 
ourselves as rational philosophers but may not provide us with a full understanding of 
culture, ideology, ethics, morality, the appeal of truth, and so on. Such a position 
misconstrues myth as static and fails to conceive of history as an evolving process. 
Dismas Masolo (1994:237) is also critical of philosophic sagacity. His main argument 
is that philosophic sagacity is not philosophy. True philosophy, for him, relies on analysis, 
definition, and explanation. Oruka’s sages may have a mastery of their traditions and be 
highly opinionated, but this is insufficient reasoning. Traditions and opinion are discarded in 
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the method of Socrates.115 The sages fall into the category of Pre-Socratic knowledge, and 
this has no place in strict philosophy. The various discussions Oruka conducts with his sages, 
according to Masolo, lack a certain rigour and conceptualization which are essential elements 
of philosophy. This explains why he also contests Oruka’s treatment of pre-literate sages as 
proto-philosophers. 
Oruka’s conception of wisdom/sagacity as abstract thinking, limited to the mind, and 
which can be retrieved only via interviews (Oruka 1991:35-36) needs serious re-thinking. 
Wisdom is not just theoretical or abstract thought (sophia) as Oruka makes us understand 
when he interviews his sages. Wisdom is also practical (phronesis), as in sangoma wisdom. 
In his conception of phronesis, Heidegger argues that it gives emphasis to our ‘being-in-the-
world’, beyond theoretical understanding. It constitutes a way of self-knowledge of our own 
existential and practical situation. This enables Gadamer to conceive understanding as a 
practical, situated, and dialogical activity. A richer approach to African traditional wisdom 
would be to explore both sophia and phronesis in African traditional society, and not focus 
exclusively on sophia as Oruka does in his sage philosophy. 
Some examples of viable African traditional wisdom, which could complement or act 
as alternatives to global science and which have potentially global applicability, are the 
following: first, as mentioned above, there is the human body; second, there are African 
local-level practices of conflict resolution and reconciliation; and third, there is comparative 
mythology, which offers promising models for the exploration and expression of traditional 
African wisdom (van Binsbergen 2008). These examples of African traditional wisdom 
strengthen the message that African sagacity should not be conceived as a theoretical and 
academic endeavour far removed from the many problems Africans face today—a distance 
we noted in Oruka’s interviews and articulations of philosophic sagacity—but rather as a way 
of contributing to the practical dilemmas of individual and collective life. Hence, Oruka 
could have benefitted not just by interviewing sages on issues related to knowledge and 
philosophy, but also by living within the neighbourhood of thinkers, sharing their everyday 
lives and having personal contacts with them (as Kai Kresse did in Mombasa, Kenya). Kresse 
(2007) lived among the Muslim community, learned Swahili, and did not conduct interviews 
                                                 
115 The Socratic method as practised by the early Greek philosopher Socrates (c. 470–399 BCE) involves 
proposing a definition, rebutting it by counter-example, modifying it in the light of the counter-example, 
rebutting the counter-example, and so forth. The Socratic method, through dialogue, helps the implied/intended 
meaning to be born—hence Socrates likens it to a midwife’s action. The method can help advance the 
understanding of concepts and improve arguments or positions.  
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per se. He listened to the intellectuals during their philosophical discourses with the other 
members of the community, and he also read their poems and lectures. Even when he jotted 
down the discourses of the thinkers in their social context, he added his own comments 
separately from the original discourses (Kresse 2007). Oruka could also ‘become a sangoma’, 
as van Binsbergen did during field work in southern Africa.  
 
5.12. Situating sagacity between universalism and particularism 
Oruka does not see the tension and implications between universalism and particularism. 
Even though there are still debates on the relationship between universals and particulars, 
philosophers agree that a universal is a common property.116 It refers to a characteristic 
common to every member of a particular culture or to every human being. When things have 
the same identity, property, kind, or class, they fall under a universal. The notion of 
universals, pertaining to the common features found in particular things, enables us to form 
concepts, by sorting universals or classifying them. Particular things are individuals, distinct 
objects that are in only one place at any given time. However, particulars fall under types and 
always have properties, which can appear in other particulars at the same time. In this way, 
universals are closely tied to particulars and cannot exist outside them. In a sense, universals 
are the other side of particulars. These two are always found together and refer to aspects of 
the same thing: universals refer to the common properties, and particulars refer to the unique 
things.  
Oruka conceives sagacity as something for the wider academic audience but limits it 
at the theoretical level. He denigrates the practical side of sagacity and dismantles the 
interaction between the sages and their contexts. Moreover, he borrows from the 
universalizing perspective of philosophy, applies it to the African context, and claims it is 
‘African’. Western wisdom traditions can blend with African traditions, as Oruka shows, but 
this translatability must be explicit. Philosophic sagacity, contrary to what Oruka contrives, 
can be seen as part of humanity’s shared, global heritage of thought. It is therefore justifiable 
to conceive of sagacity as both universal and particular. The new vision of sagacity ought to 
be one that encourages diversity and pluralism without losing sight of our common humanity. 
                                                 
116 Even outside philosophy, there is renewed interest in the study of universals, especially in comparative 
mythology, which has repeatedly posed the important question of how the many (near) universals found in the 
cultural expressions of anatomically modern humans can be explained and sustained, and how such universals 
can be reconstructed methodologically through comparative mythology.  
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African traditional wisdom is not limited to the African context, but it can be translated 
globally. Hence, the tension between universalism and particularism does not need to be 
destroyed. This can provide complementary ways to North Atlantic science and be a way to 
help the rest of the world. There is no need for Oruka to fall prey to the claims inherent to the 
North–South knowledge construction, where the hegemonic subordination of Africans and 
their life-worlds persists. In our search for African sagacity, we need to conceive of Africa as 
part of the world of humankind as a whole.  
 
5.13. Conclusion 
The focus in this chapter has been to present the inherent weaknesses in Oruka’s philosophic 
sagacity. Oruka’s methodological and definitional weaknesses were discussed above. We 
tried to see if from a modernist standpoint he achieves his objectives. Oruka leans on the 
assumption that wisdom can only be found in human intelligence and human will. Such a 
premise or metaphysical stance, in the mind of Heidegger, encourages individual loneliness, 
alienation, unfulfillment, and social destructiveness (Heidegger 1996). We also saw that 
Oruka’s philosophic sagacity is largely a Western heritage and heavily dependent on Western 
thought. The Western power/knowledge system has had far-reaching implications for the 
constitution of knowledge about African realities. Oruka is implicitly aware of the hegemonic 
situation, but he does not explicitly situate his philosophic sagacity in a counter-hegemonic 
framework. His project ends up only propagating the West and gives the impression that 
Africa can receive only and not give. Such a conception is highly problematic, especially in 
contemporary times characterized by interactions between peoples from all corners of the 
globe. We have tried to examine Oruka’s intention to counter three negative claims regarding 
the philosophical status of indigenous African thought. Nevertheless, Oruka’s project rather 
propagates the West and its hegemony in African philosophy. The task of revising Oruka’s 
methodology is in a bid to propose one that is current with contemporary concerns. 
Contemporary worries and challenges invite us to pose a new way for searching into 
traditional wisdom. The various insights, findings, and conclusions in the previous chapters 
suggest that an up-to-date sagacity, sensitive to various contemporary concerns, should be 
fluid and flexible rather than fixed and unchanging. Our search for traditional wisdom needs 
to be modest and open to discussion and reconsideration, to challenge, and to redefinition and 








In the introductory Chapter 1 and in Chapter 5, I briefly presented two schools of thought 
with clearly divergent positions in African academic philosophy: those with a universalizing 
perspective, and those with a particularizing perspective. These two schools of thought 
accuse each other of playing into the hands of colonial and neo-colonial oppression. The 
universalists, for example, accuse the particularists of settling for an inferior and idiosyncratic 
conception of philosophy, which lacks the intellectual rigour of Western professional 
philosophy and thereby virtually guarantees its own marginalization in the world market. The 
particularists, on the other hand, accuse the universalists of letting the West dictate the rules 
and agenda of the philosophical enterprise, thus playing the game as their oppressors would 
have it played and guaranteeing its irrelevance to the issues and struggles of Africans. These 
accusations and counter-accusations point to the fact that colonial experiences have had a 
profound impact on African studies/philosophy. Mudimbe argues that until now Western 
interpreters as well as African analysts have been using categories and conceptual systems 
that depend on a Western epistemological order. The cultural orientations and prejudices of 
the authors are so glaring that African academic philosophy is virtually reduced to an 
extension of Western philosophical traditions into the African context. In other words, he 
sees these authors as African collaborators in imposing an alien order of knowledge on 
Africa. 
In this chapter, I demonstrate the implications for African philosophy of Oruka’s 
uncritical acceptance of North Atlantic categories in his conception of philosophic sagacity. 
Does this mean that we cannot conceive of African traditional systems of thought or make 
them explicit? In this chapter, I present colonialism as a hegemonic project that uses 
anthropology, as a science, to foster the mercantilistic ideology of colonialists. I posit that the 
Western power/knowledge system has had far-reaching implications for the constitution of 
knowledge about African realities. This hegemonic imposition challenges me to bring out the 




6.2. Colonialism and Western hegemony in academic African philosophy 
If we take a critical look at academic African philosophy or African studies as an 
interdisciplinary field in general, we quickly notice that it is largely reactionary. It does not 
matter whether any particular scholar is writing for or against the West; we realize that the 
West is at the heart of African knowledge production. Western theories are used as tools of 
this hegemony, as they are applied universally, on the erroneous assumption that Western 
experiences fit the entire human experience. The Nigerian sociologist Oyeronke Oyewumi 
observes that African thought, be it universalist or particularist in orientation, has always 
centred not on dissimilarity from the West but on similarity with the West. This explains why 
African philosophers have accepted and identified so much with the Western approach to 
philosophy that they attempted to create its African versions. Hence, Western models are 
propounded and African cultural orientations are described from the ‘outside-in’ and not the 
‘inside-out’. Oruka also falls prey to this, together with many African philosophers who are 
locked into embracing Western hegemony without trying to engage in exchange in an 
intercultural context. However, what accounts for the persistence of North Atlantic models in 
African scholarship?  
 
6.3. Colonial invention of Africa 
The ‘scramble for Africa’ and the most active period of colonization took place between the 
end of the 19th and the mid-20th centuries. Even though the colonial experience was a 
relatively brief period, it influenced new forms of discourse on African traditions and 
cultures. The colonial experience reveals that colonial masters aimed at organizing and 
transforming non-European territories into essentially European constructs (Mudimbe 1988). 
The colonial structure was designed to ensure the domination and marginalization of the 
colonies. In this way, these structures controlled the spiritual, human, and physical aspects of 
the entire colonizing experience. They denied any attributes of humanity to the colonized 
peoples, and this dehumanization was achieved by physical and mental violence. Even 
though African countries have been granted independence, the North Atlantic hegemony is 
still very visible in all domains. 
This hegemonic relationship is also identifiable in knowledge production. It follows, 
therefore, that knowledge production about Africa is never unbiased but hegemonic or 
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counter-hegemonic—that is, it strengthens a particular hegemonic structure or seeks to 
destroy that structure. This means that knowledge production is always characterized by the 
vested interests of those producing it. On the one hand, those producing knowledge have in 
mind to establish power over those to whom the knowledge will be applied. This also means 
relegating other modes of knowing, which may not correspond with the interests of those in 
the ruling authority, as invalid or irrational. These can include the magical, mythical, and 
other sources of esoteric knowing. On the other hand, knowledge production can be counter-
hegemonic, an alternative form of knowing from the ruling authority or scientific circle or 
institution in power. This dominance or resistance is a pointer to the fact that knowledge 
production is not neutral. 
Against this conceptual framework, Mudimbe largely leans on the works of French 
philosophers such as Derrida and Foucault and the French sociologist Bourdieu for his 
archaeological constructions. For example, he uses Foucault’s paradigm of power/knowledge 
to deconstruct the Eurocentric invention of Africa.117 He states: 
 
The history of knowledge in Africa and about Africa appears deformed and disjointed, 
and the explanation lies in its own origin and development. (Mudimbe 1988:175) 
 
Mudimbe’s comment is reminiscent of Foucault’s claim to have found, in his 
archaeological method, a series of discontinuous ‘created realities’ or epistemes, that serve in 
each era as the ground of the true and the false. However, since these epistemes are a social 
given, there can be no appeal to any absolute truth of things (unless ‘absolute truth’ is part of 
the particular episteme, but that would mean such a concept is merely a construct of social 
discourse and not ‘absolute’ at all). Here, Foucault is anti-Hegelian. Where Hegel saw the 
working out of history as Absolute Reason becoming self-conscious, Foucault saw history as 
a series of discontinuities, one following the other but with no hint of true progress. 
Mudimbe describes how the Europeans used their ability to dominate Africans, with 
the major hypothesis that Africans must evolve from their primitive and frozen state to the 
dynamic and civilized state of their Western counterparts. Europeans did not just place 
                                                 
117 See also Said (1978). He argues that power and knowledge are central in the way Occidentals claim to have 
knowledge of the Orient. It is this knowledge that allowed Occidentals to change the Orient into imperial 
colonies. This power/knowledge binary relation is vital for our understanding of colonialism, and it shows us 
that the thought patterns in Africa, Europe, and Asia can hardly be neutral relative to the hegemonic or counter-
hegemonic representations of power. 
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Africans below European humanity, but they used their science and rationality to complete 
the subjugation of the African mind, body, and lands. This was achieved through the Atlantic 
slave trade and colonization. According to Mudimbe: 
 
Evolution, conquest and difference become signs of a theological, biological, and 
anthropological destiny, and assign to things and beings both their natural slots and 
social mission. Theorists of capitalism, such as Benjamin Kidd and Karl Pearson in 
England, Paul Leroy-Beaulieu in France, Friedrich Naumann and Friedrich von 
Bernhard in Germany, as well as philosophers, comment upon two main 
complementary paradigms. These are the inherent superiority of the white race, and, 
as already made explicit in Hegel’s Philosophy of Right, the necessity for European 
economies and structures to expand to ‘virgin areas’ of the world. (ibid.17)  
 
Mudimbe’s observation enables us to see clearly that the West is at the centre of 
everything, while Africa is left out on the margin. Colonialism was principally aimed at 
subjugating and re-inventing the ‘inferior’ African in a bid to exploit Africa’s economic 
resources. Discourses on African studies/philosophy emanate from, and are engulfed in, 
colonialism and its hegemonic project.118 
This observation by Mudimbe stems from an image he has of three figures from 
Western culture that were central to the construction of Eurocentric stereotypes, concerning 
colonial dependencies generally and Africa in particular: the explorer, the soldier, and the 
missionary. Of the three, the missionary played the most profound role in destroying and 
subsequently transforming traditional societies. This is because the missionaries held 
important spiritual, moral, and educative responsibilities in Africa. Since missionary 
discourse was associated with reason, history, and power (Mudimbe 1988), they thought they 
could use it to ‘civilize’ pre-colonial societies. Nevertheless, a missionary like Tempels’ 
could encounter the Baluba and be led to have different feelings. Mudimbe is correct in his 
contention: 
 
                                                 
118 For African thinkers who address the issue of Africa as a victim of colonialism and where her interests could 




Rather than as a philosophical treatise […] Bantu Philosophy could be understood 
simultaneously as an indication of religious insight, the expression of cultural doubt 
about the supposed backwardness of Africans, and a political manifesto for a new 
policy for promoting ‘civilization’ and Christianity. (ibid.50) 
 
This new policy, in my opinion, should be interculturally motivated, a policy free 
from hegemony and essentialist connotations. Tempels’ meeting with the Baluba did not 
permit him just to create a new community; it also caused him to study and appreciate the 
complex situations which arose from such encounters. In meeting the Other, Tempels found 
his own meaning: the fact that he is. True meaning and understanding of oneself can only be 
reached by a meeting with the Other in all its strangeness. This Other remains a puzzle, but a 
puzzle that can nevertheless reveal secrets. The concomitant forgetting of self leads to real 
communication and justice. The human being is Dasein, ‘being-in-the-world’ and 
encountering other beings.  
 Hence, Western hegemony, with its attendant Christianity and capitalism, may have 
affected Africans negatively, but it has also certainly provided methodological alternatives 
and insights into our lives. Westerners give us new ways of conceiving identity and 
belonging. The African, in this context, should neither be just a passive receiver of cultural 
achievements coming from outside nor be confined to the role of a giver of cultural 
achievements—rather, one who combines the role of both giver and receiver of cultural 
achievements. This will be much more rewarding in our philosophizing in contemporary 
conditions of globalization, instead of the outright abandonment to Western hegemony as 
Mudimbe maintains. 
It may be instructive to note the transcontinental elements in African philosophy. We 
can recognize African philosophy as localized and particularizing, but we need to look at the 
universalizing, transcontinental components as well. This promising transcontinental 
orientation will enable us to integrate African philosophy into other global traditions of 
philosophy. It will also act as a line of connection or a rhizome of transcontinental 
interconnectedness, from which to contribute to or tap resources, from the local to the 
global.119 
                                                 
119 For more on this discussion, see the various contributions in ‘Lines and Rhizomes: The Transcontinental 
Element in African Philosophies’, a special issue of Quest: An African Journal of Philosophy/ Revue Africaine 
de Philosophie 21, 2007. 
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Mudimbe himself observes that Christianity has been inculturated in Africa, unlike 
the situation that obtains today in Europe. He notes the Africanization of European 
Christianity: 
 
If European Catholicism seems to be aging dangerously, the dynamism of its African 
counterpart belongs either to a holy nightmare or, if one prefers, to an incredible 
miracle: monasteries are being built; new religious movements, both activist and 
charismatic, are appearing and organizing themselves successfully; there are not 
enough schools for potential catechists, nor are there sufficient convents for nuns. 
(ibid.54-55) 
 
This adaptation of European Christianity can be explained in terms of consumerism 
caused by the dynamics of contemporary cultural globalization. Through communication 
processes, a world religion like Christianity has gained a metalocal distribution, and Africans 
are taking part in this distribution because it satisfies their desires. Since they live in a 
plurality of overlapping cultural orientations, Christianity, for example, is one of those 
religious alternatives that Africans are appropriating. Such appropriation is fluid, initiating a 
dialectic of flows and closures. Africans today seek to partake of Modernity on a 
Shoestring.120 The tension between Roman Catholicism as a product of colonialism and 
African historical religion, for example, has often been resolved in different ways. After 
decades of adamant rejection of historical forms of ritual practice, Roman Catholicism has 
sometimes become the very locus for the incorporation and continuation of local tradition (as 
we find in music, dance, and funerary rites) in the modern African context. Moreover, the 
Roman Catholic Church and its officials have played a considerable, though controversial, 
role in the articulation and preservation of philosophy in Africa (van Binsbergen 2005). 
In this section, we have seen how colonialism was couched in hegemony and how it 
had a profound impact on African society as a whole. These North Atlantic values can be 
oppressive because they attempt to impose cultural values or ideology on others. Yet, I 
submit that instead of allowing oneself to be such a hegemonic victim, it will be rewarding to 
foster intercultural dialogue by producing counter-hegemonic discourses.121 In addition, 
intercultural philosophy allows us go beyond hegemonic and relativistic tendencies about 
                                                 
120 Fardon et al. (1999). 
121 I will take this up in detail in Chapter 8. 
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knowledge production in Africa. It suggests interconnecting the specificities of any local 
knowledge system with others, with the possibility of accessing the transcultural knowledge 
inherent in each system. It is this possibility of a converging, transcultural knowledge that 
intercultural epistemology exploits. 
 
6.4. From anthropology to intercultural philosophy: Some critiques of Africanist 
anthropology 
This section deals with van Binsbergen’s criticisms of anthropology and his desire to put 
intercultural philosophy centre stage in academic concerns with culture. Anthropology, as an 
academic discipline, was created to sustain the colonial adventure under the guise of science, 
thereby endorsing the power/knowledge political system (Foucault). It was through 
anthropology that Western intellectuals generated knowledge about non-Western peoples, 
which was later used by colonial institutions to subjugate them into a colony in a bid to serve 
the interests of the colonial masters. This explains why it is impossible to imagine any 
anthropology without a Western ideological and epistemological link. This led Europe to 
create binary ideological paradigms whose vocabularies were founded on specific 
oppositional terms. As discussed earlier, Lévy-Brühl’s main contribution to anthropology and 
to European ideas is posited in an explicit hierarchy of values in which Western values serve 
as an absolute reference.122 The ideological and philosophical significance of Europe’s 
contemplation of a world in which it was master due to the quality of its collective mind 
emerges most clearly from Hegel’s philosophy of history, which, when all is said and done, is 
nothing but the celebration of the European spirit. This provided a powerful philosophical 
base for the chorus of denigration of the non-white races that accompanied and endorsed 
colonialism. 
 In his conception of philosophic sagacity, Oruka endorses anthropology and reminds 
us: 
 
One way of looking for traces of African philosophy is to wear the uniform of 
anthropological field-workers and use dialogue to pass through anthropological fogs 
to philosophical ground. (Oruka 1991:5) 
                                                 
122 Nevertheless, these binary ideological paradigms are social constructs. They are interrelated; the one cannot 




This method is interesting but is it interculturally tenable? Can cultural anthropology 
provide a valid base for intercultural knowledge production? Why must we transcend 
ethnography and begin to explore intercultural philosophy in our new conception of sagacity? 
Moreover, when anthropologists and other Westerners reject African cosmologies and 
epistemologies as a priori invalid, are they not overlooking the essential continuity between 
African and Western modes of thought, and do they not underestimate the world-creating, 
truth-producing potential of non-Western cosmologies?  
Van Binsbergen is quite wary of anthropology in general and Africanist anthropology 
in particular. He asserts that anthropological research can also be a problematic mode of 
intercultural knowledge production. This is because anthropology depends on manipulated 
face-to-face relations, personal history, transference, and North–South hegemonic power. 
Van Binsbergen is a distinguished anthropologist of religion with experience in five different 
complexes: rural Tunisia, rural Zambia, urban Zambia, rural Guinea-Bissau, and urban 
Botswana. He takes anthropology so seriously that he wishes to transcend its historical and 
knowledge/political built-in limitations, as well as the defective general and intellectual 
education (unusually very unscholarly and rather blinkered) of most anthropologists. He 
considers that ‘anthropology is more than just a sublimated form of sleuthing or espionage’ 
(van Binsbergen 2003:73), with an ideological nature in the production of intercultural 
knowledge. 
 
6.5. Anthropology as ideology 
Van Binsbergen addresses questions of the politics of knowledge and the justification of what 
he calls a ‘North Atlantic’ knowledge practice. In his critique of anthropology, he discusses 
the works of one of the leading Marxist-inspired anthropologists of the 1970s and 1980s, 
Pierre-Philippe Rey. Rey’s works make special theoretical contributions on the conditions for 
and the mechanisms by which an encroaching capitalist mode of production manages or fails 
to impose itself upon the non-capitalist societies of the Third World, such as those of Africa. 
In van Binsbergen’s assessment, Rey’s works demonstrate the impact of colonialism and 
capitalism and do not turn a blind eye to both local and imported forms of exploitation and 
how these are interrelated.  
African societies (in Congo-Brazzavile and Northern Togo) are presented by Rey as 
people who interact, produce, and think like human beings and not just as essentialized 
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beings. His brand of Marxist anthropology seeks to render the struggles of Africans against 
capitalist and bourgeois ideology. In spite of his admiration for Rey’s stance on 
anthropology, van Binsbergen finds Rey’s approach lacking in several ways. Rey is not self-
critical enough and does not explicitly criticize the ideologies of North Atlantic capitalist 
modes of production. Van Binsbergen reminds us that all contemporary anthropology, even 
Marxist or revolutionary versions such as Rey articulates, is produced by intellectual 
producers whose class position in the world system is based on dependence on capital. This 
dependence is mediated by the modern state or by large funding agencies, given that 
individuals cannot get the mammoth funding necessary for academic production today 
elsewhere. It is therefore sociologically impossible for this capitalist context of intellectual 
production not to totally determine the nature and contents of the intellectual products of the 
anthropologists. 
Moreover, anthropology stems from actors who have their own specific class 
positions and interests. Even among anthropologists, the difference is quite clear between 
those of the North and their colleagues of the South. The mere fact that anthropologists from 
the North come from a certain class location there is every reason to doubt the authenticity 
and validity of their productions. This leads van Binsbergen to think that anthropology is 
produced more at universities, research institutes, and private writing desks than in the field. 
In this case, the researchers do not actually learn from the masses in the African periphery but 
revel in ideological constructs and try to remain submissive to the largely objective forces of 
a sociology of knowledge that obtains at a given place and time. Van Binsbergen’s position is 
an invitation to a self-reflexive, auto-critique of anthropology so that the latter can avoid the 
products of a ‘false consciousness’.123 
Anthropology represents a form of intellectual appropriation and humiliation which 
Africans in the nationalist era rightly protested. This is because even the income used in the 
production is partly realized by exploitative relations between rich and poor countries. 
Anthropology is also a form of brokerage or caricaturing. Van Binsbergen writes: 
 
                                                 
123 The term ‘false consciousness’ is derived from the Marxist tradition. It pertains to the state of mind of a 
group of people or individuals who have a distorted understanding of their class identity and interests. The 
German–American philosopher, sociologist, and political theorist Herbert Marcuse (1898–1979) asserted that 
many people are not conscious of their true concerns and need to develop a consciousness that is consistent with 
their class identity and interests (Marcuse 1964). 
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Another caricature but likewise with some truth in it: as an anthropologist I realise my 
intellectual production partly through a form of brokerage. I may buy my information 
very cheaply from paid assistants somewhere in the African periphery. Most 
information in the field, of course, derives not even from paid assistants but from 
unpaid informants on the basis of the anthropologist adopting or mimicking forms of 
exchange peculiar to domestic, antecapitalist modes of production, such as putative 
kinship, friendship, joking relations, neighbourly relations, etc. Here the 
anthropologist’s role in the field as that of a broker is even more pronounced. 
Anyway, after intellectually processing the information I sell it at the metropole at a 
price that at least by Third World standards is very attractive: my academic salary. 
(van Binsbergen 2003:85) 
 
Van Binsbergen shows us how ineffective, hegemonic, and hypocritical anthropology 
can be. This explains why he brands anthropology as being ‘Eurocentric’ with an entirely 
North Atlantic mission. ‘Being’ has been reduced to a world of ‘objects’ that are manipulated 
and dominated by human ‘subjects’ through a series of human-made logics.  
Moreover, we can uncover an ethical problem from the knowledge/political 
arguments cited above: the participant observer is unfaithful to the communicative interaction 
and shared experiences of the community. In this case, the ethnographer is dishonest towards 
him/herself. Van Binsbergen reports: 
 
I became aware of scholarship’s political and ethical responsibilities, and of the 
potential humiliation and betrayal of the people under study by social researchers in 
the field. In subsequent years, I was to ask myself more and more the following 
question: Who was I that I could afford to make-believe, to pretend, on those very 
points that attracted the undivided serious commitment of my research participants? 
Several among them have played a decisive role in my life, as role models, teachers, 
spiritual masters, loved ones. Experiencing their religion and ritual as an idiom (a 
symbolic technology) of sociability which I was privileged to share, I could not 
forever bear the tension of joining them in the field and betraying them outside the 
field. (ibid.507-508)  
 
This leads us to doubt the claims of authenticity and validity for ethnographic 
fieldwork. The only kind of ethnography that could claim some intercultural validity would 
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be an intersubjective one. The ethnographer works closely together not so much with 
academic colleagues, but with his/her hosts. The work with his/her hosts should not just end 
in the field, but especially subsequently, during write-up, publication, distribution, and 
marketing of the written product. When such fieldwork experiences are rendered in terms of 
regular anthropological theorizing, they tend to betray social roles and friendship, and the full 
meaning of the local life interaction with ‘subjects’ is sacrificed. Van Binsbergen does not 
see, for example, why he should betray sangomahood, his fellow healers, and himself, and 
why the North Atlantic paradigm of understanding should take pride of place in sangoma 
healing practice.124 
Nevertheless, just like Gadamer, Habermas, and Mall, intercultural philosophy can 
lead towards interaction that is free of hegemony and inequality of power. Deleuze (1988: 98-
104), building especially on Spinoza and Nietzsche, does not see power as simply repressive. 
He understands power in a positive way, having a capacity to influence and be influenced or 
enriched. The power of an entity can receive the possibilities to act and establish interactions 
with other entities. Intercultural philosophy, as an academic medium, does not have 
hegemonic roots as cultural anthropology does. It rather unmasks concepts like ‘Africa’ and 
‘Europe’ and shows how such concepts engender a certain geopolitical hegemonic agenda 
that often leads to exploitation. It tries to investigate the conditions for the possibility of other 
forms of interaction between different cultural orientations. 
Intercultural philosophy can also provide a social science such as anthropology with 
important insights into how to cross seemingly unbridgeable epistemological differences by 
making radical existential choices. This is because anthropologists often think of cultures as 
closed entities and of contacts with other cultures as a rupture in the totality of a particular 
culture.125 This is a wrong description of reality, given the cultural globalization of our daily 
lives. An intercultural philosopher or an anthropologist can try to speak in the name of the 
Other by identifying with the perspective of the Other. This interaction can foster the sharing 
of intersubjective experiences and mutual understanding. It is a call for an ‘anthropology of 
                                                 
124 See van Binsbergen (2003: 507-508) and Chapters 5, 6, and 7. 
125 We may cite the impact of the anthropological discourse on African ethnicity. Ethnicity was conceived of as 
closed entities. This discourse lays much emphasis on cultural pluralism and separateness of cultures, to the 
extent that there is no room for finding a common ground. In this way, the population of Africa are arranged 
into different ‘tribes’, each tribe having its own fixed ‘culture’, art, language, somatic features, political 
organization (including ‘tribal chief’), and ‘tribal territory’. If we rely on this anthropological discourse on 
African ethnicity, all we can have is more ethnic divisiveness, conflicts, and violence than is already there. 
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advocacy’ to counter the discipline’s affiliation with established ideological and political 
positions.126 
 
6.6. Anthropology and intercultural knowledge production 
In the section above we discussed the knowledge/political arguments against anthropological 
research. In this section, we focus on intercultural knowledge production by discussing some 
epistemological and methodological criticisms of anthropology, especially anthropological 
fieldwork. 
The anthropologist gathers data through fieldwork (using interviews) and immersion 
in the form of life concerned, in order to make meaning in the context. Thus, cultural 
phenomena can be understood from within the context of meaning and can be experienced as 
they really are, in an emic way—that is, in terms of a locally lived model. After gaining 
understanding of cultural phenomena, the results can carefully and honestly be presented in 
academic writing. We saw in the preceding chapter that anthropological fieldwork raises the 
problems of access and representation. Modern philosophy, especially from Kant onwards, 
hinges on the understanding that to have direct knowledge of essences is illusory, and 
consequently all knowledge of representation is unavoidably based on appropriation and 
misrepresentation. To this we can add Quine’s principle of the ‘indeterminacy thesis of 
radical translation’, which can be relevant to anthropologists and philologists in their bid to 
produce intercultural knowledge by supplying them with different forms of translation they 
can use. Hence, if both problems of access and of representation were given due attention, we 
would have to discard anthropology and adopt different modes of intercultural knowledge 
production. 
Secondly, when van Binsbergen discards fieldwork and is personally transformed into 
a sangoma, he goes beyond just collecting ethnographic data.127 This has intercultural 
implications:  
                                                 
126 African intellectuals have tried to radically transform anthropology by exploding its Eurocentric affiliations 
and implications. We may cite the attempts by Magubane (1971); Mafeje (1976); Mudimbe (1988, 1994); and 
Mudimbe & Appiah (1993). This attempt is not limited to Africa. In the study of Asian societies and history, 
there have been intense critical reflections on the models imposed by North Atlantic scholarship, ever since the 
publication of Said’s Orientalism (1978). This critical appeal outside the North Atlantic clearly shows that 




I was seeking existential transformation, fulfilment and redress, much more than 
anthropological data, across cultural and geographical boundaries. (van Binsbergen 
2003:171) 
 
Nevertheless, he cautions: 
 
[...] becoming an intercultural philosopher means a further step: one that amounts to 
integrating that deed in a systematic, reflective and intersubjective framework, in 
order to augment the anecdotal, autobiographical ‘just so’ account with theoretical 
analysis, and to explore the social relevance of an individual experience. (van 
Binsbergen 2005) 
 
Van Binsbergen’s positions show us how individual experiences can be beneficial in 
our creating new homes and in cross-border discovery, rather than our staying within the 
confines of ethnography. I think his experiences as a sangoma are welcome, but we also 
expect to find such fieldwork experiences rendered in terms of regular anthropological 
theorizing. This will be interculturally rewarding because it will appeal to the points of 
convergence and common values among different peoples all over the globe. It will provide a 
valid base for mutual respect and intercultural exchanges, and provide the possibilities for 
dialogue and tolerance. In addition, van Binsbergen invites us to discard anthropology and 
adopt intercultural philosophy in the study of culture. 
In reaction to these critiques, the Dutch Africanist philosopher Boele van Hensbroek 
(2003) asks if intercultural philosophy should take over from anthropology in the study of 
culture. Even though limited to considerations from the philosophy of science, he ponders 
whether the limitations van Binsbergen attributes to anthropology are necessarily part of the 
discipline (and thus require its abandonment) or they can be overcome by a more elaborate 
practice of the discipline (and thus lead to repairing it). There are two aspects to the response 
                                                                                                                                                        
127 Yet, some other anthropologists of religion have considered such a move simply as a form of adaptation to 
specific, difficult field conditions in a bid to get valid information. Even when they were initiated into a local 
ritual status, their experiences were presented, even by themselves, as simple strategies of adaptation in the 





to this question. First, van Hensbroek considers that the failures van Binsbergen indicates in 
anthropology cannot be repaired. There is the possibility of a more elaborate cultural 
hermeneutics. This involves a kind of ‘double hermeneutics’, which suggests trying to 
understand the actions of local actors by grasping the interpretations that the actors 
themselves have of their situation. In this case, the academic analyst explains human action, 
but the action cannot be understood without, again, understanding the self-interpretation of 
these actors. This implies that, in principle, the actors can answer and ‘speakback’ (ibid.). 
This hermeneutical approach suggests that anthropology can be repaired if the ‘speaking-
back element’ of the actors is given central place in the discipline. 
Second, van Binsbergen discusses at length the status of North Atlantic theoretical 
and metaphysical frameworks, and he accuses anthropology of uncritical acceptance of North 
Atlantic paradigms. However, this shortcoming can be refined by the self-reflective 
hermeneutical approach à la Gadamer, which van Binsbergen does not highlight. For 
Gadamer, any hermeneutics necessarily involves a pre-understanding of the object. This 
helps us re-define the relationship between the outsider and insider as far as anthropological 
study is concerned (ibid.). Anthropology may at first sight look like a one-sided process of 
subjecting others to one’s interpretation; however, it is possible to practise a hermeneutically 
sophisticated anthropology which incorporates both dialogic elements to advance 
interpretations and a self-reflective approach towards Western paradigms. In this way, I 
concur with van Hensbroek’s inclusion of both anthropology and philosophy in our 
intercultural knowledge production. This inclusion will involve using both anthropology in its 
more elaborate hermeneutical forms and an expanded form of anthropology (conducted by 
both Northerners and Southerners). 
 
6.7. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have tried to show that Oruka’s philosophic sagacity is to a considerable 
extent a continuation of Western hegemony in African philosophy. The discussion focused on 
colonialism and its hegemonic influence on knowledge production in Africa. The colonial 
masters created structures aimed at marginalizing and exploiting Africans. Yet, this 
bittersweet encounter has caused Africans to move on. We also saw some of the weaknesses 
of anthropological research. Anthropology is largely discarded by van Binsbergen as a naïve 
and hegemonic model for intercultural knowledge production. This explains why he 
recommends that we advance beyond anthropology to intercultural philosophy. Intercultural 
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philosophy is basically a communicative, dialogic form of knowledge production, based on 
interaction and equality. Yet, Boele van Hensbroek advises us to be prudent with van 
Binsbergen’s idealistic recommendation. The reason is that a renewed and truly intercultural 
knowledge production cannot be expected without addressing the incredible global 
imbalances—imbalances in terms of dominance of Western paradigms as well as in the more 
material terms of who produces knowledge and discourses, where and in what social and 
cultural environments. With almost all centres of knowledge production located in the North 
Atlantic, the cultural biases observed by van Binsbergen in anthropology may simply be 
repeated in the new discipline of intercultural philosophy. At the same time, I think van 
Binsbergen’s insight can be strengthened by considerations about the political economy of 
knowledge production. Intercultural knowledge production in this sense would require 






TOWARDS A PHILOSOPHY OF GLOBALIZATION 
 
7.1. Introduction 
In this chapter, I intend to go beyond Oruka’s conception of philosophic sagacity in a 
globalized context and posit intercultural philosophy as a new path for contemporary African 
philosophy. The word ‘globalization’ has become one of the most popular words used in 
political and academic discourses to cover different cultural, economic, and political 
tendencies. Intercultural philosophy emerges from analyses of the present-day reality of 
globalization. It is therefore logical that, like every other branch of human life, philosophy 
today is also affected by the phenomenon of globalization. According to Deleuze and 
Guattari (1994), it is necessary to create new concepts, because only new concepts can form 
adequate solutions to the problems that are emerging within contemporary society. The need 
to create new concepts in philosophy is a truism of relevance because of the uncertainties and 
incompatibilities of intercultural situations in the contemporary world. Basing themselves on 
the work of Hegel, Deleuze and Guattari argue that philosophical investigation is dependent 
on the historical epoch and context in which it is undertaken. Philosophy must understand its 
own time and, in light of that, develop concepts that will influence the creation of future 
reality. The empirical research of globalization is obviously not the philosopher’s task, but a 
spate of recent empirical research has demonstrated that globalization does indeed entail 
profound changes and has far-reaching effects. This will imply that our sagacity goes beyond 
the confines of a culture. Contrary to Oruka’s model of a sagacity that is closed, I propose an 
open and globalized sagacity based on intercultural exchanges. This is an invitation for us to 
advance to new forms of knowledge production which better fit the present globalized 
intercultural world. The various transformations in contemporary experience necessitate 
philosophical exploration, especially in our elaboration of sagacity. 
 
7.2. What is globalization? 
As mentioned earlier, one of the most important social and political developments within the 
contemporary world—and, as such, in need of philosophical reflection—is the process of 
globalization. Globalization, the process of increased contacts among the different parts of 
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the world, is changing our reality. Globalization points to the oneness and interconnectedness 
of humanity. It refers to those processes by which the peoples of the world are incorporated 
into a single world society, a global society. This is due to the fact that the worldwide 
integration and interdependence of societies and cultural orientations is rapidly increasing. 
This is made possible by new information and communication technology (ICT) as well as by 
the increases in speed of conventional means of transport. In this way, globalization involves 
a profound transformation, not just of economies but also of contemporary experience as a 
whole. This is because technology has practically effected—towards the end of the 20th 
century of the North Atlantic Common Era—a reduction to zero of time and space as limiting 
factors in human communication. When messages travel at lightning speed across the globe 
using electronic media, when physical displacement is hardly required for effective 
communication (yet such displacement can be effected within one or two days from 
anywhere on the globe to anywhere else), and when the technology of manufacturing and 
distribution has developed to such levels that the same material environment using the same 
objects can be created and fitted out anywhere on the globe at will—then we have reduced 
the limits that time and space impose on the social process of interaction and communication 
to virtually zero. Globalization is about not just the absence or dissolution of boundaries, but 
about the dramatically reduced limits imposed by time and space for interaction and 
communication, and thus the opening up of new spaces and new times within new boundaries 
that were hitherto inconceivable. Globalization as a condition of the social world today 
revolves on the interplay between unbounded worldwide flow and the selective framing of 
such flow within particularizing, localizing contexts of identity and difference. 
 
7.3. Globalization and its post-modern philosophical elaborations 
The multitude of explanations that circle around globalization as a concept are based on the 
constant contraction of space and time in the world, and the intensification of consciousness 
of the world as a whole. Giddens (1991) suggests that modernity involved the growing 
increase of the interconnectedness across social, cultural, and class systems. He asserts that 
rather than looking at the integration of bounded systems, people need to deal with the issue 
of order as one of time–space distantiation (i.e. the conditions under which time and space are 
organized to connect presence and absence). Waters (1995), writing on the cultural impact of 




a social process in which the constraints of geography on social and cultural 
arrangements recede and in which people become increasingly aware that they are 
receding. (Waters 1995:3)  
 
In the same vein, van Binsbergen and Geschiere use the word globalization: 
 
as a descriptive term to draw attention to the rapidly accelerating circulation of goods, 
people and images on a global scale, since roughly the 1960s; the emphasis here is on 
‘rapidly accelerating’ since it is clear that global circuits were much older than this.128 
 
 In this way, the oneness of humanity is often justified by appealing to the effects of 
globalization and the contemporary interrelationships of humankind. It is also important to 
mention that if our world today is recognized to be globalizing, this offers a context in which 
it becomes thinkable that globalizing tendencies did not just emerge under particular and 
dramatic technological achievements in the late 20th century. It points to the fact that human 
cultural history may always have had a globalizing tendency, and that the globular shape of 
our Earth has always prompted both the spread and the ultimate convergence of cultural 
ramifications. In the last few decades, long-range research within the social sciences shows 
that the phenomenon of globalization has a long antecedent history.129 The Dutch sociologist 
Nederveen Pieterse conceives of globalization as human integration and hybridization, 
arguing that it is possible to detect cultural mixing across continents and regions that goes 
back many millennia. Globalization, as a process of hybridization, gives rise to a global 
mélange (Nederveen Pieterse 2009:65). The concept of hybridization serves as a 
hermeneutical tool for interpreting the cultural dimensions of globalization, as most notably 
exemplified by the works of Bhabha and Spivak. Since the 1990s and the fall of the Berlin 
Wall, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and the spectacular advances in ICT, the phenomenon 
of globalization has received a fresh impetus. Friedman (1999), for example, thinks that new 
forms of social and cultural globalization have increased in their intensity and 
interconnectivity. 
                                                 
128 Van Binsbergen & Geschiere (2005: Introduction).  
129 See for example, Worsley (1957); Appadurai (1997); and Nederveen Pieterse (2009). These authors argue 
that contacts, relations, and intercultural borrowings from different cultural orientations and civilizations are not 
new. Globalization, therefore, should be viewed as a long-term historical process. 
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There is a need to identify how Africans have sought to modernize and participate in 
the globalized world. In the recent past, and in some aspects, Africans took part in the global 
world as equal partners, but that is not the case today. Ferguson (1999) paints a grim picture 
of how Zambia, in the past praised for being at the forefront of the African industrial 
revolution, has declined economically and is now on the periphery of the modern globalized 
world. Brecher and Costello (1994) also highlight the uneven impact of globalization in 
African societies and communities, coining the term ‘downward levelling’. Interestingly, they 
identify ways in which globalization can be countered. Contrary to these gloomy pictures on 
the consequences of globalization, Friedman conceives of the term ‘glocalization’, by which 
he means: 
 
healthy glocalization […] [is] the ability of a culture, when it encounters other strong 
cultures, to absorb influences that naturally fit into and can enrich that culture, to 
resist those things that are truly alien and to compartmentalize those things that, while 
different, can nevertheless be enjoyed and celebrated as different. (Friedman 1999:29) 
 
He cautions that societies need to develop ‘glocalization’ in order to avoid further 
marginalization. Implicit in Friedman’s view is the fact of hegemony, on the one hand, and 
the apparently static nature of African societies, on the other. Healthy glocalization can take 
place only when there is mutual cultural enrichment in the process. 
Recent globalization has largely resulted in a blurring of the ideal-typical difference 
between Africa and the North Atlantic region. Under post-modern conditions typical of 
globalization, North Atlantic societies, too, have experienced large-scale erosion of meaning 
and consensus, fragmentation of identity, and erosion of the nation-state by elusive 
intercontinental corporate powers in the economic domain. In Africa, the percolation of 
global linguae francae, of global media such as television, cell phones, and the Internet, of 
globally circulating manufactured consumer goods, and of globally available religious 
expressions such as Islamism and Pentecostalism have brought the forms of African social 
and religious life closer to those in other continents today. These major factors of 
globalization have increased the global interdependence of economic and cultural activities. 
Increasingly also for Africa and for an increasing number of Africans, the neat 
compartmentalization of the world into sharply demarcated continents has become an idea of 
the past. This permits van Binsbergen to conceptualize globalization under the following 
aspects: proto-globalization, the panic of space, the panic of time, the panic of language, 
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rebellion against older inequalities, the new object, virtualization of experience, the new 
inequality, and the new body(van Binsbergen 2003:377-381). These are the main social and 
cultural transformations that are visible in the context of globalization. Nevertheless, have 
these processes of globalization actually become situated in local communities, in social 
processes and thought in Africa? In this context of globalization, what becomes of Oruka’s 
sages, who operate in ‘a culture’? Can we then talk of a kind of ‘globalized sagacity’? I 
attempt an answer to these questions with an intercultural reading of Oruka’s conception of 
sagacity. 
 
7.4. Towards the globalization of African sagacity 
We have noted above the impact of globalization on African societies and cultural 
orientations. This implies we ought to re-think our conception of sagacity as well. Oruka, as 
we have seen in Chapter 4, maintains that sages are ‘indigenous’ and have had no contact 
with modern education. He also argues that these sages produce wise sayings that can be used 
as moral and metaphysical counselling on human existence. This wisdom exists in a context 
and is limited to it. This position is quite similar to what South African philosopher Mogobe 
Ramose (1999) places to the fore of his ubuntu philosophy. As we discussed in Chapter 2, 
ubuntu is seen as a key concept to evoke unadulterated forms of African social life before 
European conquest. In his conception of sagacity, Oruka does not foresee the need for a 
globalized sage, and Ramose’s work presents an explicit rupture with that view. According to 
Ramose, the globalization process is inclined towards economic maximization and has no 
concern for humanity. Globalization is one of those ways the North Atlantic region intends to 
perpetuate political and cultural hegemony.  
From Ramose’s argument, we realize that globalization is an outside phenomenon, 
driven by North Atlantic conquest, and has resulted in the destruction of ubuntu-based 
communities. Hence, ubuntu, as a form of African philosophy, ought to be revived to counter 
the course of southern African history and to remedy the trauma caused by colonization and 
the imposition of capitalist relations of production. Our study of intercultural philosophy 
endorses Ramose’s point that ubuntu philosophy and southern African society have 
something of great value to offer to the globalized world. However, Ramose does not take 
into account the fact that both contemporary southern Africa and ubuntu itself are products of 
globalization. Ubuntu is a contemporary academic construct, called forth by the same forces 
of physical oppression, economic oppression, and cultural alienation that have shaped 
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southern African society over the past two centuries. In this way it can mask real conflict, 
perpetuate resentment, and hide the fact that someone is using ubuntu in the excessive pursuit 
of individual gain (van Binsbergen 2001a, 2003).130 Hence, even though ubuntu may be able 
to curb some of the effects of globalization, it is a new concept in a globalized format, not a 
perennial village concept in an authentic format as Ramose asserts.  
Ubuntu, as a form of philosophy, also reminds us of the necessity to patiently study 
the rich empirical realities of African societies before making any final judgements. This is 
because what the ubuntu experts present is a liberation of Black Africa by revisiting and 
romanticizing the past—rétrodiction (à la Mudimbe) or rétrojection (à la Towa). Ramose is 
concerned with re-dreaming rural Africa along dated ethnographic lines and consequently 
presenting a static view of traditional Africa. We must also admit that African historical 
societies have been dynamic, ever changing, and complex, and have been influenced by 
relations with the outside world.  
To assume a self-evident, static African society is reminiscent of Plato’s philosophy. 
As we saw in Chapter 4, Plato used his theory of Forms to account for reality. He argued that 
what is truly real is not the objects we encounter in sensory experience but, rather, Forms, 
and these can be grasped only intellectually. He used the theory of Forms partly because he 
assumed that the objects of knowledge must be unchanging and certain rather than changing. 
His student Aristotle contested this firm and unmovable foundation. According to Aristotle, 
even though things have essences (what makes them what they are), these essences cannot be 
separated from the things themselves. The essences of a thing exist in that thing, and that is 
why we recognize it. It is not being and non-being as Plato maintained, but being and 
potential being for Aristotle.131 Even though Enlightenment philosophers rejected Plato’s 
world of Forms, they endorsed the fact that one can build on firm, a priori foundations. I 
submit that in the era of globalization, characterized by intercultural encounters, our sagacity 
should go beyond Plato’s Forms and be grounded in human realities and existential facts 
about the human being and his daily condition.  
Hence, we must note that the ubuntu experts render a remote etic reconstruction into 
an alien globalized format, and not an emic one as they may claim. In other words, what we 
                                                 
130 Van Binsbergen’s analyses of ubuntu, however, generated some controversy. For more on this debate see, for 
example, Bewaji & Ramose (2003). 
131In Aristotle’s The Categories, 1a 24-25, he argues that all non-substances owe their existence to substances. 
Each of them exists only ‘in’ a subject. That is, each non-substance is in something, not as a part of the thing, 
and cannot exist separately from what it is in. 
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have as ubuntu is global urban reformulation of African values. If the notion did not take this 
globalized format, it would hardly have made any sense to the majority of South Africans 
today. Moreover, if we are to accept Ramose’s conception, this would imply that African 
wisdom and globalization are polar opposites with no meeting point. It would therefore be 
impossible to effectively mediate this wisdom to the rest of the world. Paradoxically, if the 
whole ubuntu project worked, it was because southern African intellectuals were able to 
mediate it to others. Since the world is becoming increasingly interconnected and 
interdependent, it makes sense to think of a globalized sagacity. In this way, African wisdom 
traditions can be put at the disposal of the rest of humanity and not limited to a stable, 
immobile context. A great majority of Africans are exposed to globally circulating cultural, 
productive, reproductive, and consumptive models, and the influence of ICT. The 
globalization of African society is an invitation to us to utilize these technologies for the 
globalization of African wisdom. A globalized sagacity would help us develop an explicit 
counter-hegemonic discourse and practice in the global context. In this way it would facilitate 
promotion of intercultural dialogue. African dance, music, and sangoma therapy, just to name 
a few aspects of Africa, have become translatable to a global format thanks to ICT. 
 
7.5. Oruka’s cultural fundamentals in philosophy and philosophical debate 
In this section we will examine how Oruka conceives culture and how relevant it is for our 
conception of intercultural philosophy. The notion of ‘culture’ has become an essential 
concept in discourses pertaining to our contemporary social experience and philosophy. This 
emanated from Western scholarship and subsequently in North Atlantic society, which has 
developed such great self-evidence as to assume a transcendental nature. We may define 
culture as ‘everything a person derives, through social as distinct from genetic transmission, 
from the society that person belongs to’ (Tylor 1871). Oruka, like many other philosophers, 
adopts this notion of ‘culture’ as found in cultural anthropology. This conception points to the 
existence of a plurality of cultures, each bounded, holistic, unique, and non-performative. 
Hence, many professional African philosophers and the wider African society have 
appropriated such a conception of culture, which combines claims of totality, unicity, 
integration, boundedness, and non-performativity. According to this view, a human being 
does not have a plurality of intersecting ‘cultural orientations’ coexisting simultaneously but 
only one culture with no options. Implicitly, such a culture has to be holistic (i.e. geared 
towards a totality, a whole) and, in consequence, intolerant of diversity. It is instructive to 
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note that this interpretation of culture is in accord with the modernist conception of collective 
representations as one, indivisible, individual subject with its own identity. As we discussed 
in the introductory chapter, such a unitary conception of culture only ignites the assumption 
(linked with ethnicity) that there is a Dutch culture, a Bakweri culture, etc.  
Moreover, in contemporary public culture, the concept of culture is also closely 
associated with ethical and political judgements. This claim, in a concrete interaction, is 
linked to respecting a person’s claims to basic rights and the ‘politics of recognition’ (Taylor 
1994). In such a situation, a person may want to appeal to basic rights that have been 
privileged by public opinion and by bureaucratic and political practices and regulations. In 
this case, the person in question is not expressing a free choice but one that is determined by 
a specific ‘cultural’ or ‘ethnic’ group in which they have acquired certain practices specific to 
that group. This claim for respect expresses a conception according to which culture 
represents a total commitment, constituting the essence of the person. 
This background information is vital in understanding the relationship Oruka 
establishes between philosophy and culture (Oruka 1983). He assumes that philosophy is a 
significant branch of man’s search for knowledge of himself and nature. This search is often 
dominated by cultural commitments and prejudices. He outlines his study of culture with two 
theses, namely the universalist and the culturalist theses. The universalist thesis, according to 
Oruka, brands philosophical thinking or inquiry as a universal activity, unlike the culturalist 
thesis, which maintains that any philosophy is a corollary of a culture. However, the 
culturalist thesis does not deny that there may be a number of philosophical problems that are 
universal in character and can be a basis for transcultural dialogue in a world of unity in 
diversity. This implies that when persons from different cultural backgrounds meet to discuss 
philosophy, the issue of ‘cultural universals’ becomes evident. Cultural fundamentals, Oruka 
maintains, are obstacles to any meaningful philosophical dialogue and can hinder the ‘birth’ 
of potential philosophers, however gifted. By a cultural fundamental, Oruka means: 
 
[...] a concept, a style of language, a method of work or a psychological expectation 
that helps to mark one culture from another. (Oruka 1990:32)  
 
He asserts that among the sub-cultures of philosophy, the cultural fundamentals are 
very important signs to be watched for in assessing the possibility of a success or failure in 
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philosophical dialogue.132 A cultural universal, such as intuition,133 is a way of promoting 
smooth intercultural philosophical dialogues. According to Oruka, intuition is a form of 
mental skill which helps the mind to extrapolate from experience and come to establish extra 
statistical inductive truth, or it enables the mind to make a correct/plausible logical inference 
without any established or known rules of procedure (Oruka 1990b: 28-29). Intuition is a rare 
quality of wisdom, of sagacity, which is found only in great philosophers, and in Oruka’s 
Kenyan context among his philosophic sages. In summary, Oruka thinks there are different 
cultures and posits intuition as the mark of the ‘great’ philosopher (Oruka 1990b). 
Kwasi Wiredu (1990) argues that there are cultural universals. He finds language (the 
fact of the existence of a language in all human communities) as the first proof of a cultural 
universal. Every human group has a language, and in principle, at least, all human groups can 
learn alien languages and engage in intercultural communication with the native speakers of 
other languages. These are skills of reflective perception, abstraction, and inference (Wiredu 
1990:10). 
Therefore, despite Quine’s thesis of ‘untranslatability’, intercultural communication 
and understanding, Wiredu explains, are possible since untranslatability is not 
‘unintelligibility’. He finds no obstacles in both intercultural and intracultural 
communication. Godwin Sogolo (1993) uses the same argument against the extreme 
relativism of Winch (1964) and applies the principle of charity as formulated by Davidson 
(1984) as a valid intercultural approach.  
The position of Oruka and Wiredu requires a slight modification here. The human 
situation today comprises diverse cultural orientations, between which there is a continuous 
interaction, both in one person in his many changing and inconsistent roles, and among a 
number of persons in their interactions with each other. People can communicate even 
                                                 
132 He typifies this in his five mirrors. See Oruka (1990b: 32-35). 
133 The word is used in different ways in English. In everyday life the word ‘intuition’ pertains to ‘gut feelings’ 
about things. In the history of Western philosophy, it is primarily used by rationalist philosophers like Plato and 
Descartes. Plato, in The Republic, conceives of intuition (anamnesis) as a fundamental capacity of human reason 
to understand the true nature of reality. Descartes, in his book Meditations on First Philosophy, uses the concept 
to signify a pre-existing knowledge acquired through rational reasoning, or the acquisition of truth through 
contemplation. For Kant, in his Critique of Pure Reason, intuition pertains to the basic sensory information 
provided by the cognitive faculty of sensibility. Kant discusses intuition as something all humans have and 
certainly not as something restricted to great philosophers or philosophic sages as Oruka asserts. Swiss 




without language. This reminds us that in our time characterized by globalization and 
multicultural society, the boundedness of cultures and languages has given way to human 
interaction, thereby creating the dynamics for social life and identity. Hence, if we think of 
‘cultures’, with all the attributes outlined above, we realize that the tension between the 
individual and the community is concealed because it is enclosed in that conception. 
Furthermore, if we conceive of self-identity with reference to cultures, we also realize 
that self-identity is inevitably and constantly situated in a tension between self-evidence and 
performativity. Moreover, on theoretical grounds, the supposed separate statuses of cultures 
risks depriving contemporary society of open communication, identification, community, and 
reconciliation. These are indispensable ingredients for our collective survival (Appiah 2006). 
In this way, intercultural philosophy promises to be one of humanity’s survival strategies. It 
permits us to recognize hybridity as an antidote to essentialist notions of identity and 
ethnicity. This is because it revels in dialogue, exchange, and compromise between the 
positions that have been tenaciously held by the conception of culture.  
Secondly, this view of culture also reminds us of multiculturalism and cultural 
recognition.134 We must admit that local cultural orientations have also lost their self-
evidence through their constant encounters with other global patterns of expression, 
organization, and identity. This implies that we should cease to conceive of cultures as 
bounded. This will enable us to learn from and give to any stranger in our community 
(Appiah 2006). Moreover, it is very common for people to acquire a new ethnic identity later 
in life, invariably leading to more than one identity in one person at the same time. Hence, it 
would be interculturally misleading to think that in today’s world the individual has only one 
cultural attachment. This has implications for any discourse on an ‘authentic’, ‘indigenous’ 
African identity. In light of the impact of globalization in Africa, identity cannot be 
considered closed. Identity has to be conceived of as one having a flexible capability to relate 
with other identities.  
The Canadian philosopher Charles Taylor (1994) sees identity as culture-bound, a 
valuable achievement to be preserved in order to develop an authenticity against the backdrop 
of a shared horizon of meaning; and withholding recognition can be a form of oppression 
(Taylor 1994:36). The tendency to endorse cultural difference and the patchwork view of 
African societies, however, can promote divisiveness and ethnic tension. It does not give the 
possibility for intercultural dialogue in our increasingly globalizing society. In order to 
                                                 
134 Young (1990). 
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understand cultural particularity, we ought to presume a background of cultural commonality. 
Multiculturalism should mean, above all, mutual enrichment by cultural difference and a 
search for the more universalizable elements embodied in various cultural orientations. We 
can attain this ‘upgraded’ meaning of multiculturalism through intercultural dialogue (Shen 
2010). 
Another major drawback of cultural recognition is that it may also perpetuate 
hegemonic, racialist tendencies even at the most local level of society. It can also promote 
stereotypes, prejudices, and racism, and give the impression that human life is reduced to an 
immobile essence. This can incite feelings of fundamental differences, enmesh us in 
relativism and identity politics, and create barriers that in fact do not exist. Mudimbe sees the 
idea of an African identity as a construct—the result of various Western power structures. 
The African identity has been constructed as the Other, but as a historical and collective 
Other. Mudimbe’s anti-hegemonic contention is that Africa is an invention of the West; he 
critiques the way in which the construction of a European (or, by extension, North Atlantic) 
identity in the modern world has often taken the form of claiming to be the antithesis of what 
Europe (or, by extension, the North Atlantic) has constructed as Africa. Yet, for Mudimbe 
this identity is fixed—a dilemma we cannot free ourselves from. This is contrary to the view 
of French philosopher Simone de Beauvoir (1908–1986), who from an existentialist position 
sees identity as a product of daily life. Human life is a project determined by daily reality and 
not by abstractions and speculations. The issue of identity is not fixed but one that changes. 
We ought to have an active attitude regarding life in our social environment, as this is 
necessary for our freedom (de Beauvoir 1974). 
Hence, any discourse on African identity should engage with the physical, daily 
reality. We should rather speak of cultural orientations, which inform us of the situationality, 
multiplicity, and performativity of culture. Our identity is not fixed, stable, or bounded, but 
open and flexible. This means respect for, and dialogue with, other cultural orientations in a 
bid to mutually enrich one another. This will enable us recognize and live (even beyond 
words) our shared humanity. Given that the construction of fundamental differences is a 
major drawback in African societies today,135 intercultural philosophy remains our only hope 
in defining a credible and mobilizing formula for the revitalization of African societies 
beyond fundamental differences. 
                                                 
135 See, for example, the contemporary anthropological discourse on African ethnicity in authors such as Barth 




7.6. The hermeneutics of intercultural philosophy 
The globalization process presupposes a plurality of domains, each with a distinct identity. 
These have been separately constructed and have been internally structured by processes of 
signification that are predominantly embedded in language. In this situation, how can we 
produce valid and reliable intercultural knowledge? Is intercultural communication possible? 
What is a viable method for contemporary African philosophy in a context marked by the 
high degree of global interactions today? We will present intercultural hermeneutics as 
discussed by van Binsbergen and the Indian-born and leading intercultural philosopher in 
Germany, Ram Adhar Mall. 
Mall sees the possibility of an intercultural hermeneutics as a solution to the 
theoretical problems raised by globalization. Let us summarize the main points of his 
hermeneutics and see how we can situate them in the context of a philosophy of 
globalization, in a bid to explore the possibility of approaching the problem of intercultural 
communication. Like Oruka and most African/Africanist philosophers, Mall subscribes to the 
apparently self-evident conception of humanity as being subdivided into distinct cultures. He 
asserts that because these cultures exist side by side, intercultural understanding and 
interpenetration has to be achieved. He argues that intercultural hermeneutics stresses not 
only the sometimes problematic parallel coexistence of cultures, but also the significant 
contributions they may yet make to one another.136 For Mall, the existence of many cultures 
is not a threat but a precondition for interculturality. In other words, the existence of distinct, 
bounded cultures is required before we can speak of interactions between these cultures; and 
such interactions are essentially non-problematic, because ‘cultures can be explained to one 
another’ (Mall 1995:99). 
Mall rejects the idea of one universal world philosophy and also insists on the need 
for any comparative philosophy to be impartial. He argues that in post-modern hermeneutics, 
no tradition, place, or language should be privileged, as that could trigger the dangers of 
absolutization. His conception of intercultural philosophy is one that is ‘placelessly 
localizing’ and ‘localizingly placeless’ (ibid. 78). He proposes the theory of an open 
hermeneutics where one tolerantly acknowledges that the Other differs from that which one 
considers one’s own.  
                                                 
136 Mall (1995). 
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Mall’s position presupposes a plurality of different domains and raises the 
problematic of how intercultural knowledge can be produced in encounters between these 
domains. For van Binsbergen, the ‘placelessly localizing’ character of intercultural 
philosophy posited by Mall tends to conceal the fact that localization undeniably takes place 
in this hermeneutic process (van Binsbergen 2003:386-387). Localization does not 
necessarily take the form of any geographical domain the size of a language region or a 
nation-state; the philosophical interpreter, with the use of specialist philosophical language, 
explicitly constructs this kind of localization.  
Such intercultural hermeneutics will certainly be language-based. Our study of 
intercultural hermeneutics therefore urges us to re-visit the use of language and its 
implications. The language of the interpreter normally produces a universalist impression on 
the persons whose expressions are being interpreted. In fact, it takes the place of a touchstone 
that is situated at an unattainably higher and more valid level than that on which the matter is 
situated that it seeks to comprehend: the cultural Other and his/her manifestations. Moreover, 
language also has a major shortcoming in that it gives the philosopher a privileged position 
with regard to intercultural hermeneutics and communication. A large part of human 
manifestations is not framed and can hardly be expressed in language. Even though language 
has a clear structuring potential, it does not finally and completely establish the cultural 
domain, nor the entire limits of human cognition. 
Hence, in the case of Oruka’s search for and expression of sagacity, these should not 
be limited to language, given our context of contemporary globalization. Intercultural 
philosophy, from a wisdom perspective, should allow us to celebrate the human body as a 
transcultural common given, rather than relying heavily on explicit articulation of language 
as Oruka does. It should be an encounter. We can also depend on other forms such as bodily 
contacts, songs, dances, rituals, and rhythms, and on the forms of epistemological modesty 
such as silence, love, empathy, and introspection (van Binsbergen 2008). Intercultural 
philosophical hermeneutics will be more effective in our search for wisdom in a globalizing 
society through contacts in pop culture, on sports fields, on the Internet, during vacations, on 
the streets, in the pubs, in urban neighbourhoods, over the counters of formal bureaucratic 
institutions, in doctor’s surgeries, and even in bed. When people come together, we see a 
genuine fusion of publicly constructed identities on a world scale, which is the real hallmark 
of contemporary globalization. Hence, wisdom in this context will not be in the essentialist 
sense of incomparably wise and eternal truths, or in the sense of an appeal to particularist, 
local authority figures—who may be effective and have valid knowledge in their local 
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domain but have no authority in other cultures, cultures which have their own ancestors and 
do not accept the authority of foreign ones. Rather, traditional wisdom in the context of a 
multifarious wisdom revival today need not be culture-specific, but it should be capable of 
generating valid knowledge across cultural boundaries. It challenges us to be aware of 
diversity, incompatibility, conflict, and the need to mediate these from those structures that 
do not constitute political power and scientific knowledge (Mudimbe 1988: xi). This explains 
why from an intercultural perspective, wisdom is characterized as a vital instrument to solve 
practical problems. In this connection, the American philosopher John Dewey (1859–1952) 
conceives of thinking not as a search for ‘truth’ but rather as activity aimed at solving 
individual and social problems. Whereas empiricism and rationalism separate thinking and 
doing, Dewey holds that reflective thought is always involved in transforming a practical 
situation. Philosophy should not escape by searching for fixed, universal, and immutable 
truth. Rather, it should be a problem-solving, pragmatic exercise. 
In addition, such intercultural hermeneutics will not be one of cultural boundaries and 
distinctness but of fusion and exchanges such as we experience in contemporary 
globalization. As we have argued in this work, cultures no longer exist as distinct, bounded 
entities. Rather, what exist are numerous cultural orientations in which people interact and 
intersect. Hence, we can assert that the hermeneutical dimension in African and intercultural 
philosophy will add something new (methodologically and intellectually) into the African 
context. Yet, we cannot limit such a hermeneutic to difference, because cultural diversity is 
performative (Ceton 2005) and because in many respects people the world over share in a 
worldwide society, producing more and more similar environments and similar experiences at 
many different places. An example is watching the same film or wearing similar jeans in five 
different continents, due to the increasing globalization of production, distribution, and 
formal organizations such as the state, education, health services, media, and multinational 
companies (van Binsbergen 2003). An intercultural hermeneutic, not exclusively language-
based, has become indispensable, as it will help us in self-questioning in order to attain 
wisdom that will enable us to better our human condition. It should be grounded on human 
life and existence. In this context, we can achieve self-understanding to the extent that the 
self relates to itself as it relates to the Other. Our lived experiences can lead us to understand 
ourselves as we relate with others (Dilthey 1989; Heidegger 1996). 
Oruka is correct when he links culture and philosophy. Where I disagree with him is 
where he limits his vision of sagacity and culture to the North Atlantic paradigm and does not 
explicitly elaborate from his African base. He encloses African sagacity, following the North 
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Atlantic paradigm. Moreover, the North Atlantic paradigm is being challenged today with the 
possibilities of other traditions of wisdom. In this age, a complementary vision of sagacity 
will enrich the way we perceive and collectively solve our individual and collective 
problems. It can open up a space of existential and political possibilities. Our new conception 
of sagacity can be one that is dynamic, with a productive power that undermines the idea of 
reality as a fixed, unyielding network of authoritative patterns of interpretation. 
 
7.7. The rise of more dynamic and optional approaches to ‘culture’, as from the middle 
of the 20th century 
In today’s world, the particular conception of ‘culture’ endorsed by Oruka—as reificatory, 
essentializing the African element, static, bounded, and non-performative—needs some 
critical revision since it is, in crucial respects, an incorrect description of reality (van 
Binsbergen 1999, 2003). In his conception of intercultural philosophy, van Binsbergen 
proposes a shift away from the more relative and parochial conception of culture as 
conceived by anthropologists and later adopted by philosophers. We may define culture as 
‘everything a person derives, through social as distinct from genetic transmission, from the 
society that person belongs to’ (Tylor 1871). It is presupposed that within these ‘cultures’, 
communication and even interaction take place as if they were ontologically different, and 
even conscious and coherent, entities. The attempt at critiquing the traditional concept of 
culture as immutable and internalized and as a force completely dictating behaviour is in a 
way a product of globalization. For van Binsbergen, we cannot conceive of ‘cultures’ in the 
plural because they present a monolithic, integrated picture. In times of global interaction, 
van Binsbergen prefers to speak of ‘cultural orientations’. The expression ‘cultural 
orientation’ is more appropriate because it incorporates the overlapping and the dynamics of 
space and time in these patterns of collective programming. It also points at internalization; 
culture is not conceived as a fixed, internal programming but as an option. Nonetheless, this 
does not deny the fact that components of such programming, notably those acquired in 
childhood, can become quite profound and indelible. 
Cultural orientations remind us of the situationality, multiplicity, and performativity 
of the rhizome of culture and its inherent dynamism (Nederveen Pieterse 2009:54). Oruka, in 
his conception of sagacity, did not take into consideration the influence of some theories (in 
the course of the 1960s and 1970s) in which culture was conceived of as more relative and 
more dynamic. We may cite the Manchester School of Anthropology, which was founded in 
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1947 by South African and British social anthropologist Max Gluckman137 (1911–1978).138 
We may also refer to transactionalism as conceived by Norwegian anthropologist Fredrik 
Barth (1969). Barth rejects the notion of cultures as bounded and static entities and argues for 
the interconnectedness and interdependency of ethnic identities. He considers that the 
interaction and interface between ethnic identities give rise to newer identities. These more 
dynamic and outward-looking approaches in the study of culture would have helped Oruka to 
re-think his conception of sagacity. They would help to go beyond the culturalist thesis. This 
is my focus in the next section. 
 
7.8. Cultural relativism and difference: Beyond the culturalist thesis 
In this section, I will attempt to show why African/intercultural philosophers have been 
tempted to take the concept of culture so seriously and have applied it in their arguments. 
This tendency springs from the influence of cultural relativism in the philosophy of 
difference. The culturalist way of thinking consists in identifying cultural units and 
perceiving the natural place of a person to be within that unit. This thesis is based on an 
essentialist, bounded, holistic idea of cultures. I will go further, beyond culturalism, to show 
the limitations and implications for our study of sagacity and intercultural philosophy. 
The concept of cultural relativism was developed by an American anthropologist of 
the 1940s, Melville Herskovits (1895–1963), who became a specialist on Surinam and 
published on this topic.139 Cultural relativism is based on the premise that there are 
substantial differences in the beliefs, practices, and worldviews of different cultures. In 
cultural anthropology, culture was perceived as bounded, internally integrated, consistent, 
unique, and holistic. Within anthropology, this notion emerged as the obvious and inevitable 
outcome of the fieldwork paradigm that had become the norm in the discipline from the 
1930s onwards: research of cultural and identitary specificity within very narrow horizons of 
space and time. This meant the anthropologist needed to study by trying to apply an emic 
                                                 
137 See Gluckman 1964, 1967, 1969. 
138 The Manchester School of Anthropology emphasized the method of ‘Case Study’.The method included 
detailed analyses of particular cases of social interaction to infer rules and assumptions. This school used the 
works of Marx and examined issues of social justice such as class conflicts and reconciliation in small-scale 
societies and organizations, and the tension between the individual and the society. Among the Manchester 
School anthropologists were Fredrik Barth, Richard Werbner, and Victor Turner.  
139 Herskovits (1973). 
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analysis specific to the ‘other culture’, which is considered non-performative (Beattie 1964). 
In summary, such a ‘non-Western’ or ‘comparative philosophy’ approach to interculturality 
gives the impression that ‘culture’, ‘cultures’, and ‘cultural specificity’ remain plural and 
holistic. In this case, culture is non-performative and static, endorsing the isolationist 
conception of the ‘impenetrable Other’ (Moody-Adams 1997).  
Understandably, contemporary African and intercultural philosophers were tempted to 
take this anthropological conception of culture and immediately apply it to their own 
philosophical arguments without further revision.140 To this, we may add the interest in the 
philosophy of culture with philosophers like Cassirer (1953–1957) and Dilthey (1989), who 
were out to address almost exclusively European culture. Moreover, debates on rationality 
and analysis of exotic cultures were also influenced by such relativist tendencies.141 As we 
have seen above, cultural anthropology promotes absolute difference across cultures, with an 
inward-looking approach to the notions of culture and identity. In addition, the concept of 
culture, with its implied relativism, as borrowed from cultural anthropology, gave 
African/intercultural philosophers the possibility of taking a critical distance from 
Eurocentrism and ethnocentrism. 
The assumption that the valid and invalid contents of a local, non-Western cultural 
orientation and society can be meaningful only if embedded in the North Atlantic paradigm is 
interculturally untenable. This assumption reveals the subordinating and universalizing 
format of North Atlantic science and philosophy, which most professional 
African/intercultural philosophers endorse but which we discommend.142 Philosophers with 
post-structuralist affinities have challenged such ethnocentric views with alternative views 
that constitute the starting point for a non-ethnocentric theorizing of globalization, identity, 
and signification.143 
                                                 
140 See, for example, Appiah (1992); Sogolo (1993); Mall (1995); and Gyekye (1997).  
141 For more on this debate see, for example, Horton (1967); Hallen & Sodipo (1986); Appiah (1992); and 
Sogolo (1993). 
142 For African philosophers with a universalizing frame of mind see, for example, Oruka (1975, 1987); 
Hountondji (1983); Bodunrin (1991); Wiredu (1991, 1998); and Gyekye (1995). By contrast, those with a 
particularizing frame of mind posit that African cognition is underrated and does not receive the attention it 
deserves or the credibility it merits as an alternative way of understanding. See, for example, Senghor (1964); 
Outlaw (1987b); and Sogolo (1993) 
143 We may cite the cases of Deleuze & Guattari (1972, 1980, 1994); Mudimbe (1988, 1994); and van 
Binsbergen (1999, 2003). 
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African and intercultural philosophers also subscribe to the Tylorian notion of culture 
(Tylor 1871),144 owing to the way post-structuralist philosophers such as Derrida, Lyotard, 
Deleuze, and Guattari have thought about difference. In the history of Western philosophy, 
thinking about identity and difference can be traced back to Heraclitan proto-dialectics and 
especially to Aristotelian logic. Under the influence of Hegel and Nietzsche, mid-20th century 
thought—in the context of decolonization, the critique of masculine dominance, and the 
critique of racism—at first applauded difference as a liberating expression of the inalienable 
identity of a person or a collective. Hence, any attempt to reclaim ‘the Other’ as more or less 
‘one’s own’ on the basis of an extraverted discourse (Hountondji 1983) had to be exposed as 
a strategy of appropriation, of hegemony, and of denial. In contrast to their structuralist 
predecessors—especially Lévi-Strauss, who stressed fundamental difference as a primal 
strategy of human thought, and Marx, who postulated the historical inevitability of the 
struggle over material production and appropriation—these post-structuralists argued further. 
They have explored the very rich and revealing implications of Hegelian and Marxist 
dialectics—that any presence carries within itself the implications of its own absence, and 
that any difference carries within itself the implications of a non-difference (i.e. a state of 
being identical). In other words, the strategy of difference contains the possibility of both 
deconstructing and affirming identity at the same time. 
The post-structuralists focus on difference and insist on cultural plurality and the 
patchwork view of humanity. They assume that different cultures have different traditions. 
Hence, it is unacceptable for one culture to be imposed on or to exclude the other. This is 
because each culture has the right to exercise and defend its own standards.145 This view is 
also endorsed by communitarians who defend the preservation of multiculturalism. The 
culture or community a person is born into and grows up in has a great impact on the life of 
that person. Hence, they stand for cultural differences, the local and particular community.146 
To this, we can add fundamentalism, which is increasingly on the rise in our contemporary 
societies—for example, Christian, Islamic, and Hindu fundamentalism. Fundamentalists are 
opposed to modernity and globalization and focus instead on unchanging and absolute truths. 
                                                 
144 Tylor’s cultural evolutionism argues for the progressive development of the human from the savage to the 
civilized state in all societies. He also identifies uniformity in culture. Even though human societies evolve 
differently, in particular contexts, the human mind and its capabilities are the same in all societies. 
145 For a post-structuralist conception of difference see, for example, Young (1990). 
146 For more on communitarianism see, for example, Walzer (1985); Taylor (1994); Vincent (2002); and 
MacIntyre (2007).  
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These can be in the Bible, in the Koran, or in a ‘culture’. They reject the idea of a common 
humanity and absolutize difference at all levels. 
Derrida’s philosophical position is based on deconstruction and difference (Derrida 
1976). He used this method to criticize the assumptions of structural linguists like de 
Saussure, the anthropologist Lévi-Strauss, and the philosopher Husserl. He criticizes what he 
considers the dominant view of language and reference. As we saw in Chapter 2, de Saussure 
points out that language is made up of signs, and the sign is made up of the signifier and the 
signified. The signifier is the sound pattern, while the signified is that concept which comes 
to mind upon hearing the sound pattern. For de Saussure, these are psychological processes, 
and recognizing a sound is more complex than connecting a name with a thing. Derrida 
questions this binary opposition between sign and signifier and posits that such a relationship 
is arbitrary. This relationship is not hierarchical, essential, referential, and natural as de 
Saussure asserts. Derrida also argues that the rapport between sign and signifier is not very 
easy to recognize but has to be interpreted continuously. We get meanings from signs through 
interaction with other signs and meanings. For a sign to be distinct, it must also be different 
from other signs. It is difference in language which makes things unique, not different things 
in the external world. The free play of signifiers implies that meaning is not fixed. The same 
sign can mean different things in different contexts. This implies that we can hardly have an 
ultimate meaning since signs have to be interpreted in different contexts and realities.  
Derrida also used this method to attack the structural anthropology of Lévi-Strauss 
(ibid.).He brings to the foreground the less privileged terms implicit in language. He argues 
that there is no basis for making myths into a fixed, coherent system; therefore, the 
philosopher cannot be an ‘engineer’ who finds unifying elements within myths. Myths have 
no single unitary source; hence, interpretation of them is not scientific but rather a product of 
the imagination. Myths have no authors and cannot give rise to scientific knowledge. 
Derrida’s critique of linguistic structuralism and structural anthropology gives the 
intercultural philosopher several grounds to argue for cultural difference. 
Derrida also used his deconstructive method to attack Husserl’s transcendental 
idealism (ibid.). He agrees with Heidegger that metaphysics has been reduced to onto-
theology, a term Heidegger used to describe the development of metaphysics since Plato. 
Metaphysics has increasingly come to reduce being to God. Husserl attempted to ground 
human knowing in a transcendental science of logic or a universal phenomenology of 
consciousness. Derrida elaborated on this development as a logocentrism: nostalgia for an 
original state of full being or presence that is now lost. Logocentrism is based on a preference 
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for a stable, hierarchical world of necessary being. This, according to Derrida, is unfounded 
and artificial. Husserl sought a transcendental consciousness that is beyond any particular, 
individual consciousness. This was based on ideal objects that had some kind of certainty and 
clarity as geometrical concepts. They are just like Plato’s Forms, which are taken to be pure, 
universal, stable, and nonphysical. Truths do not need to be represented using empirical 
content; they can be directly intuited. Nevertheless, for Derrida, there is no direct intuition of 
these truths. There is only mediated, representational knowledge that is dependent on 
linguistic structures. Truth does not take place prior to language but rather depends on 
language and temporality for its existence. Derrida maintains that language and things 
change. Only through the playful use of language will the interaction between the presence 
and absence of things, as well as between their certainty and uncertainty, enter consciousness. 
Thinking and language can never be closed systems of absolutely certain, transcendental 
concepts; they are rather open and temporally limited. They ought, in some way, Tobe 
capable of dealing with things as unique, changing, uncertain, and incomplete. 
The difference-oriented intercultural philosopher could be tempted to absolutize 
difference with an essentialist view of culture. Culturalism holds a number of assumptions 
about culture and presents several intercultural challenges. First, the idea of culture is 
contrived as a kind of separate ‘body’ or ‘entity’ which is strongly sustained by internal 
coherence and essence. Second, there is a notion that human beings ‘belong’ to a specific 
culture, that they should be anchored in it in order to be authentic. This culture gives us our 
identity, which is deeply rooted, and our feeling of authenticity as opposed to others. Third, 
the notion of culture tends to imply that everyone within the cultural unit naturally belongs 
together (what Hountondji describes as the ‘myth of unanimity’). And fourth, there is a 
tendency to construct ‘over conditioned’ boundaries (Boele van Hensbroek 2001b).  
Such a position is interculturally dangerous because it can lead to exclusion, racism, 
and xenophobia. Moreover, cultural relativism and difference do not give us viable strategies 
to live in our intercultural world of today. The culturalist thesis deprives us of seeking a 
common ground in intercultural relations, by encouraging people to live inwards and not 
outwards. People need to live together and solve their individual and collective problems. We 
need to move beyond mere passive acceptance of a multiplicity of cultures and rather 
promote dialogue and interaction among cultural orientations. We need to be tolerant and 
open to others. Intercultural philosophy endorses dialogue and frowns on the self-segregating 
tendencies among cultural orientations. 
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Moreover, contemporary realities contradict the idea of an unchangeable human 
nature and culture. Culturalism implies that a person’s identity is pre-determined by his or her 
‘culture’, and that man cannot choose freely or make decisions. We cannot know human 
nature directly because it is always mediated in myriad different yet intersubjective forms. 
Sartre, for example, thought that there is no such thing as a human nature that is common to 
all humans. There is no such thing as a specific essence that defines what it is to be human. 
For Sartre, the individual produces her/his essence, because no God created human beings in 
accordance with a divine concept. In the case of human beings, ‘existence precedes essence’. 
This means that a person is what he/she makes of him/herself. Cultural identity is one of the 
identities a person may have. It is important to that person but it does not define his/her total 
being.  
The culturalist thesis supposes unanimity in a community. This can be misleading, 
because people rarely speak with one voice in any given community. It is an overstatement to 
insist on a shared communal understanding; diversity is inherent in every society. Moreover, 
contrary to Walzer (1985), we cannot think of society as unchanging, fixed, and homogenous; 
people interact and borrow from those beyond their cultural orientations. It would be more 
rewarding to take into consideration the hybridity of cultural orientations (Benhabib 1992, 
2002a, 2002b). 
 
We can now return to van Binsbergen. He maintains that the conception of culture as 
bounded and distinct cannot be used effectively as a philosophical concept today (van 
Binsbergen 1999, 2003). In the context of globalization, we need to go beyond essentialist or 
fundamentalist traits. This is because migration and the cultural globalization of our daily 
lives (with new techniques of communication and information) have greatly reduced space 
and time. This makes it more evident that no cultural situation is homogeneous and that no 
cultural situation exists in isolation. It implies that cultural specificity can occur only by 
virtue of local, parochial boundary maintenance in the face of an expanding, worldwide field 
of locally available and perceived cultural alternatives. Moreover, what people claim to be 
their culture today turns out to be selected, arbitrary, situational, performative, and 
ephemeral, merely boundary markers of explicit difference. 
What does exist, however, are numerous cultural orientations, shared with some or 
many other people, orientations which in each person’s life and each situation intersect and 
interact. This intersection is problematic because of the power relations tending to hegemony 
and the hermeneutics of otherness, which are inherently appropriative and distorting. And 
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yet, human cultural history is informed by a common search for truth and a common 
epistemology.147 Cultural relativism, for example, used to be a simple assertion against 
Western hegemony as seen in imperialism and colonialism. Nevertheless, we have to be very 
vigilant because this relativism can go to extremes and engender an immovable stalemate of 
positions, leading to fundamentalism and violence. Such insistence on irresolvable 
differences is insufficient as a survival strategy for the modern world. In order to face the 
future, we need dialogue, exchange, and compromise so that we easily blend and cross-
fertilize our differences. Preserving what is unique and distinctive in our various cultural 
orientations should not blind us to cultivating and celebrating our common humanity, and 
intercultural philosophy helps us to explore the various possibilities that can ensure our 
collective survival. 
 
7.9. Beyond Bernal’s boundaries 
I pursue my reflection beyond the culturalist thesis with a brief re-assessment of Bernal’s 
study of Ancient Egypt. I discuss Bernal’s Black Athena thesis because it has been a major 
inspiration for many African philosophers. This will help to bring out the implications for my 
conception of sagacity and, subsequently, for intercultural philosophy. As discussed earlier in 
this chapter, the culturalist thesis tends to over-generalize and absolutize cultural divisions. 
African culturalists tend to go back to Ancient Egypt, while their European counterparts 
favour ancient Greece. The impression we get is that cultural fragmentation is the original 
condition of humankind, whereas it is a secondary product of historical group interaction. In 
his attempt to compare Greek sages with his Kenyan sages, Oruka recommends studying 
Bernal’s exposition of the Eurocentrism that has characterized North Atlantic research on 
Greco-Roman antiquity for the past two centuries (Oruka 1991:1-2).  
One of the main objectives of intercultural philosophy is to create a philosophy that 
will allow for a non-essentialist perception of intercultural relations. Intercultural philosophy 
must account for the permanence within spatio-temporal social organizations but also needs 
to affirm the possibilities of change and interaction (van Binsbergen 1999). Intercultural 
philosophy must therefore deconstruct the absolute and essentialist differentiations that are 
brought to the global debate with concepts such as ‘Africa’, ‘the Orient’, and ‘Europe’. These 
concepts miss the fundamental point of the ‘globalization of diversity’, of the mélange effect 
                                                 
147 See van Binsbergen (2003), especially the Introduction and Chapters 7 and 15. 
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pervading everywhere from the heartlands to the extremities and vice versa (Nederveen 
Pieterse 2009: 70). This gives us the opportunity to rebut the racialist variant of Afrocentrism. 
As discussed in the introductory chapter, Bernal identifies the African and Asiatic 
sources of classical Greek civilization (notably its language, philosophy, and religion), and he 
subsequently uncovers the non-European origins of important cultural orientations in the 
North Atlantic civilization, which is progressively becoming global anyway. In other words, 
and pertaining to philosophy, the Black Athena debate hinges on the non-European origin of 
the European philosophical tradition. This is suggestive of Egyptocentrism as a possible 
model of African cultural history. Bernal’s works have the merit of placing Eurocentrism and 
North Atlantic hegemony on the scholarly agenda. Thus, he makes a lasting contribution to 
the liberation of Asian and African difference à la Mudimbe, and to scholarly production’s 
self-reflexive awareness of its responsible, even though dependent, position within the global 
politics of knowledge. However, Bernal does not take into account the fact that Ancient 
Egypt and Sub-Saharan Africa interchanged ideas in various domains, such as modes of 
thought, symbolism and myths, childbearing, and state formation. Moreover, Ancient 
Egyptian civilization developed (contrary to what Bernal asserts) owing to the mutual 
exchanges between Sub-Saharan African and East Mediterranean/West Asian cultural 
orientations. Such heterogeneous and fragmented ‘Pelasgian’ continuities can hardly be 
relegated to a primal and exclusively African origin. The Aegean region looks similar to 
Ancient Egypt not primarily because of diffusion from Egypt in the Late Bronze Age, but 
primarily because both were the recipients of the ‘Pelasgian’ demic, linguistic, and cultural 
movement from West (ultimately Central) Asia. Subsequently, this movement also extended 
to Sub-Saharan Africa, producing the same similarities there (van Binsbergen 2011a: 327ff.).  
Van Binsbergen (2011c) goes further to show the limits of the Black Athena thesis 
and of Afrocentricity as empirical explanatory models, in his search for transcontinental 
continuities and to underpin his premise of the fundamental unity of humankind. He engages 
in the comparative transcontinental study of divinatory (oracular, soothsaying) systems, 
seeking to illuminate the striking similarities that became manifest between the divination 
system he had learned as a diviner in Botswana, and other southern African divination 
systems and those further afield: the ‘Ifa’ and ‘Sixteen Cowries’systems of West Africa and 
the New World; the ‘Sikidy’ of Madagascar and the Comoro Islands; the ‘Sand Science’ 
divination system recorded for southern Iraq c. 1000 CE and subsequently spread all over the 
Islamic world of South and South-West Asia, as well as North-East and East Africa (with 
ramifications into medieval and Renaissance European specialist magic and even into Early 
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Modern peasant practices); and beyond that even, the Chinese wisdom system of I Ching, 
puzzlingly similar in notational system and divinatory symbolism, with its enormous impact 
on East Asian cultural history. As highlighted in the introductory chapter, this 
transcontinental study of divinatory systems points to the undeniable empirical reality of 
massive cultural continuities in space and time and the fundamental unity of humankind. It 
also invites us to stress the transcontinental complementarity of the intellectual achievements 
of ourselves, anatomically modern humans, in the course of millennia.  
The implications of this discussion for Africa and Afrocentrists are clear. First, it 
suggests that cultural orientations overlap regions and even within countries. We cannot talk 
of quintessential African values that separate Africa from the rest of humanity. The use of 
homogenous categories such as ‘African’ and ‘Asian’ can conceal the complexity of each 
tradition and overlook the history of cross-cultural influences between them. Second, Ancient 
Egypt had rich and influential contributions not just (as Bernal argues in his Black Athena 
thesis) from the East Mediterranean basin and consequently Europe, but equally had several 
intercultural exchanges in many aspects of life in Black Africa. Instead of a diversity of 
cultures, what emerges is the image of cultural homogeneity, which comes from identifiable 
historical processes. We may cite Ancient Egyptian civilization, Arabian/Islamic, and North 
Atlantic colonial influences (van Binsbergen 1999). Third, the approach of Afrocentrists 
could tear Africa loose from the texture of transcontinental continuities in which it has always 
thrived and downplay its own global contributions. Africa can be recognized and can affirm 
itself as a major player in global civilization instead of (as is the global reality of the last few 
decades) a disqualified outsider. 
Furthermore, some lessons can be drawn for my conception of intercultural 
philosophy. We can say that culture is not bounded, not tied to a place, not unique but 
multiple, and easy to combine, blend, and transcend. We do not need to exaggerate the 
boundaries that exist between different cultural orientations but can blend our differences and 
commonalities. In a world where colonialism and racism are now left behind as obsolete 
ideological frameworks, and where Africa is no longer regarded (as it was by Hegel) as the 
continent of a history-less infantile state, the thought can arise that not Europe or Asia but 
Africa was the cradle of humankind (some 4 million years ago), and also, much more 
recently (200,000 BCE), was the cradle of anatomically modern humans—the species to 
which all humans living today belong. The subsequent ‘out-of-Africa’ migration of people 
and culture, on which the past two decades have brought near-consensus among specialists, 
then offers a fruitful paradigm to articulate and periodicize global world history by reference 
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to an Africa-centred framework. This will mean revising Afrocentrism by bringing it closer to 
mainstream global science. The study of ethnographic distributions—with emphasis on 
cultural (near-) universals of myths and wisdom traditions—will allow us to proceed beyond 
a timeless cultural relativism and begin to write a cultural history of difference, one in which 
Africa takes pride of place and in which the fundamental historical unity of (anatomically 
modern) humankind emerges as the ultimate point of departure (van Binsbergen 1997a, 
1997b, 1997c). This suggests that in cultural analysis we cannot afford to ignore 
comprehensive long-range correspondences in time and space, across millennia and across 
thousands of miles. It is true that the essential cultural repertoire of anatomically modern 
humans came from Africa, but Bernal and Afrocentrists limit this origin to a much more 
recent past—the Bronze Age or the Neolithic Age, at the very remotest. 
There is every reason to avoid thinking of cultural diversity, for it can affirm 
difference and endorse stigmatization and fragmentation. The assumptions of cultural 
relativism and difference can lead to violent ethnic, religious, and political conflicts (Sen 
2006). The attempt to polarize humanity into fixed identities can bring only further violence 
between different groups. If there is any ‘clash of civilizations’, as Samuel Huntington(1996) 
would have it, it is precisely because of the way people have been categorized as fixed, 
without taking into consideration their ability to acquire new identities. In addition, the 
racialist alternative of Afrocentrism shows how the very language of identity (be it ethnic or 
religious) is inclined to the essentialistic assertion that identity has a pre-established, 
immovable quality, which conditions present-day qualities and functioning. Identity should 
be seen as being realized in a dialectical and mainly unpredictable historical process. This 
process is not one of a remaining essence, but of becoming—fostering multiple identities 
while constantly switching from one identity to the other, and being conscious of the arbitrary 
nature of all socially upheld identity. 
 
7.10. Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter we have attempted to highlight the impact of globalization in 
contemporary society. This globalizing process poses a major challenge for intercultural 
philosophy. There is the urgent need to reshape the philosophical discourses in this context, 
to meet with the numerous encounters that characterize contemporary life. African 
philosophy ought to be ultimately rooted in the everyday experience of the people living in 
historical communities, but it should also be informed by confrontations with the world 
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outside Africa, as is the case today. This will usher in a lasting and powerful effect upon the 
transformation of the lives of the contemporary African. From an intercultural philosophical 
perspective, where there are human encounters cultures do not exist as fixed identities. 
Intercultural philosophy reminds us that culture is pragmatic, as we must learn from other 
cultural orientations, given the fact that no milieu is immutable. This implies that we look for 
an African sagacity that does not limit itself just to a ‘culture’ but goes beyond borders. Our 
new conception of sagacity ought to take into consideration the oneness and 
interconnectedness of our humanity. We need to search for and construct a kind of practical 










In this concluding chapter, I wish to make some remarks and recommendations on the role of 
the African and, subsequently, intercultural philosopher today.148 A more satisfactory way of 
dealing with African philosophy is to develop it into intercultural philosophical studies. In 
today’s global age, given that intercultural encounters and interactions are a fact of human 
experience, there is a need for an intercultural philosophy. The underlying idea of 
intercultural philosophy is that there are many equally valuable philosophical traditions of 
significance in all regions of the world, rather than just a few, or one. Furthermore, there is a 
need to include the intercultural approach to philosophy because it will prevent any one 
philosophical tradition from adopting an absolutist and hegemonic position. Considering 
contemporary conditions, it is not difficult to understand that ‘hard’ Afrocentrism or 
Eurocentrism have become obsolete, as have other forms of centrism. This implies that we 
must not speak on behalf of others, who are well able to speak for themselves. In addition, 
these others may even be more resolute when speaking for themselves. We also need to 
critically assess theories before applying them to African philosophy. Hence, I submit that the 
study of African wisdom must become not a mere anthropological side-line, but rather a 
penetration into the very sources of philosophy. This will reveal the work of being itself in 
time as its creative power is lived and unfolded in the daily lives of Africans. This will 
proceed not with the ingenious hypothesis of an individual, but with the lived and tested 
experiences of African peoples, and it will involve patiently studying African wisdom 
traditions and values in a bid to translate them to the global scale and not the other way 
round.  
 
                                                 
148 For the various recommendations made by African philosophers on future orientations of African philosophy 
and the role of African philosophers see, for example, Towa (1971a, 1971b); Eboussi-Boulaga (1977); 
Hountondji (1983, 1996, 2002); Gbadegesin (1991); Wamba-dia-Wamba (1991); Appiah (1992, 1993); 
Mudimbe (1994); and Gyekye (1997).  
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8.2. The need for an intercultural hermeneutics: Oruka on the scale of hermeneutics 
In this section, I will attempt to go beyond Oruka’s conception of philosophic sagacity by 
making some recommendations for a viable methodology for contemporary African 
philosophy. The mainstream approach that has been explored by most African philosophers is 
that conventionally referred to as analysis, or analytical philosophy (Hallen 2009). Another 
approach that deserves consideration is that derived from the phenomenological-existential-
hermeneutical tradition, which is conventionally, at least as far as its African and intercultural 
manifestations are concerned, referred to as hermeneutics. For the future of African 
philosophy, there is a need to modify Oruka’s and many African philosophers’ application of 
hermeneutics. The standard intercultural approach has been the hermeneutical approach, but 
what are its potentials? And what are its limitations if brought to bear upon the contemporary 
situation of globalization?  
Oruka applies the individual-hermeneutical approach in his philosophic sagacity, but 
we need a specific intercultural hermeneutics under contemporary conditions of 
globalization. Hermeneutics, in all its etymological nuances, suggests a process of making 
intelligible what was once foreign and impenetrable. It refers to the art of explaining human 
phenomena by vicariously articulating what they mean for the actors who originally produced 
them. In contemporary times, hermeneutics has received a great deal of attention in the work 
of Martin Heidegger and, following him, Hans-Georg Gadamer. Heidegger’s conception of 
philosophical hermeneutics involves historicity and commitment to the existential horizon of 
one’s time. This is the central element of being-in-the world. Understanding, Heidegger 
intimates, serves as the basis of interpretation and is deeply related to one’s situation, but it is 
not closed in by one’s situation. Gadamer (1975), in his specific form of hermeneutics, argues 
that the various frameworks that have been invented or created by human beings over the 
course of their history (including all the arts and sciences) should constitute the objects of 
obvious and important, if comparatively less fundamental, hermeneutical or interpretative 
exercises. The frameworks are not just about symbolic communication but also about human 
life and existence. The element of theoretical and methodological transcendence 
(universality) evinced by Heidegger is absent from Gadamer’s approach. He mildly 
encourages us to have a self-consciously explicit appreciation of the fact that we all find 
ourselves in the world as products of specific historical, cultural, and intellectual contexts. 
Hermeneutics as ‘interpretation’ can certainly promote our understanding as well, of course, 
but always still for us as beings who have no choice but to continue to exist, to learn, to 
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understand, and perhaps even to struggle against or to overcome within these contexts. In 
other words, human understanding is always affected by, a consequence of, the various 
contexts in which it is sited. This implies that human understanding is always and inevitably 
interpretation, a rendering arising from the contexts of which it is a product and which it, in 
turn, may thereafter transform. 
Gadamer emphasizes the role of the past in constituting any present or future 
understanding. Any understanding whatsoever, he argues, is conditioned by the affections, 
concepts, and practices of the cultural heritage of the participants in conversation. He refers 
to this as ‘philosophical hermeneutics, whose concern is not what we do or what we ought to 
do, but whatever happens over and above our wanting and doing’(Gadamer 1975:xvi). 
Conscious that there is no idea or work of art that is ‘proposition-less’, Gadamer goes on to 
insist on the relevance of prejudice in the understanding process. Accordingly, he subscribes 
to Schleiermacher’s conviction that ‘understanding becomes a special task only when […] 
misunderstandings have arisen’ (ibid.158-159). He also maintains that the ‘recognition that 
all understanding inevitably involves some prejudice gives the hermeneutical problem its real 
thrust’ (ibid. 239).  
In Schleiermacher’s theory of interpretation (Schleiermacher 1977, 1998), he stresses 
the importance of the interpreter in the whole process of interpretation. The interpreter needs 
to understand the text before interpreting it. Understanding the text does not come only from 
reading it, but involves knowledge of the historical context of the text and the psychology of 
the author. This means that understanding a text comes from what is common by our use of 
language and what is distinctive to a particular author. Hence, understanding other cultures is 
not something we should take for granted; it entails openness towards the fact that our 
prejudices or deep-seated opinions may turn out to be erroneous upon serious scrutiny. This 
explains why Schleiermacher recommends a strict hermeneutic approach, as opposed to a lax 
one, towards our own prejudices in a bid to guarantee a just or fully adequate understanding. 
A strict hermeneutic practice may help the hermeneutist not to be lured into the temptation of 
other cultures from his/her position. 
Gadamer is aware that the negative side of the word ‘prejudice’ had been overstressed 
by the philosophers of the period of Enlightenment, who made human reason the one and 
only legitimate tribunal. For them, to achieve an adequate understanding of a subject matter, 
reason and method must be allied with one another against prejudice and authority. For 
Gadamer, this assertion is deceptive. In an attempt to rehabilitate prejudice (in both its bona 




It is not so much our judgement (about truth or value) as our prejudices that constitute 
our being. This is a provocative formulation, for I am using it to restore to its rightful 
place a positive concept of prejudice that was driven out of linguistic usage by the 
French and the English Enlightenment. It can be shown that the concept of prejudice 
did not originally have the meaning we have attached to it. Prejudices are not 
necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth. 
(Gadamer 1994:69) 
 
In Gadamer’s view, any hermeneutics necessarily involves a pre-understanding by the 
interpreter of the object. However, this pre-understanding, can change, because academic 
works of interpretation change, or owing to inherent cultural and political processes of 
change. This implies that hermeneutics is, finally, a never-ending process. Hermeneutics 
throws light on the object of research in ever-new ways, from an ever-shifting starting 
position. Hermeneutics, as elaborated by Gadamer, is an exercise in always re-defining 
ourselves in relation to the historical and cultural ‘Others’. In this sense, it is an indirect way 
of questioning ourselves, of attaining wisdom that can help in solving the practical dilemmas 
we encounter daily. This is quite similar to what Habermas (1984) thinks of hermeneutics. 
The human being as a subject can only have meaning and understand others in life when he 
interacts with other subjects. This interaction and understanding takes place in the sharing of 
intersubjective experiences. Through society and language, man gains a ‘pre-understanding’ 
of others in the quest for mutual self-understanding. 
In summary, the hermeneutics of Gadamer invites us to guard against the universal 
seclusion of philosophy from human reality. Any philosophy is an interpretation mediated by 
language, geography, and the cultural as well as the economic, social, and political realities 
that surround the human subject who engages in the interpretation, that explores the detail of 
existence. This implies that human existence and experience are universally applicable as a 
basis for interculturality. Hence, when Oruka limits African sagacity to language or concepts 
it gives the impression that this wisdom is stable and static, existing in a culturally and 
historically neutral environment. We need to move from an abstract ontology to a more 
practical, existential one, where the Dasein (Heidegger) or the singular person (Sartre) spread 
out to the whole of humanity and is not limited just to the individual. Moreover, Gadamer 
flaws the idea of analysing language in isolation from the particular social and historical 
contexts in which human beings use it. This is because language is so fundamental to being 
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human. It cannot be conceived of as an object on display in a museum. For Gadamer, 
language is like a living thing, a thing in process that is constantly adapting or being adapted 
to express new ideas, new understanding. Given that language is a means of understanding 
and communication, as we see in dialogue and conversation, this ensures that understanding 
is intersubjective rather than private. The contemporary African sage-philosopher is one who 
does not see wisdom as fixed or absolute but as something that is relative to a time and 
purpose and is thus ever changing. 
The views of African/Africanist philosophers on hermeneutics give the impression 
that humanity is separated in a plurality of domains, each separately constructed with a 
distinct identity. However, contemporary realities point to the contrary. Contemporary 
conditions of globalization increasingly point to the fact that no cultural situation is 
homogenous, and that cultural specificity can occur only by virtue of effective boundary 
management against an influx of other cultural alternatives. Intercultural hermeneutics will 
enable us deconstruct some of the monolithic, absolutist, and exclusivist tendencies inherent 
in all centrisms. It will involve intercultural dialogue to help us avoid the limitations of 
culture-bound hermeneutic traditions. This is because, as French philosopher Paul Ricoeur 
(1913–2005) argues, we can know others and ourselves better only through our relation with 
the world and our life with and among others in the world (Ricoeur 1969). Our search for 
wisdom and its contributions to this global age necessitates moving beyond borders. It will 
require going beyond the particular context in which our wisdom is acquired. It will be one 
that applies the dialectics of the emic and the etic. This intercultural encounter can make 
sense only if these dialectics are free from prejudicial and condescending tendencies. This is 
what I propose to discuss in the next section. 
 
8.3. Intercultural philosophy and the counter-hegemonic challenge 
Oruka’s conception of sagacity gives one the impression that the North Atlantic model of 
philosophizing is the only one and so has to be applied to Africa without any further revision. 
It also considers the European and subsequently North Atlantic example as incomparably 
superior to those in the rest of the world, and without historical debts to other continents. The 
entire project and method of Oruka’s philosophic sagacity reflects the increasingly popular 
approach to be found especially among modernist African philosophers. They think Western 
science and philosophy is rational, universal, and objective and that applying this method in 
the search for wisdom to contemporary Africa is not a hegemonic imposition. Foucault opens 
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our eyes to the rapport between power and knowledge, and how these are used as a form of 
social control through societal institutions. However, today this hegemonic perspective is 
increasingly becoming obsolete. Intercultural philosophy, on the other hand, makes us see 
that there is a need to avoid hegemonic, essentialist othering and ethnocentric constructions—
in critical awareness of the historical fact that the global North has, for centuries, sought to 
define itself by denying the global South.149 
Mudimbe (1988, 1994) provides us with a lucid picture of how Europe has built and 
celebrated its identity, statehood, and cultural and scientific achievements and denied these 
very exploits to Africans. This hegemonic submission of Africans and their life-worlds was 
evident during the colonial experience and is perpetuated today in racism.150 Mudimbe may 
sound pessimistic about the attempt by African intellectuals to deconstruct Eurocentric 
inventions when he observes: 
 
In these enterprises one notes a remarkable mediation between the rigor of a 
philosophical exercise and the fantasies of a political insurrection: the text commented 
upon is a mirror which reveals the self to the reader or commentator. (Mudimbe 
1988:43) 
 
Intercultural philosophy, on the other hand, permits us to formulate a critical 
reflection on the North Atlantic-dominated, hegemonic context in which African knowledge 
production takes place today. In this way, it can foster the expression of radical anti-
hegemonic alternatives. Intercultural philosophy is a communicative, dialogic form of 
knowledge production. It does not involve the model of a subject gaining knowledge about an 
object, but a model based on interaction and equality. Cultural biases and hegemony need to 
be erased from knowledge production. 
                                                 
149 Hegel, for example, denied Africa a proper place in the history of humanity. In 1965, British historian 
Trevor-Roper was even sceptical that there is any African history to teach. He claimed that all history taught by 
Africans is that of the Europeans in Africa—and the rest is darkness, which will never be a topic in history. 
Ironically, one of Trevor-Roper’s students, Terence Ranger, became one of the finest historians of Africa and 
contributed immensely to the creation of what his master claimed did not yet exist. 
150 The South Asians and Africans have taken up the counter-hegemonic challenge seriously—for example, by 
producing their own post-colonial theory, where ‘hegemony’ and ‘the subaltern’ are key concepts. To name 
some key figures: Césaire (1950); Memmi (1965); Fanon (1967a, 1967b); Nkrumah (1970); Said (1978); 
Bhabha (1986); Spivak (1987, 1988, 1990); Mudimbe (1988, 1994); and Mbembe (2001). 
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Moreover, contemporary mainstream North Atlantic philosophy itself has largely 
given up the possibility of a privileged vantage point from which to overlook the world and 
humanity objectively, dispassionately, and authoritatively. Nevertheless, contemporary 
African philosophy or any other philosophical tradition in the world cannot claim such a 
vantage position either. The intercultural philosophical perspective does not deny the validity 
of any particular philosophical perspective. What intercultural philosophy shuns is the 
tendency for any of the globally available philosophical perspectives to claim a monopoly on 
validity. Intercultural philosophy helps us see the hegemonic situation and discommends the 
imposition of Western standards of philosophy on the non-Western philosophical traditions. 
This will require exposing North Atlantic hegemony and condescension, on the one hand, and 
trying to situate Africa globally, on the other. This implies philosophical interaction between 
the North Atlantic and African and other globally available philosophical traditions. Hence, 
there is a need for African voices to correct the distortions so typical of Western intellectual 
appropriations of African life and thought. Even though this is typically expected to be an 
intellectual debate, waged in cities and universities far away from the villages and the poor 
urban compounds, we need the forceful input of oral-based local African thought. Oruka’s 
project and thesis reveals a wide range of inspirations in the search for African wisdom. Yet, 
his essential dilemma was that he was wedded to Western-style philosophy to such an extent 
that the regional and local qualities of African knowledges had to remain a declared 
possibility for him, but never became a tangible and lived, central reality. 
 
8.4. Crossing cultural boundaries with African wisdom traditions 
I submit in this section that Oruka’s fascination for the modernist brand of philosophy and its 
uncritical adaptation in his search for African wisdom also requires serious revision. This 
fascination and adaptation are hegemonic and condescending, as noted above. Will Oruka, 
and contemporary African philosophers, not derive anything of lasting intercontinental, nay 
global, value from African knowledge traditions? Did Africa receive only and not give 
anything suitable for intercultural knowledge production? Is the African position merely an 
invitation to take the North Atlantic hegemonic heritage with a slight pinch of salt, as Oruka 
implicitly does, but not to flavour it and augment it more radically with whatever world 
culture can learn from African knowledge traditions? 
Oruka’s adaptations of the North Atlantic model in his search for wisdom in 
traditional Africa realistically require major adaptations. This is understandable given his 
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inspiration from the dominant mainstream academic philosophical tradition of Western 
thought at the time. Yet, today’s realities, as we see in cultural globalization, which largely 
inspire the substance of intercultural philosophy, make us take a critical distance with the 
philosophy of Oruka. North Atlantic science cannot claim to have a monopoly on the truth. 
Intercultural mingling privileges border-crossing and subverts nationalism and identity 
politics. The growing awareness of globalization and cultural difference is not simply 
contradictory, but interdependent. Thus, ‘African’ sagacity should be conceived as 
compatible with and transferable into other cultural orientations. This is an active step ahead, 
as opposed to the mere passive acceptance of a plurality of life-worlds and resigning oneself 
to the non-negotiability of that plurality. 
Hence, in order for contemporary African/Africanist philosophers to make a tangible 
contribution to the development of philosophy, they ought to be forcibly counter-hegemonic 
rather than resigning themselves to marginal revisionism. The latter is often the position of 
peripheral powerlessness, to which the global system condemns African thinkers today. 
African thinkers also need to engage in a balancing act between African essentialism and a 
globalizing or universalizing detachment, between deconstruction and affirmation, between 
Africa and the rest of the world. The contemporary African philosopher needs to avoid such 
hegemonic assault by exploring and projecting the potential relevance of comparative 
Africanist models in a global perspective. Oruka does not exclusively project the life-worlds, 
the cosmologies, the languages, the day-to-day struggles and the pastimes, the religious, 
artistic, culinary, and sexual expressions, the political and legal institutions, and so on of 
African people, whose lives are greatly affected, even though not completely determined, by 
these various factors. The anti-hegemonic and comparative Africanist in the context of 
globalization will enable the contemporary African philosopher to explore and throw 
additional light on the specifically traditional African forms of expressing wisdom.  
Finally, in our global age the intercultural philosopher needs to address the issue of an 
intercultural epistemology. It will consist in systematizing local wisdom so that it becomes 
intelligible in other cultural orientations. The intelligibility of local wisdom becomes a 
condition sine qua non for its share ability. This converging epistemological foundation can 
help inspire new ideas, enrich our perception of life-worlds, and ensure our collective 
survival. Hence, if we conceive of intercultural epistemology, we do not need to rely 
exclusively on those epistemologies determined by North Atlantic intellectual traditions. This 
implies taking African and other global epistemologies seriously. Van Binsbergen sums up 




Anyway, the task of intercultural epistemology is not to solve the riddles of the world, 
but to call attention to the world-wide diversity of approaches vis-à-vis those riddles, 
other people’s promising attempts at such resolution, and to help create an 
intercultural framework within which these can be appreciated. (van Binsbergen 
2003:278) 
 
Throughout this work, I have been exploring Oruka’s philosophic sagacity, showing 
rationality in indigenous African philosophy. For Oruka, philosophic sagacity is better placed 
than the other trends he identifies in contemporary African philosophy. I propose intercultural 
philosophy as a viable approach for contemporary African philosophy in the current 
globalizing framework. Oruka postulates philosophic sagacity—a reflection of some 
individuals in a given ‘culture’; yet, such a conception of culture is highly problematic, as it 
bases itself on boundaries that are gradually eroding in our global context. In his conception 
of intercultural philosophy, van Binsbergen chides the North Atlantic anthropological 
concept of culture that is applied to African philosophy without further revision. Cultures do 
not exist (at least, not any more) in the sense of closed, discrete bounded units. What exists in 
contemporary conditions of globalization is a plurality of overlapping cultural orientations. 
With sangoma wisdom, van Binsbergen leads us to see that culture is not tied to a place. In 
interpreting and naming the 16 possible combinations of the sangoma tablets, he shows us 
that they are similar to 10th century Arabian magic and to the Chinese I Ching, whose 
astrological implications had been elaborated much earlier in Babylonia. Crossing cultural 
boundaries with healing and knowledge production make us see that the boundaries between 
the seemingly unrelated therapy and knowledge systems across the world are relative and 
porous. In addition to their being rooted in the shared experience of the human body and 
mind, to some degree they share a common inspiration and intellectual past. Moreover, 
African philosophy today is largely tributary to the North Atlantic academic philosophical 
tradition, which is a hegemonic imposition in the political, ideological, economic, and 
cultural domains. In his conception of sagacity, Oruka implicitly, but not explicitly, counters 
this hegemony. His individual philosophic sages must resemble Western sages and revel in 
the North Atlantic philosophical tradition. Van Binsbergen’s vision of sangoma wisdom goes 
beyond asserting African wisdom through the eyes of North Atlantic science. He does not 
just interview wise people as Oruka does, but he tries to look for wiser ways of helping them 
go through their daily problems. Hence, when he becomes a diviner-priest, he uses this 
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wisdom for healing and transformation of individual and collective lives. In contrast to 
Oruka, who limits sagacity to abstract thinking (sophia), it would be more rewarding to 
broaden African wisdom to practical matters (phronesis). This practical approach to wisdom 
contributes to an intercultural therapy, to health and psychological assistance nearer to 
people’s experiential and existential lives. We need to blend both sophia and phronesis for a 
richer African sagacity. We also need to blend the emic and etic approaches in our quest for 
sagacity. Moreover, we cannot claim, as Oruka does, that African sagacity is uniquely 
African. African sagacity has benefitted from its contacts with other wisdom traditions. We 
see that in the answers Oruka’s sages in Kenya give when they are interviewed.  
The principal challenge facing the African philosopher today lies in his/her ability to 
engage in a balancing act, between deconstruction and affirmation, between African 
essentialism and globalizing or universalizing detachment, and between Africa and the world. 
African philosophy should not be conceived of as just an abstract and academic undertaking 
with no bearing on African life today as Oruka implies. A new African philosophy should be 
one that consistently seeks to contribute to solving individual and collective predicaments. In 
this way we incorporate both the theoretical and practical side of wisdom in a bid to activate 
human virtue. This will require an African philosophy that remains close to the everyday 
experience of people living in historical communities, who are trying to conceive of and 
understand the world close to them, to face both domestic and outside threats. Even though 
these modes of thought may have stood out emphatically as foreign imports, they have had a 
lasting and powerful effect upon the modern transformation of African lives. The wisdom of 
intercultural mediation and negotiation remains quite a fundamental and promising challenge 
of our time. We must affirm local wisdom in African cultural domains, but we should also 
find ways to negotiate these local wisdoms into a wider context in a bid to contribute to other 
global wisdom traditions.  
 
Mudimbe (2005) asserts that in spite of the diversity and variety inherent in African 
philosophy and beyond the sterile debate on its ‘existence’ or ‘inexistence’, what affirms 
itself amazingly is simply the vocation of something called philosophy. In his mind, this 
philosophy actualizes itself as a perpetual récommencement (an on-going process).In this 
case, I would propose a redefinition and re-articulation of sagacity in the globalized 
intercultural context. Such sagacious knowledge ought to be fluid and flexible, rather than 
fixed and unchanging. Beyond all facile solutions, beyond all limited horizons imposed upon 
us by anthropologists, we must have courage and make a fresh intercultural start. This will 
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imply an intercultural philosophy that enriches and promotes a hegemony-free interaction of 
cultural orientations, in a bid to complement each other for our collective survival. This is an 
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